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I defend a non-traditional version of sentimentalism about normative reasons for action. 
I agree with traditional Humeans, such as Blackburn and Schroeder, that desires, or, 
more broadly, sentiments, are necessary for normative reasons. However, instead of 
providing a traditional explanation for this necessity (i.e. instead of saying that I have a 
good reason to do something only if it promotes some desire of mine), I argue that 
sentiments are necessary for mastering evaluative concepts, and these concepts, in turn, 
are necessary for having (access to) normative reasons.
In Chapter 1, I show that reasoning alone, understood as coherence and consistency, 
cannot help us in discovering what we have a good reason to do. There are at least two 
equally consistent courses of action for a given choice, so one should be equally 
motivated to do them. What is missing is evaluation, but reasoning alone fails to 
provide it.
In Chapter 2, I argue, following Quinn and Scanlon, that Humeanism has a problem 
with normativity: intuitively, it creates reasons where there are none. Just because I 
want to do something silly, it does not make it any less silly. I argue that to overcome 
the problem one should admit that desires don't create normative reasons directly, but 
via providing mastery of evaluative concepts, which then figure in our evaluations.
In Chapter 3, I look at empirical evidence, such as psychopathy and damage to 
ventromedial prefrontal sector of the brain. Patients with these conditions exhibit 
emotional deficiencies as well as practical irrationality. I conclude that the best 
explanation of some empirical evidence is the postulation of a link between sentiments 
and evaluations.
In Chapter 4, I demonstrate that evaluative concepts are a species of phenomenal 
concept. Someone who has never experienced colours lacks mastery of colour concepts; 
similarly, someone who has never had sentiments lacks mastery of evaluative concepts. 
I argue that this lack of mastery of evaluative concepts is important because such a 
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We do things, and often for good reasons. What sort of creatures do we have to be in 
order for this to happen? This is the question I aim to answer in what follows. The are 
several traditional answers to this question. The main division between them is whether 
they emphasize the rational or the emotional side of agents. Various kinds of 
Kantianism exemplify the first type of answer, whilst sentimentalist theories, such as 
Humeanism (Blackburn 1998, Schroeder 2007) and sensibility theories (McDowell 
1978 and 1979) exemplify the second. In order to illustrate the difference, I introduce a 
perfectly rational alien who possesses no emotions as all, and call him Mr Spock, 
borrowing a name of a similar character from the science fiction series Star Trek. 
According to Kantians, Mr Spock is an agent: he can act, and do so for a good reason. 
Not so for sentimentalists: they say that an emotional faculty is also needed in order to 
act for good reasons. The theory I propose is a sentimentalist one: in order to be an 
agent, one must be both a rational and an emotional creature. In order to act for good 
reasons, I must be able to evaluate actions. These evaluations contain evaluative 
concepts. In this thesis, I argue that it is impossible to master these concepts without 
experiencing sentiments.
I start, in Chapter 1, by showing that reasoning alone fails to provide evaluations. 
Theories that emphasize rational capacities often have a problem with motivation. I 
argue that the problem goes deeper – in fact, a purely formal rationalism (one that 
emphasizes consistency) also faces a normative problem: it cannot explain why one 
consistent course of action should be preferred over another, equally consistent one.
My theory – I shall call it 'indirect sentimentalism' – is different from sentimentalist 
theories currently on offer, as I explain in Chapter 2. There, I acknowledge the force of 
criticisms levelled at sentimentalists, and show how my theory accommodates them. 
Traditional sentimentalists have a problem in explaining normativity: they move from 'I 
want to do x' to 'I should do x'; they hold that I have a good reason to do whatever 
promotes my desires. But, as their opponents have emphasized, just wanting to do 
something gives me no good reason to do it. I deal with this problem by denying that 
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sentiments give one normative reasons directly. Rather, sentiments enable me to master 
evaluative concepts. These concepts then figure in my evaluations, and evaluations 
either constitute my normative reasons (if values are not real) or represent them (if 
values are real). So, my normative reasons are tied to my evaluations, not directly to 
sentiments. I then spell out the role that sentiments play in mastery of evaluative 
concepts, in part by making an analogy with phenomenal concepts of colour 
experience. Someone who is colour-blind, for example, does not have mastery of colour 
concepts. Her colour judgements may be extensionally correct (she may be able to say 
what colour objects are if she were to measure the wavelengths of reflected light, for 
example), yet, intuitively, she is missing something. Similarly, someone who has never 
had sentiments lacks mastery of evaluative  concepts, even though her evaluations may 
be extensionally correct. The thesis that sentiments are necessary for evaluations is 
supported by empirical evidence, as I show in Chapter 3. This chapter is devoted to 
discussion of cases when one's sentiments are abnormal, which leads to abnormalities 
in evaluations and in patterns of intentional action. I argue that the best way to explain 
the pattern of action found in some of these conditions is to accept a sentimentalist 
theory.
In Chapter 4, I argue for my thesis – that sentiments are necessary for mastery of 
evaluative concepts – by drawing on the work done in philosophy of mind. I show that 
a creature like Mr Spock, a rational alien who lacks emotions, might have extensionally 
correct evaluations, yet lacks mastery of evaluative concepts. This means that Spock 
cannot respond to normative reasons. I have two arguments for this claim. The first 
argument relies on conclusions reached in Chapter 1: reasoning alone fails to provide 
evaluations. The second argument spells out the link between sentiments and 
evaluations. I shall not argue for this link directly, rather, my tactic will be to remove 
reasons for disbelieving that such a link exists. I show that traditional reservations one 
may have against sentiment-based theories do not apply to my weakly sentimentalist 
account. Hence, we have no reason to resist the idea that sentiments are necessary for 
mastery of evaluative concepts.
I am not taking a metaphysical stance in this thesis: good reasons, or values, for all I 
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know, may be objective or subjective, or they may not exist. My aim here is to show 
that sentiments are necessary for agency, whatever metaphysics of values one cares to 
adopt. They are necessary for agency because our ability to have normative reasons (if 
values are not real) or to respond to them (if values are real) depends on sentiments.
To recapitulate, my aim in this thesis is to say what agents must be like, and to explain 
why. In answering this question, I argue against a formal Kantian theory, which says 
that agents do not need sentiments, and point out a mistake in the traditional 
explanation of why sentiments are needed. I show that sentiments are necessary for 
(access to) normative reasons for action not because of the promotion relation, but 
because of conceptual mastery.
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Chapter 1. Rationalism
Part I. Why Reasoning Alone Can't Make Us Act for Good 
Reasons
1. Introduction
It is often said that rationalist theories of action, such as Kantianism, whilst explaining 
normativity, cannot explain motivation. In this chapter, I argue that Kantianism has a 
problem explaining normativity as well, and it is this failure that gives rise to the 
problem with motivation. This is the task of the first part of the chapter. In the second 
part, I explain why Kantianism is appealing, and argue that its opponents can retain this 
appeal. There are many forms of Kantianism, and here I consider only its formal 
version, as exemplified by O'Neil (1985). I also discuss Smith's (1994) theory, which, 
one may say, is not purely Kantian, but rationalist.
In the first part of the chapter, I argue that reasoning alone fails to provide evaluations, 
and hence fails to motivate. This is because reasoning alone tells us only what is 
consistent and what is not, which is insufficient for motivation. First, I explain how 
reasoning alone can be thought to motivate: you are motivated to do something when 
your proposed course of action conforms to the Categorical Imperative, which works 
by detecting inconsistencies. If there is no inconsistency, then, according to Kantianism, 
you have a good reason to act as proposed (section 2). Then I pose a problem for the 
Kantian view by showing that reasoning fails to provide evaluations, and thus leaves us 
without a definite course of action (subsection 3.1). I then consider two ways in which a 
Kantian may try to show that reasoning provides evaluations, and argue that they are 
inadequate (subsections 3.2 and 3.3).
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2. A Kantian theory
2.1. Reason and reasons: a disambiguation
There is an unfortunate homonymy in English. 'Reason' can refer to either the process 
of reasoning or to a reason to do to something, as in 'He left because it was late'. 
Hume's contention that reason is the slave of the passions is about the process of 
reasoning (1738-1740, 2.3.3, pp. 413-418). When he argues for this claim, he takes 
reason to be 'that which judges truth and falsehood' (Ibid., p. 417), a faculty that 
discovers relations between ideas and causal connections between objects. How does 
this faculty relate to what we have reasons to do? Let me illustrate. I like chocolate and 
I think that is a good reason to get it. Here my liking provides me with a reason for 
action which is most definitely a Humean one. A Kantian would agree so far. But she 
would add that there is another type of reasons to do things, reached through the 
process of reasoning alone. If your proposed course of action conforms to the the rules 
of reasoning (for example, to the Categorical Imperative), then, according to 
Kantianism, you have a good reason to act as proposed. The debate between Kantians 
and Humeans is defined by the answer to the question: can reasoning alone provide 
reasons for action? Kantians answer yes, Humeans – no. A Humean contends that 
reasoning alone does not give one reasons for action.
There is a wide dissatisfaction with Humean, or, more broadly, sentimentalist theories. 
The main reason for this dissatisfaction is that our sentiments are contingent – they 
could have been other than what they are – which makes morality contingent. If 
responding to good reasons is impossible without having sentiments, and if morality 
gives us reasons to behave morally, then someone who lacks the requisite sentiment has 
no reason to act morally. This worries the opponents of sentimentalism: surely, they 
say, everyone has a reason to be moral, and cruel and insensitive people are no 
exception. There are also worries connected specifically to Humeanism: in putting 
motivation first, it fails to explain why I have a good reason to do something. Problems 
for sentimentalism will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, but for now I register 
them as a prima facie reason to seek an alternative. The alternative is a rationalist one. 
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Rationalists (e.g. Kant 1785 and 1788, Korsgaard 1996, O'Neill 1985) claim that 
sentiments are not the only source of motivation; reasoning is capable of motivating 
without help.
So, how can reasoning alone motivate?1 It motivates, Kant says, when we find that our 
proposed plan of action obeys the Categorical Imperative (hereafter CI) 'Act only on 
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law.' (1785, 4:421, italics in original).2 For example:3
(1.1) I intend to make a false promise.
(1.2) Universalize this: everyone makes a false promise.
(1.3) If (1.2), then no one would believe a promise, i.e. the practice of making 
promises ceases to exist.
(1.4) If (1.3), then I can't make a promise.
(1.5) If (1.4), then, a fortiori, I can't make a false promise.
The proposed course of action – make a false promise – is not consistently 
universalizable. The opposite course – always make true promises – is universalizable. 
Being universalizable is a feature of a good reason, so, if I find that my proposed action 
is consistent when universalized, I, as someone who cares about acting for good 
reasons, will have motivation to act on it (Kant 1785, 4:390.) This is how reasoning 
provides motivation.
Two notes about the CI are in order. First, Kant is not a consequentialist. It may seem 
that Kant is saying that I cannot rationally want the practice of promising to stop 
because of the bad consequences  this will bring. This is what Singer (1961, pp. 261-
275) takes Kant to mean. I think that's wrong. The CI test works on rational 
1 I am very grateful to Dr John Callanan, Michael Campbell, and to the audience at King's College 
London Advanced Research Seminar for the comments that lead me to understand Kantian theory 
better.
2 A disclaimer: it is not my  concern to reconstruct the views that Kant himself has held. Rather, I am 
interested in a theory that claims motivational power to reasoning alone, as defended, for example, by 
O'Neill (1985) and Smith (1994).
3 My discussion of the CI follows O'Neill (1985).
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consistency, without taking the consequences into account. The point is not that I, or 
most people, won't want a world without promises. The point rather is that my proposed 
action is inconsistent when universalized: in a world where false promising is universal, 
the institution of promising does not exist, so I can't make a promise. Secondly, we 
must be clear what the CI is intended to preclude. It does not rule out the possibility of 
acting on motivating reasons: if you made a false promise, you would have acted for a 
(motivating) reason. The CI is meant to preclude you from doing what you have no 
good reason to do. If you don't care about acting for good, i.e. normative, reasons, go 
ahead and make a false promise; but if you do, you should not violate the CI, because, 
according to Kant, it tells us what good reasons are like – they must be universalizable.
At this point some may worry that the CI test does not get off the ground. It seems that 
we need sentiments in order to make plans. If we lack them, we lack a plan which can 
be submitted to the CI test. Reasoning needs the material it can work with: it is only 
once I want to do such and such that I can apply the CI to the proposed plan of action. 
We can make this worry more explicit with an example. Mr Spock is a perfectly 
rational alien who lacks sentiments. If the CI applies to all rational beings, it should 
apply to Spock. But what would Spock do? Will he recognize any possibilities as 
possibilities for action? Will he make a plan? A Humean says he won't, and it is 
tempting to agree. A purely rational agent initially seems like a Kantian ideal, but she 
may fail to be an agent at all. To use Blackburn’s snappy characterisation '[w]ithout 
emotions the will is rudderless' (Blackburn 1998, p. 131).
This worry is easily allayed. A Kantian theory is a theory of normative reasons only. 
We can leave initial motivation to sentiments, but if we want to know whether we have 
a good reason to act as motivated, we apply the CI. O'Neill is explicit about this, and, 
perhaps surprisingly, she agrees with Blackburn that the will is rudderless without 
emotions and desires:
The categorical imperative provides a way of testing the moral acceptability of 
what we propose to do. It does not aim to generate plans of action for those who 
have none. (O'Neill 1985, p. 259.)
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It seemed that the CI applied to any agent simply in virtue of her rationality, so it 
would apply to Spock. But a Kantian may insist that the CI procedure, although it 
does apply in virtue of rationality, was not designed with Spock in mind. It was 
meant to provide a guide for agents like us. Sometimes we fail to act for good 
reasons because our desires lead us astray. At other times we fail to act for good 
reasons because we are imperfectly rational, as when we fail to remember some 
relevant fact and include it in our deliberation. Spock, if an agent at all, will not 
be led astray or fall victim to irrationality. His agency will be utterly unlike ours, 
reminding rather that of a holy will (Kant 1785, 4:414). For such a will the CI is 
not a demand. Its possessor does not have to go through the CI test to find out 
whether it has a good reason to do such and such; being perfectly rational, it 
would already know. The CI does not apply to Spock because Spock does not 
need it, but it is helpful to creatures like us. I am an agent, i.e. someone who cares 
to act for good reasons. Suppose I have a plan of action prompted by some 
Humean considerations. I then universalize it. If it can be universalized 
consistently, then I have a good reason to do it. The recognition that I have a good 
(i.e. consistently universalizable) reason motivates me:
for if any action is to be morally good, it is not enough that it should conform to 
the moral law – it must also be done for the sake of the moral law … .(Kant 1785, 
4:390, italics in original.)
We have seen how reasoning is meant to provide motivation. As an agent, I care to act 
for good reasons, the CI tells me which reasons are good, so I am motivated to act on 
those. In the next section, I pose a problem for this idea.
3. Why reasoning alone can't make us act for good reasons
  
3.1. Inconsistency vs. evaluation
Blackburn's argument
As we have seen above, the CI is meant to tell me which reasons are good reasons, and 
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it works by detecting inconsistencies. But detecting inconsistencies is not the same as 
providing evaluation (and hence motivation) that is necessary for action. It is a fairly 
uncontroversial assumption that if I act rationally, I have evaluated a course of action. 
Suppose I believe that education is a good thing. It is this evaluative belief that gives 
me a normative reason to pursue a degree.4 This is a natural description, but one that is 
unavailable if we think of normative reasons in terms of universalization. Some plans 
of action are consistent when universalized, but what about the evaluation of such 
plans? Let me illustrate by an example from Blackburn (1998, pp. 217-220). Suppose I 
intend to pay my credit card off every month. If everyone did that, then banks will not 
offer credit cards (they are only offered because some people don't pay them off, so 
banks charge them and make a profit). If there were no credit cards, I could not intend 
to pay mine off. My intention to pay off the credit card every month results in 
inconsistency, and hence, according to the CI test, I have no good reason to do this. In 
fact, since not paying off credit cards on time can be universalized consistently, I have a 
good reason to do that. But, intuitively, there is a very good reason to pay off credit 
cards: one avoids debt.
One may object that the examples are different.5 If false promising is universalized, we 
can't make sense of the concept of promising at all, because it is essential to promising 
that I intend to do as I say (at least at the time of the promise). When I say 'I promise to 
be at the party.', I don't merely raise the probability of going. I am communicating my 
intention to be there. If I am not doing that, then I don't really understand what 
promising is. Someone who makes a false promise fails to have the intention, and, since 
promising involves intending to do as promised, is inconsistent. Compare this with 
credit cards. If paying off credit cards is universalized, we can still make sense of this 
concept, because it is not essential that credit cards are offered for profit. All we 
4 For reasons discussed in Velleman (1992), the evaluation that motivates me may not always be a 
positive one. Velleman denies that agents are always motivated by the good. His counter-examples 
are Satan, who is motivated by the bad, and depressives, who recognize the good, but are not 
motivated by it. This is not a problem for my proposal that reasoning alone fails to provide 
evaluations. Even if we accept what Velleman says, there is still a contrast between evaluations and 
inconsistencies that my argument rests on. My claim is that any evaluation, positive or negative, is 
not provided by reasoning alone. Satan may be motivated by the bad, as long as he does not work out 
which things are bad just through the process of reasoning. Depressives may fail to be motivated, 
because evaluations are necessary, but not sufficient for motivation.
5 This objection is due to Dr John Callanan.
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understand by 'credit card' is a card which allows you to spend the money you don't yet 
have in your account. A charity, say, can offer credit cards and not charge people if they 
fall behind in their repayments. There is no inconsistency in that. The only 
inconsistency we can get with credit cards, it seems, will be having a card that does not 
enable you to spend money you don't yet possess, since what we mean by 'credit card' is 
the card that gives you precisely this ability.
Blackburn responds that when we promise something we don't mean that we intend to 
keep the promise at any cost. We only mean that we won't change our mind for a trivial 
reason. For example, it is acceptable to break a promise of buying some bread if my car 
broke down, and the nearest bakery is miles away (1998, pp. 219-220). Some Kantians 
agree it may be acceptable to break a promise.6 For example, we tolerate breaking a 
promise of going to the party in order to look after a sick friend. This shows that it may 
be consistent to break a promise.7 But it does not show that it is consistent to intend to 
make a false promise. In making a promise I presuppose the intention of keeping it. 
This is just what 'promising' means. So, intending to keep the promise is essential to our 
concept of promising, whilst being offered for profit is not essential to our concept of 
credit cards. Thus, Blackburn's example fails to show that bad reasons are 
universalizable, because it does not do justice to what we ordinarily mean.8
6 Kant himself disagrees (1797). He thinks that there are 'perfect duties' – duties that can never be 
violated – and keeping promises and telling the truth are among those. If a murderer comes to your 
door asking whether his intended victim is in, and the victim happens to be at your house, you should 
tell the truth. This, indeed, is an implication of Kant's theory. It is natural to say that we are permitted 
to lie in exceptional circumstances. But being in exceptional circumstances does not remove the 
inconsistency, which means, according to Kantianism, that one still does not have a good reason to 
lie. So we could use Kant's own example, instead of Blackburn's, to show that the CI fails to give one 
intuitively good reasons for action.
7 There is a problem here: how do we distinguish between the circumstances which let me off fulfilling 
the promise and the ones which don't? Kantians might say that it is all contained in our concept, but 
I'm not sure. Some reasons, like looking after a sick friend, are clearly overriding. Some, like simply 
not feeling like it, are not. But there are plenty of cases in-between, and in some of them our 
intuitions may be hazy. Thus, Kantians may have a problem in distinguishing between the 
circumstances which let me off and the ones that don't. But maybe we can sharpen our concepts so 
that there are no vague cases, so this problem is not as serious as the one discussed in the main text 
below. The latter problem arises for any concept, vague or not.
8 As Prof. Pink pointed out, this objection to Blackburn's example is off the mark. Our concept of 
promising does not require that I have the intention of keeping my promise, but only that I represent 
myself as having such an intention. I shall, however, continue with an example different from 
Blackburn's – the example of our concept of marriage – as it allows for easier construction of 




Blackburn's example makes us appreciate an important point: whilst detecting 
inconsistencies, reasoning alone fails to provide evaluations. We could agree it is 
essential to the concept of promising that I intend to do as promised. But we can ask: is 
it the concept we should have? After we worked out what our concepts are, we still 
have two options: either we can keep the concepts as they are, and reject the proposed 
course of action as inconsistent, or we can change our concepts and go ahead as 
planned. Reasoning alone is silent about which of the alternatives we should take: it 
does not provide a motivation to do one over the other. And so it fails to tell us what to 
do, fails to tell us what a good course of action is: it tells us that as long as both courses 
are equally consistent, they are both equally good.
Let me illustrate with two examples. Suppose we run the CI test on the concept of 
marriage.
(1.6) Being already married, I want to marry someone else as well.
(1.7) Universalize this: everyone who is already married gets married again.
(1.8) If (1.7), then the practice of getting married ceases to exist. (This is 
because we pledge exclusivity when we marry.)
(1.9) If (1.8), then I can't get married.
(1.10) If (1.9), then, a fortiori, I can't get married to someone else as well.
Suppose we run some more CI tests, and suppose they reveal that our concept of 
marriage is such that marriage is only possible between one man and one woman at a 
time. This is the concept we have. So, I can either accept the current concept of 
marriage, and not get married to two people at once. Or I can decide that our current 
concept is too restrictive, and hence I can get married to one more person. Of course, I 
cannot change what we mean by 'marriage' single-handedly. But I can campaign for 
change, and marry two people as an example for others to follow. Whether I succeed in 
changing the concept is an empirical question, but trying to do so is not precluded by 
reasoning. Whatever the CI tests reveal about our concepts, we have a choice: we can 
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either accept the concepts as revealed by the tests, or we can decide to change the 
concepts. Reasoning alone does not tell us which we should do. Blackburn's response 
was vulnerable to the objection: this is not what we ordinarily mean by 'promise' or 
'marriage'. Mine is not. I agree that the CI may help us understand what we mean by, 
say, 'promising'. But it does not tell us whether we should change what we mean, and 
whether this change will make a better course of action available. This gets us to 
Blackburn's point – that the CI does not tell us what good reasons are. But it avoids the 
objection that anti-Kantians fail to appreciate what we ordinarily mean by 'promising'.
One may object that reasoning does more than detect inconsistencies, since there 
are some clear cases when we are motivated to do something after deliberation. 
So let's go through another example, which does not specifically rely on the CI, 
but resembles a process of ordinary moral reasoning (Smith 2004, pp. 269-270). 
Ann wants to give an equal amount of money to Bill and Bob, but less to Charlie. 
Ann can ask herself why she wants this. On reflection, she finds that she wants to 
give x amount of money to Bob and x amount of money to Bill because they are 
in desperate need, and one should help such people. And she thinks that Charlie is 
in desperate need as well. So, her belief that people in desperate need should get 
x is inconsistent with her belief that Charlie should get x minus y. In other words, 
she realizes she has no justification for treating Charlie differently. In order to 
avoid inconsistency, she changes her belief that Charlie should get x minus y, and 
she acts on it by giving all three people concerned an equal amount. This seems 
to be a clear case when reasoning leads to a definite course of action.
This, however, is not the only reasonable course of action Ann may take. Ann 
notices that her beliefs are inconsistent, but there are two ways to correct this. 
Ann can either reject the belief that Charlie should get less than the others. Or she 
can reject the belief that we should help those in desperate need:
Consistency I
Specific belief: Ann believes that Charlie, Bob and Bill are in need, and that she 
should give an equal amount of money to each of them.
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General belief: Ann believes that she should help people in need.
Consistency II
Specific belief: Ann believes that Charlie, Bob and Bill are in need, and that she 
should give no money to any of them.
General belief: Ann believes that people should fend for themselves. 
A rationalist must show that reaching consistency in the first way is more 
reasonable.9 Why should we privilege the general belief over the specific ones? 
Maybe because of explanatory priority: the general belief explains the specific 
ones, so Ann should retain it, and specific ones should change to accommodate 
the explanation. If there is a conflict, Ann should get rid of her belief that Charlie 
should get less, not of a general belief that anyone in need should be helped. This 
answer faces the same problem as a second-order desire theory faces. The 
proponent of a second-order desire theory, Frankfurt (1971), latches onto the fact 
that we sometimes don't want to desire what we happen to desire. For example, 
an unwilling addict wants the drug, but also wants not to have this desire: he has a 
second-order desire about the first-order one. So, Frankfurt tells us, second-order 
desires are the sensible ones, nothing less than our values. The problem with this 
is that second-order desires are not qualitatively different from first-order ones: 
there is nothing preventing one from having sensible first-order desires and 
paranoid second-order ones. So, in our case, Ann's first-order beliefs can be 
moral, but her second-order belief can be vicious. For example, Ann may start 
with a belief that she won't help either Bill or Bob because she has a general 
belief that people, even the ones in desperate need, should fend for themselves. In 
spite of this, she finds herself wanting to help Charlie. Being a reasonable person 
that she is, she realizes that her wanting to help him is inconsistent with her more 
general belief that people should fend for themselves. So, she still reaches 
consistency in the second way.
9 Smith accepts elsewhere that we have two options (2004, pp. 313-314). He says that one is rationally 
required either to get a desire in line with one's belief or to abandon the belief. Continuing with our 
example, Ann has two rationally permissible options: she must either acquire a desire to give the 
same amount to Charlie as she give to Bill and Bob, or she must abandon the belief that she should 
help people in need. This does not help the rationalist – surely, we want to say, Ann must go for the 
first option.
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One may object that Ann must have some other reasons not to reach consistency 
in the second way. She should not have the nasty belief that everyone should fend 
for themselves. I agree that she should not; but my opponent must say more than 
'it is bad that Ann has this belief'. A rationalist must say that Ann can get rid of 
this nasty belief through reasoning alone. Here is another way Kantians can try to 
do this. They may agree that second-order beliefs don't help here, but higher order 
beliefs might. If Ann gets to a general enough belief that any agent must accept 
on pain of irrationality, she will find a reason not to reach consistency in the 
second way. She will see that rationality requires her to help others. That is, we 
are back with the CI. Let's see how an appeal to it can help. The case of helping 
others as obligatory is spelt out by Onora O'Neill (1985, pp. 275-278):
(1.11) As an agent, I am committed to the possibility of action.
(1.12) Some of my actions require help of others as a means of fulfilling them.
(1.13) In willing those actions I must will to be helped (I must intend the means 
to my end).
(1.14) If I universalize the non-helping maxim, everyone (including myself) is 
not helped.
(1.15) So, I will both that I am helped (1.13) and I am not (1.14), which is 
contradictory.
If this argument works, then Ann should get rid of her belief that no one should 
be helped. She should acquire a belief to the contrary, and provide help where 
possible. 
But the argument does not work. Whilst (1.11) is conceptually true (an agent must 
be committed to the possibility of some action), (1.12) refers to a subset of 
possible actions: namely, the actions that require that I am helped. But we do not 
have to commit to the possibility of those actions. O'Neill admits as much:
It is not a fundamental requirement of practical reason that there should be means 
available to whatever projects agents adopt, but only that they should not have 
ruled out all action. (O'Neill 1985, p. 276.)
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So, nothing prevents me from ruling out actions which involve help from others: 
as long as there are some actions leftover, I am not inconsistent. And there would 
be actions leftover, especially if I count some mental activities as actions – 
judging, deciding and choosing are likely candidates. Unless we are willing to say 
that there is no mental agency, the CI does not establish that I am inconsistent in 
refusing to help others. So it does not prevent Ann from reaching the second way 
of having consistent attitudes. We find once again that reasoning alone fails to 
provide evaluations. It only alerts us to inconsistencies, but, like a reductio 
argument, it does not (by itself) tell us which premise is at fault.
Kantians say that the CI identifies good reasons, and we, as rational agents, are 
motivated by those. But I have argued that because the CI detects inconsistencies, it 
tells us what our ordinary concepts are. In doing so, it leaves us with an alternative: 
accept current concepts and follow the CI, or change what we mean and follow the 
course of action that was inconsistent under old concepts. Reasoning alone does not say 
which of these we have a good reason to do. So, it has not been shown that the CI 
motivates on its own. We need evaluations, and reasoning alone does not provide those. 
Almost everyone agrees that deliberation can help us work out what to do. (Hume is an 
exception. He thinks that passions are not representational states, and reasoning deals 
only in representations. Hence, reason and passions simply can't talk to each other. 
(Hume 1739-1740, pp. 415-416.) Neo-Humeans don't take this view.) What is at issue 
is explaining how reasoning can tell us what to do on its own.
So, reasoning alone fails to tell us what to do: for each option, it seems that we have 
two equally consistent ways of acting, and reasoning alone fails to select between 
them.10 We need evaluations, and they are different from requirements of consistency. A 
rationalist may object at this point that we get this result only because I have adopted an 
unfairly restrictive conception of rationality: there is more to it than coherence and 
consistency. This is not a problem for two reasons. First, I agree that the rationalist 
picture I am attacking is a very formal one. Yet, it is held by authors such as O'Neill 
(1985) and Smith (1994). They clearly do think that an appeal to consistency can 
10  This paragraph is due to my discussion with members of the audience at the Third Annual Dutch 
Conference on Practical Philosophy, October 2011, Amsterdam.
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explain how we respond to good reasons. Secondly, I think that a certain formalism is a 
necessary feature of a paradigmatic rationalist theory, i.e. a theory that emphasizes 
reasoning over emotions. A rationalist theory may be modified to accommodate my 
objections, but I have difficultly seeing how this can be done without making the theory 
less rationalistic. I have attacked a fairly formal theory of practical reasoning. Most 
theories, which I cannot discuss here in detail, are not that extreme, and agree that one's 
sentiments do play a role in responding to good reasons.11 I have chosen Kantianism for 
two reasons. First, because it spells out in considerable detail how one works out 
whether one have a good reason to do something. Other theories are often less explicit. 
Secondly, it is unclear how much opposition there is between weak forms of 
sentimentalism and less extreme rationalist theories. Neo-Aristotelian sensibility 
theories, like, for example, McDowell's, is one version that a sentimentalist theory can 
take. So, rather than arguing with friendly theories, I aim to tackle the most extreme, 
and most obvious, opposition. I correct my pre-occupation with the extremes of the 
spectrum in the next chapter, where I discuss both a traditional version of Humeanism 
(Blackburn 1998) and its new, unorthodox development by Schroeder (2007). 
However, I have to note that a lot of theories, rather than being pure examples of 
rationalism or sentimentalism, are hybrids. They are best understood not in terms of 
necessity of rationality or sentiment, but in terms of emphasis. I'll illustrate with 
concrete examples, and I'll use the theories of Damasio (1994) and Smith (1994). 
Damasio is a sentimentalist: he thinks that emotions, which he takes to be perceptions 
of bodily changes, are necessary for our ability to mark value and through that, to make 
rational choices. Michael Smith is a rationalist: he thinks that what we have a good 
reason to do depends on what agents with maximally coherent, informed and unified 
desire set would advise us to do. These theories look to be opposing. Damasio 
emphasizes the visceral changes, whereas rational reflection on, and refinement of, 
one's desires is important for Smith. However, the two theories can also be seen as 
complementing each other. The idea that emotions provide information that nothing 
else provides can be combined with the thought that rational reflection is the way to 
11 Examples of such rationalist theories include Aristotle’s theory of a virtuous person's knowledge in 
Nicomachean Ethics, and the medieval model of practical reasoning described in Pink (2004) and 
(2008).
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discover what we have a good reason to do. Smith (and other rationalists can agree with 
him in this) insists that rational agents must be, amongst other things, maximally 
informed. So, he could accept sentiments' contribution to normative reasons, because 
there if we, humans, lacked them, we would not be informed enough. (See also note 
23).12
So, the debate between rationalists and sentimentalists is less stark than one may think 
initially. This means that the best way of understanding my thesis is not as having 
distinctive targets (although there is one – formal rationalism, discussed above), but as 
showing that sentiments have to be paid attention to, and as explaining why a theory of 
human agency which does not mention sentiments and their role in deliberation is 
incomplete.
So, the challenge is: according to formal rationalism, reasoning alone alerts us to 
inconsistencies, but we need evaluations as well. A Kantian may respond that 
deliberation does provide evaluations. She may connect what the CI tells us with what 
is valuable. There are at least two ways to do this.
3.2. Not just inconsistencies – reason discerns values
A Kantian may think that reasoning does not merely detect inconsistencies, it also gives 
us knowledge of some type of value. This is one way of understanding Kant's argument 
in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788, 5:57-65). He makes a distinction between 
things that are good and bad depending on the sensations they produce in us (call them 
sentimental values) and values that are discerned by reasoning alone (call them rational 
values). If rational values exist, reasoning alone can detect them, and in doing so, it will 
provide evaluations. In providing evaluations, it will be motivating. 
12 There is a question here about whether rationalists always have humans in mind, or whether they are 
trying to set conditions for agency per se. But, I take it, any rationalist theory, if not specifically about 
human agency, should at least be applicable to humans, and, as such, would require the modifications 
which include sentiments.
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Why should we accept the distinction between rational and sentimental values? Kant 
motivates it as follows. Unless we accept values that do not require desires to motivate, 
we can't have objective values, we can have things that are 'good only in relation to our 
sensibility' (1788, 5:62). But it makes sense to ask: 'I want X, but is X good?' What we 
are asking for is a value independent of our desires. If there is such a value, it would be 
objective and discernible by something other than desires, by reason. So, Kant seems to 
think that if we accept a Humean theory, then we cannot have objective values. I locate 
his argument for this claim in the following passage:
The property of the subject, by virtue of which such experience [of good and evil] 
could be had, is the feeling of pleasure or displeasure as a receptivity belonging to 
the inner sense; thus the concept of that which is immediately good would only 
refer to that with which the sensation of pleasure is immediately associated, and 
the concept of the absolutely evil would have to be related only to that which 
directly excites pain.
Even the language is opposed to this, however, since it distinguishes the pleasant 
from the good and the unpleasant from evil, and demands that good and evil be 
judged by reason and thus through concepts which alone can be universally 
communicated, and not be mere sensation which is limited to the individual 
subjects and their susceptibility. (Kant 1788, 5:58.)
 The argument to the conclusion that Humeanism and objective values are incompatible 
assumes that desires can only be contingent. Our desires could have been different from 
what they are had we been constituted differently. Values can be known either through 
reasoning or through desires. Given the assumption that desires can only be contingent, 
values cannot be known through desires because values, if objective, stay the same 
whatever our desires are and whatever sensibilities we have. Hence, values cannot be 
discerned by desires. So values, if objective, would be appreciated by reasoning alone.
However, Kantians do not have monopoly on objective values. Although historically 
sentimentalists (especially Humeans) tended to deny their existence, it is important to 
point out that they don't have to. I think we should reject the assumption that desires can 
only be contingent. How we know the world depends on what sort of things the world 
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contains. If it contains solid objects, they can be known via touch (by those creatures 
who possess this sense). If it contains values they can be known via desires (by those 
creatures who possess this faculty). In this case, some desires will be not contingent, 
but necessitated by our acquaintance with objective values. (Our possession of the 
faculty of desire is, of course, contingent. But the same can be said about the faculty of 
reason. Here both faculties are on a par.) Philosophers such as Plato, Oddie (2005) and 
Mackie (1977) rejected contingency assumption, but Mackie was the only one out of 
the three who rejected objective values; Oddie and Plato are value realists. For Oddie, 
desires are data for what is valuable, just as perceptions are data for what is true. Seeing 
a red rose gives me a prima facie reason to believe that it is red. Wanting a bit of cake 
gives me a prima facie reason to believe that it is good.13
Plato's name maybe a surprise here. After all, he is famous for his rationalism, so I shall 
make a short digression to show that he is not a rationalist of the formal kind. This will 
also help further to explain the idea of desires as responses to objective values. There 
are good reasons for classifying Plato as a rationalist. He does talk of the body and its 
desires as weighing us down like an oyster shell (Phdr. 250c). His rationalism is also 
evident in the passages on the tripartite division of the soul (Phdr. 246a-c, 253d-256d, 
Rep. 436a-444e). The three parts of the soul are: rational, spirited (which is often taken 
to correspond to emotions) and appetitive. In an ideal soul, Plato tells us, reason rules, 
subduing appetites and emotions. But there are a couple of passages that sit ill with this 
straightforwardly rationalist picture.
The first passage is the erotic ascent in the Symposium (Symp. 210a-212b). In Greek 
there are two words that correspond to the English 'love': eros and philia. Eros 
emphasizes sexual desire, whereas philia connotes affection, such as love for one's 
friends and family (Vlastos 1973, n. 4, p. 4). In the Symposium Plato talks exclusively 
about eros, so in what follows I shall replace the broader term 'love' with 'sexual desire'. 
The ascent (scala amoris, in Vlastos' memorable phrase) described in the Symposium is 
13 Of course, the claim that desires are necessitated by acquaintance with objective values has an 'and all 
goes well' clause: favourable conditions are assumed. I may be in the presence of a red rose and not 
see it because my sight is defective or because the rose is somehow obscured. I may be in the 
presence of value and not desire it because, for example, my desire faculty is malfunctioning or 
because the value is somehow obscured. (I owe this point to Nate Sharadin.)
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from one sexual object to another, and is enabled by the object's possession of beauty. 
When I see something beautiful, I have eros for it. At first, one lusts after one beautiful 
body, then realizes that the same quality of loveliness is possessed by other bodies and 
comes to desire them too. Then one becomes aware of the beauty of the mind, and 
treasures that more than bodily beauty. The next step is erotic desire for beautiful 
institutions and pieces of knowledge, until at last one sees Beauty Itself, which, unlike 
the beauty of any particular thing, is eternal, and never partakes of ugliness.
In this surprising to modern ears passage, Beauty Itself is no less an object of sexual 
desire than a beautiful body. In fact, 'no less' is an understatement. If your sexual desire 
can be aroused by an imperfect beauty of some perishable physical body, how much 
more eros would you have for Beauty Itself were you to see it! This is a vivid 
description of objective values and what it would be like to perceive them. If one were 
to see them, they would affect not only the intellect, but also the appetite. You see 
Beauty Itself, albeit with the mind's eye, and you want it because it is so beautiful. This 
is so striking that it requires elaboration: does Plato really think that we have sexual 
desire for Beauty Itself? Well, at the lowest level of the ladder, when the object of 
sexual desire is a beautiful body, there is no temptation to say that eros is reasoning 
personified. Now, the word – 'eros' – has not changed throughout the ascent to other 
objects. This is one reason to think that eros is still the same sexual desire applied to a 
different object – Beauty Itself. Also, sexual desire is a response to the property 
'beautiful', and Beauty Itself possesses it to the utmost degree, so sexual desire would, if 
anything, be stronger in the case of this supremely beautiful thing than in the case of 
the objects lower down the ladder. The property (beauty) has changed in degree, not in 
kind, so there is no reason to think that the erotic response has changed to some other 
kind of response. We may, however, question the idea that the property has not changed 
in kind: after all, why suppose that when talking about the beauty of intellectual objects 
we are talking about the same thing as when we are talking about a pretty boy? But it 
seems that Plato does suppose this. He thinks that desiring bodily and intellectual 
beauty helps us ascend to Beauty Itself. In order to enable this ascent, the property of 
beauty must be the same property throughout. Beauty possessed by a boy will get us to 
the same thing, but more refined. It will not get us to some unearthly beauty which is a 
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completely different property. If beauty of the boy and beauty of Beauty Itself are 
different in kind, then the ascent Plato envisaged is impossible.
The second passage that makes one wary of straightforwardly classifying Plato as a 
rationalist comes from the Republic:
it is in the nature of the real lover of learning [i.e. philosopher] to struggle toward 
what is, not to remain with any of the many things that are believed to be, that, as 
he moves on, he neither loses nor lessens his erotic love until he grasps the being 
of each nature itself with the part of the soul that is fitted to grasp it, because of its 
kinship with it … (Rep. 490b.)
Unfortunately, we are not told which part of the tripartite soul (reason, spirit or 
appetite) is talked about here, but eros for the idea is clear enough. We are also told that 
the eros we have for beautiful things would be nothing in comparison to the desire for 
wisdom, were it accessible to our sight: an image of wisdom 'would awaken a terribly 
powerful love' (Phdr. 251d).14
So, objective values don't have to be appreciated by reason alone. Kantian monopoly on 
them follows only given an additional assumption: that desires, or sentiments, can only 
be contingent. I have argued above that if we accept that values are objective, we have 
no reason to agree with this assumption. Sentimentalism is compatible with objective 
values. (I do not take a stand on metaphysics here. I merely show the compatibility.)
If sentiments can tell us about objective values, there is no motivation to divide values 
into rational and sentimental ones. Moreover, there is motivation not to divide values. 
Sentimental values, in so far as they are values, excite our non-cognitive faculties. This 
leads to motivation in their case. It is part of our concept of values that they are 
motivating. It is natural to say that if you are not motivated to get away from dangerous 
things, you don't know what 'dangerous' is. Typically, if you say that something is the 
right thing to do, yet are not at all motivated to do it, then you are 'just saying it' without 
meaning what you say. Obviously, there is some slack: we are not always motivated to 
14  I am not pretending that I found a consistent reading of Plato. But presenting him as a rationalist 
should not let us ignore the passages where Plato clearly states that a philosopher has eros for the 
idea.
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do what we value. (See Stocker (1979) for good examples.) The slack shows that the 
token claim – that each time I sincerely make a value judgement I must be (to some 
extent) motivated – is false. So we must retreat to the level of types – when I make a 
sincere evaluative judgement, this type of judgement is distinguished from other types 
by the fact that it will, when things go well, motivate me. We can easily understand 
someone who on this particular occasion is not motivated by her value judgement, but 
not someone who claims to hold a certain value, yet is never motivated to act in 
accordance with it. Of this last person we would say that she does not really value what 
she claims to value. So, in so far as rational values are values, they will be motivating. 
Why think that in their case motivation is provided by something different than in the 
case of sentimental values? To rephrase: we know that values motivate, and motivation 
in the case of at least some familiar values is provided by desires. If there is some other 
stuff that belongs to the same category (values, motivating things), we have a defeasible 
reason to treat it in the same way. But even a defeasible reason is a good reason, unless 
a contrary one is provided. The example of a rational value that Kant has in mind is 
moral value. As he points out, it makes sense to ask 'X is pleasurable, but is X good?' 
(1788, 5:58). But it also makes sense to ask 'X is rational, but is X morally good?'
Another reason why Kantians may think that desires can't provide information about 
values is that they see desires as non-representational passions.15 In the Groundwork 
(4:399), Kant distinguishes between practical and pathological love. Practical love 
resides 'in the will and not in the propensities of feeling', and can be commanded. 
Pathological love is a type of feeling, and cannot be commanded. Presumably, it cannot 
be commanded because it is a type of feeling, or sensation: it cannot be commanded 
because it has no representational qualities, and hence cannot respond to reasoning and 
commands. Perhaps surprisingly, this is how Hume thought of desires, as well. When I 
am angry, he says, I am 'possessed with the passion, and in that emotion have no more 
reference to any other object, [than] when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot 
high' (1738-1740, 2.3.3, p. 415). But whatever stand one takes in the Kantian/Humean 
debate, there are independent reasons to reject the claim that passions are non-
representational. To continue with Hume's own examples, it looks like sentiments are 
15 I thank Prof. Pink for this point.
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object-directed: when I am angry, I am angry at John, or at an injustice, or at the state of 
the world. When I am thirsty, I want a drink, or a Fanta, or that glass of water. Sickness, 
on the other hand, is markedly unlike this: it is not directed at any object.16 There is 
nothing in the neo-Humean position that forces one to abandon this common-sense 
view. The same goes for Kantians. They can admit that passions represent, and still 
retain their opposition to the idea that passions have a role in discovering values, 
because passions can only be contingent. This line of thought, however, was attacked 
above: one need not think of passions as contingent should the world contain values.
Before I go on, I shall consider the following objection. I have described desires as if 
they were perceptions of values, should values be objective. I have also used terms such 
as 'sentiments' and 'emotions', and assumed that they play the same role in a 
sentimentalist theory that desires do. However, at least prima facie desires and 
emotions are different from perceptions. The former two are reason-responsive (desires, 
possibly, more so), whilst the latter are not.17 This reason-responsiveness is 
demonstrated by the fact that I can argue you into having a desire to go out tonight by 
presenting you with various tempting options; the same does not seem to hold for 
perceptions (and, sometimes, emotions). In the case of emotions, if you are afraid of a 
spider, I may be unable to argue you out of it: you can continue to be afraid, even 
though you have a rational belief that the spider is harmless. In the case of perceptions, 
you may firmly believe that the two lines in the Muller-Lyer illusion are the same 
length, yet this does not affect how they look to you: the line ending with arrows looks 
shorter than the line ending with forks. Thus, it looks like desires must be reason-
responsive on pain of irrationality, perceptions are not reason-responsive, and emotions 
are somewhere in the middle – sometimes they are reason-responsive (for example, I 
can argue you into being angry about a building project by convincing you that it is 
unfair), and sometimes they persist independently of one's judgements (like in the 
harmless spider example).
16 However, there are theories that make all mental states, including sensations, representational. 
Sensations, the proponents of representationalism argue, represent the state of my body (e.g. Tye 
1995).
17  I owe this objection to Prof. Pink.
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In response, I note first, that this distinction is not uncontroversial. If one defines 
desires by their reason-responsiveness, some of the states commonly known as desires 
will not qualify as such. One cannot, for example, argue someone out of a desire to 
drink. The proponent of reason-responsiveness of desires would say that thirst is a mere 
feeling which is, of course, not reason-responsive. This may be true, but there are other 
examples. A desire for a cup off coffee (even when I am not a caffeine addict) may have 
a strong phenomenology and may fail to be reason-responsive. My desire to get a new 
dress may be defeated, in the sense of not leading to an intention, by reasons such as 
lack of money, yet it does not dissipate even after I acknowledge the need for frugality. 
Scanlon, whose work is discussed in more detail in the next chapter, has captured this 
feature of desires by introducing what he calls 'desires in the directed-attention sense' 
(Scanlon 1998, p. 39). When I want something, my attention is persistently grabbed by 
the attractive features of the object of my desire.18 Such examples are ubiquitous and 
easily recognizable, so we may conclude that persisting in the face of contrary 
considerations is no less characteristic of a desire than (certain) reason-responsiveness. 
This point is reinforced by the observation that both desires and perceptions are 
perspectival, which I discuss in Chapter 2, section 4.
One could also argue that perception can be reason-responsive in the following loose 
sense. Noe (2006) argues that it is 'bad phenomenology' to think about our visual 
experiences as snapshots. Instead, what we see depends on what experiences we'll have 
when we turn our heads slightly, focus on one element or another, move around the 
perceived object, and, crucially for my purposes, on the experiences we think we shall 
have if we were to do all these things.19 If what we perceive depends on what we expect 
to perceive, then it is a kind of reason-responsiveness. This thesis may seem 
controversial and implausible. However, I have a confirmation of it from my own 
18 Scanlon, of course, thinks that these attractive features are reasons, in which case desires are  
responsive at least to pro tanto, if not always to pro toto reasons. But one could accept that these 
features grab our attention independently of our judgement about what is best, yet deny that they are 
perceptions of reasons, as Scanlon claims them to be. For example, my attention can be grabbed by 
these attractive features not because they are reasons, but because I have conflicting desires: a taste  
for expensive clothes and a desire not to go on a spending spree quite so often.
19 Noe's aims are different from mine. He does not say that perceptual experiences are reason-
responsive. Rather, he argues against internalism about mental content, i.e. the thesis that what mental 
states I have depends only on my intrinsic properties. Noe's (externalist) view is that in order to have 
some mental states one has to be 'related to the environment in the right way'. (Lau and Deutch 2010.)
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phenomenology. When staying in the Lake District, I admired the view from our 
window. The two hills that I could see looked about the same height and the same 
distance from Lake Windermere. They looked so nice that we decided to walk up there, 
and so we did. On coming back after the walk, I looked out of the window again, and 
was extremely surprised: the view looked different. Now one the hills looked shorter 
and closer to the lake, whilst its neighbour was clearly higher and further away, as our 
walk has proved it to be. The difference was startling. Thus, visual perception can 
depend on one's expectations of what one will see after she moved in a certain way, and 
is reason-responsive in this looser sense.
Even though the objection does not succeed, because it is unclear that desires are 
reason-responsive to an extent that cannot be matched by emotions and perceptions, it 
leads to a related question. What I designated as 'sentiments' is quite a broad term, so 
what unifies the items under it? My answer is that the criterion for identification here is 
phenomenology: in order to count as a 'sentiment', in my sense, a mental item has to 
have a characteristic feel.20
3.3. Not just inconsistencies – reason creates values
A Kantian can make a different response. Reason does not provide access to a special 
type of value. Instead, it creates values. I make the object valuable by choosing it:
… what makes the object of your rational choice good is that it is the object of a 
rational choice. (Korsgaard 1996, p. 122, italics in original.)
A natural question arises: if I confer value to the object by rationally choosing it, 
what makes my choice rational? Korsgaard may explain the rationality of my 
choice by reference to other rational beings (cf. 1996, p. 241). My choice of A 
20 This may exclude some desires. Schueler (1995) claims that some desires, such as a desire to visit my 
sister, lack phenomenology. This desire is just a disposition to do certain things. I am not sure 
whether any desire can be reduced to a disposition: just because a desire lacks the strong, distinctive 
phenomenology of, say, sexual desire, it may still have some phenomenology. (At least it does when I 
imagine that I want to visit my sister.) But if some desires do lack phenomenology altogether, they 
are excluded from my definition of sentiments. This is not a problem, because, as I argue in this 
chapter, a rational creature only armed with consistency and coherence will fail to have even purely 
dispositional desires. No desires – even purely dispositional ones – are based on reasoning alone.
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over B is rational if anyone rational chooses A over B after correct deliberation. 
This explains why my choice counts as rational – because it follows the laws of 
rationality, and what I chose is good because I rationally chose it. But this 
explanation gets things backwards. To show why, I use Plato's discussion of piety 
(Euth. 7a-10d). Socrates asks Euthyphro what pious is. Euthyphro answers that 
pious is what gods love. Then Socrates asks: 'Is the pious being loved by the gods 
because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?', and 
answers his own question: it is loved by the gods because it is pious, not vice 
versa. The same goes for rational choice – if I choose rationally, it is because the 
object of my choice is valuable, not the other way round.
One may object that the comparison is unfair. Gods may happen to love anything, 
which may or may not turn out to be pious. But laws of rationality will prevent 
me from getting any odd thing as my rational choice, they will keep me in line. 
The procedure by which I arrive at my choice – reasoning – is not arbitrary. This 
objection is countered by what has been said above, where I showed that the 
process of reasoning alone will not lead us to a particular choice. I may discover 
that my concepts are inconsistent, but I still have two options: keep the current 
concepts and follow the course that avoids inconsistency or change the concepts I 
have and avoid inconsistency that way.
 4. Conclusion
Reasoning alone alerts us to inconsistencies in our plans of action. In doing so, it fails 
to select between courses of action that are equally consistent. We need an additional 
standard – that of evaluation – in order to select between courses of action that are 
equally consistent. So, a purely formal rationalist theory has a problem with 
normativity: it fails to provide a way of deciding between consistent courses of action, 
even though intuitively one is better than the other.
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Part II. Kantian Appeal Explained
1. Introduction
In the first part of the chapter, we have seen that rationalism has a problem: reasoning 
alone fails to provide evaluations. However, rationalism has been, and continues to be, 
appealing. And my task will not be complete without explaining its appeal, and 
showing that a sentimentalist alternative can retain it. My example of a sentimentalist 
theory will be Humeanism. I argue that Kantianism is appealing because it satisfies our 
pre-philosophical intuition about normative reasons for action:
For any normative reason to φ: if some feature F in circumstances C gives me a 
normative reason to φ, then F will give a normative reason to φ to any agent in 
C. 
I show that Humeans can also accept this feature of normative reasons, thus 
accommodating the way we ordinarily think about them at least to some extent. I then 
argue, however, that traditional Humeans fail to put enough space between motivations 
and normative reasons. This can be shown via disagreement about which ends one 
should pursue. I introduce my solution to this problem – I use evaluations as a way of 
distancing the motivational from the normative – which will pave the way for the 
indirect sentimentalist account spelt out in the next chapter.
2. A Kantian intuition: nothing special about me as user of reasons
2.1. A Kantian intuition
Suppose I am walking in the park. It is a nice, hot day and I rather fancy an ice-cream. I 
have no reason not to buy an ice cream (I am not allergic to it, I don't need the money to 
buy bread for my children, etc.). In this case I have a reason, and a good reason, to buy 
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an ice-cream. It seems that as long as it is a reason, and a good one, if you were walking 
in the park on a nice, hot day, and fancied an ice-cream, and did not have a reason not 
to buy it, then you would also have a good reason to buy an ice-cream. If my wanting in 
circumstances C gives me a good reason to φ, then, if this really is a good reason, it 
will function in the same way for a different agent in the same circumstances. Whether 
it is you or me who is walking in the park wanting an ice-cream is irrelevant for having 
a reason. This seems to be a feature that all normative reasons have. I put this intuition 
more formally:
Normative Reason Feature (NRF)
For any normative reason to φ: if some feature F in circumstances C gives me a 
normative reason to φ, then F will give a normative reason to φ to any agent in 
C.
This is a universal constraint on normative reasons: any normative reason must satisfy 
it in order to count as one.
Note three things:
1. Humeans accept this constraint, but they make a restriction on the feature that 
gives us normative reasons: for Humeans, this feature F is always a desire.
2. The NRF itself is not relative to an agent's desires; it applies independently of 
any desires she may have.
3. This constraint is expressed by a conditional, which can be true even if nothing 
satisfies it: that is, it can be true even if there are no normative reasons at all.
The NRF still allows for differences in personal taste. For example, suppose Mary likes 
wine and John hates it. There is a bar nearby that serves a great selection of wines. 
Intuitively, this is a reason for Mary, but not John, to go to the bar. According to the 
constraint, Mary and John agree on the following:
if the fact that there is good wine at that bar gives Mary, in her circumstances 
(where these include liking wine) a normative reason to go to that bar, then the 
fact that there is good wine at the bar would give John a normative reason to go to 
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the bar if he were in the same circumstances as Mary (that is, if John liked wine 
as well, which he does not).
So, the constraint does not mean that John has a reason to go to the bar, even though he 
hates wine. It only says that if Mary's liking of wine gives her a reason to go to the bar, 
then, if John liked wine, he would also have a reason to go. In actual fact his 
circumstances are dissimilar from Mary's (he does not like wine), so he does not have a 
reason to go to the bar.
Moreover, and this is easily overlooked, the constraint proposed does not say whether, 
given her liking wine, Mary actually has a reason to go to the bar. This is because the 
constraint is not meant to be a full account of what it is for someone to have a reason. It 
is just one plausible constraint on normative reasons, there may be others. It is not 
meant to indicate what reasons everyone has, or even whether there are things that 
everyone (or anyone) has a reason to do. It is just a parity principle. If you assume that 
there are normative reasons
and
some feature F – e.g. your liking vanilla ice-cream, to use Sobel's (1999) 
example –  gives you a normative reason to buy this flavour in circumstances C,
then you must, on pain of inconsistency, admit that
this same feature F – another agent's liking vanilla ice-cream – gives that agent 
a normative reason to buy this flavour in circumstances C.
The NRF formalizes an intuitive thought: we do think that good reasons are 
independent of at least some features of the agent. There is nothing special about me as 
a user of reasons. Cf. beliefs: I can't rationally believe any odd thing I like; if my beliefs 
are to be rational, they have to satisfy constraints that are independent of me. Similarly 
for normative reasons: I may have motivations to do all sorts of things, but if they are to 
be good reasons for action, they have to conform to constraints which are independent 
of me, the agent, and are the same for all agents. It is this thought that rationalism, and 
Kantianism in particular, tries to accommodate, and it is this thought that is expressed 
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by the Normative Reason Feature.
Beliefs + Constraints  Rational beliefs
Motivations + Constraints  Normative reasons
At this point it may be useful to re-state the question I am trying to answer: what sort of 
creatures do we have to be in order to do things for good reasons? Thus, I am not 
interested in moral action in particular; egoism, for example, is consistent with my 
thesis. There may be some creatures that only respond to reasons connected to their 
self-interest, but even of such beings we may ask: what has to be true of them? And my 
response, developed in subsequent chapters, is that such creatures must have 
sentiments; reasoning alone is not enough to respond to reasons, moral or otherwise.
We have identified the intuition behind Kantianism. At what level of understanding of 
normative reasons can this intuition be accommodated? Let us consider three agents, 
each exemplifying a different level of understanding of normative reasons.
Level 1 – Extreme egocentric.
Someone who takes only her own reasons to be reasons. E.g.:
A: Can you lend me some money, I need to buy a present for my daughter?
B: No, I need it to buy a present for my own daughter.
A: Why would I care about your daughter? 
In this first case we have someone who thinks that her reasons are much weightier 
(better qua reasons) than anyone else's.
Level 2 – Humean agent (sensible knave).
I have a reason to coerce you into doing what I want, and I appreciate that you have a 
reason to resist. I also appreciate that you have a reason to coerce me to promote your 
interest, and I have a reason to resist you then. There is a kind of universalization here: 
the knave admits that if promoting her interest is a reason for her, it is also a reason for 
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anyone. This is what I call 'Humean universalization'. In this second case we have 
someone who thinks that everyone's reasons have equal weight: my reason is as good as 
yours in so far as they are good reasons.21 Agents' reasons may clash (A will coerce B 
to promote her interest, B will coerce A to promote hers), but, since they are of equal 
weight, there is nothing to decide between them in terms of rationality. Humeans may 
still say that A and B have a reason not to coerce each other, because it is bad to treat 
someone like this. 'Bad' here does not refer to incorrect reasoning, but to our appraisal 
based on our values.22
Level 3 - Kantian agent.
I have a good reason to do something only if everyone has a reason to do this. So far 
this is no different from the sensible knave. We need to add: I discover good reasons 
through reasoning alone. I can do this, for example, by working out whether a world 
where everyone acts as I propose is consistent. Such discovery of reasons by applying 
the rules of reasoning, and, in particular, of consistency, is a feature of a formal 
rationalist theory, as proposed by O'Neill (1985) and Smith (1994). This is what I call 
'Kantian universalization'. In this third case, we have someone who thinks that anyone's 
good reasons have equal weight, and she tests for a good reason by seeing whether a 
world where everyone acts on this reason is consistent. A and B do have a reason not to 
coerce each other, for example, because it is inconsistent to treat each other like this.
So, we have three cases. In which of these is the NRF satisfied? Level 1 clearly does 
not satisfy it. Someone who treats only her reasons as normative reasons does not 
understand what normative reasons are. The agent at Level 1 fails to accept that there is 
nothing special about her as an individual in relation to reasons. She takes her 
motivations to be all and only good reasons, and this is not what good reasons are. The 
agent at Level 2 does satisfy the NRF: whatever gives a good reason to the knave, gives 
a good reason to anyone. So, if the NRF captures the intuition behind Kantianism, we 
21 Is this equal weight measured from the point of view of the agent, or from the point of view of an 
impartial observer? I believe that in order to appreciate what reasons are, one has to be able to, at 
least sometimes, take the all-agents'-reasons-are-equal, impartial point of view. This is why an 
egocentric comes across as someone who fails to appreciate what good reasons are. However, 
appreciating that your reasons are as good as mine does not rule out the sensible knave's position, as I 
argue below.
22 This is the approach taken by Blackburn (1998).
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don't have to go beyond Level 2 and introduce a further constraint – that a good reason 
must be universalized consistently. Kantians go too far in trying to accommodate 
ordinary thought.
Kantians, of course, say that the knave is failing to appreciate what good reasons are. 
Here is how Smith argues for this conclusion (1994, pp. 193-196). For Smith, one has a 
normative reason to φ in circumstances C iff one's fully rational self (i.e. a self that has 
a maximally informed, coherent and unified desire set) would advise one to φ in C. 
(Smith 1994, pp. 151-152, 2004, pp. 263-264.)23 A knave, or 'successful criminal', as 
Smith calls him, thinks that he has a normative reason to gain wealth no matter what 
the cost to others: 
as we have seen, this is equivalent to the claim that fully rational creatures would 
want that, if they find themselves in the circumstances of the successful criminal, 
then they gain wealth no matter what the cost to others. And the successful 
criminal's opinion notwithstanding, it seems quite evident that we have no reason 
to believe that this is true. Fully rational creatures would want no such thing.
Note what I have not said. I have not said that the fact that we all disagree with the 
successful criminal entails that he is wrong. Perhaps we are all mistaken about 
what fully rational creatures would want. But the mere fact that it is logically 
possible that we are wrong gives us no more reason to endorse the opinions of the 
successful criminal and doubt our own convictions than the mere fact that it is 
logically possible that we are wrong when we think that the sun will rise tomorrow 
gives us reason to endorse the opinions of the prophets of doom. (Smith 1994, p. 
195.)
So, the successful criminal (the knave, as I call him, and I'll stick to the masculine 
pronoun as Smith does) thinks that fully rational creatures in his circumstances would 
want to gain wealth no matter what the cost to others. But Kantians think that fully 
23 Smith's definition glosses over the differences between sentimentalism and rationalism. When does 
one have 'maximally informed' desires? In the following chapters I argue that, without sentiments, 
one would lack mastery of evaluative concepts. If this is true, then Smith could admit that the desires 
of someone who lacks sentiments fail to be maximally informed. This admission would mean that 
Smith no longer holds a formal version of rationalism, which emphasizes reasoning over sentiments. 
If he were to concede a greater role of sentiment in the process of responding to normative reasons, I 
no longer have a quarrel with him. I do, however, take Smith's theory to be Kantian in spirit, because 
he thinks that convergence of agents' desires will be achieved via a process of reasoning, understood 
in terms of consistency and coherence.
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rational creatures in the circumstances of the knave would not want that. They appear to 
be at loggerheads. But, Smith says, we have a reason to prefer Kantian opinion to the 
knave's. Given everything else we believe about the world, we shouldn't believe the 
world will end tomorrow. Given everything else we believe about how we should treat 
each other, we should not believe that it's OK to gain wealth no matter what the cost to 
others. I agree with Smith that we should not believe this. But in order for this 
observation to support a Kantian position, we need to show that beliefs about how we 
should treat each other have a rational, rather than a sentimental, foundation, and this is 
precisely what is currently at issue. 
But this is a side point. Kantians require the knave to be irrational. Smith thinks that the 
knave is irrational because
he sticks with his opinion despite the fact that virtually everyone disagrees with 
him. Moreover, he does so without good reason. For he can give no account of 
why his opinion should be privileged over the opinion of others; he can give no 
account of why his opinion should be right, others' opinions should be wrong. 
(Ibid.)
And so, Smith concludes, the knave is intellectually arrogant. He discounts the 
arguments of others without producing counter-arguments. And whoever does this is 
irrational. 
Indeed, some descriptions of the knave can be filled out to make him irrational, but 
then the knave is no longer as I characterized him. Suppose the knave does not want 
others to do to him what he proposes to do to them (Foot 1972, p. 161). This is not 
enough to decide whether the knave is inconsistent, but the case can be constructed so 
that he is. Suppose he thinks that others have no normative reason to treat him as he 
treats them, whereas he does have such a reason, simply in virtue of being himself. 
Such a person is, indeed, inconsistent, but this person is not the knave, according to my 
definition. He is failing to appreciate the Normative Reason Feature: he only takes his 
own reasons to be reasons. This is the extreme egocentric – level 1, not the knave, who 
is at level 2. The knave accepts the Normative Reason Feature. He realizes that there is 
nothing special about him as a user of reasons, so if he has a good reason to treat others 
badly, so do they. And if he has a good reason to resist coercion, so do they. The knave 
accepts that if any rational agent were in his circumstances, then she would have a 
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normative reason to treat others badly. In accepting this, he is not behaving as someone 
who discounts others' opinions. He admits that anyone's normative reasons are as good 
as his. He can even admit that he may be mistaken about what we have a normative 
reason to do. But if he does, so should a Kantian. In Smith's terms, if everyone started 
off as a knave, and then, through correct deliberation, became a moral person, then 
Kantians are correct. If everyone started off as a moral person and then, through correct 
deliberation, converged on the knave’s desires, then the knave is correct. But at present 
we don't have such convergence, so we don't know who is correct.24 For Occamist 
reasons, we may side with the sensible knave. He only requires a minimal (level 2) 
convergence in order for normative reasons to exist. The rationalist makes a bolder 
claim and requires level 3 convergence, and if we don't have that, then there are no 
normative reasons.
What one should note is that sentimentalism does not preclude convergence in 
everyone's desires. As we have seen in Part I section 3.2, sentimentalism is compatible 
with objective values. If there are such things, we may converge on them, but not, 
according to sentimentalist, by a purely rational process. Instead, such convergence will 
be, at least partly, a matter of sensitivity. Convergence could be provided by 
acquaintance with objective values, in which case you don't have to be fully rational, 
you just have to be fully receptive to values, and that receptivity does not have to be 
cognitive.
The NRF is prefaced with 'for any normative reason', so it is a universal constraint on 
good reasons. Therefore, the discussion above leads to an important distinction between 
universality of constraints on reasons and universality of reasons themselves. Kantians 
(and not only they) often talk about reasons that everyone has. When I explained the 
Kantian intuition, I used the phrase 'nothing special about me as a user of reasons'. This 
may be reminiscent of what is called 'universality of reasons'. I have not used this 
phrase because I think it's misleading. When we call reasons 'universal', or 'reasons that 
24 Smith (1994, pp. 187-189) is optimistic about the possibility of Kantian convergence because of the 
level of moral agreement we have reached historically. Sobel (1999, pp. 145-147) offers persuasive, 
in my view, reasons why much historical moral agreement is not helpful for a rationalist. In brief, 
agreement has often been reached for the wrong reasons. Arguments were accepted because of the 
position of those offering them, not because arguments themselves were good. And sometimes 
arguments were accepted because they were rationalizations offered after the prevailing attitudes have 
already changed. The best case for rationalism is convergence among societies that differ in the 
evaluative concepts they use, and Smith has not convinced us that there are any such cases.
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everyone has', 'reasons that we all share', we end up with
Universality: Everyone rational has a reason to … [purely in virtue of their 
rationality].
The dots can be filled in by different things: promote her own welfare/promote 
the greatest happiness/respect others. This is very different from the Normative 
Reason Feature. The NRF does not require us to get above the level of the 
sensible knave. Universality asserts that there are some reasons that any rational 
agent has simply in virtue of being a rational agent. It goes to the level of a 
Kantian agent. The NRF, on the other hand, is a conditional. It does not say, 
unlike Universality, that there are some reasons that everyone shares. It only says 
that if there are good reasons, they are subject to constraints which are 
independent of the agent who uses them: there is a feature common to all good 
reasons. Unlike Universality, the Normative Reason Feature says nothing about 
sharing reasons themselves.
2.2. Disagreement about reasons25
In this subsection, I shall discuss another argument which is Kantian is spirit, and show 
that, although the argument can be countered by Humeans, it still points to a real 
weakness of traditional sentimentalist theories: they fail to provide enough space 
between normative reasons and sentiments. I then suggest that one way of providing the 
necessary space is to introduce evaluations, and make them, and not sentiments 
themselves, act as normative reasons. I shall explore this option more fully in the 
following chapter.
Smith (1994) argues that our pre-philosophical conception of normative reasons is anti-
Humean. For him, the debate between Humeans and their opponents is about whether 
or not normative reasons are relative to our desires. The definitive feature of anti-
Humeanism is that
under conditions of full rationality we would all reason ourselves towards the same 
conclusions as regards what is to be done; … via the process of systematic 
25 I thank audience at the Société de Philosophie Analytique (SOPHA) 2012 conference in Paris and as 
well as Prof. Pink for their comments on this subsection.
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justification of our desires we could bring it about that we converge in the desires 
that we have. (Smith 1994, pp. 165-166.)26
Humeans oppose this view by holding that 
desires an agent would have if she were fully rational are themselves simply 
functions from her actual desires … An agent's reasons are thus relative to her 
actual desires …  because we cannot expect that, even under conditions of full 
rationality, agents would all converge on the same desires about what it is to be 
done in the various circumstances they might face. (Ibid., p. 165.)
So, anti-Humeans à la Smith hold that as long as we deliberate well, we would all end 
up with the same desires; we converge, and it matters not what desires we start with. 
Their conception of a normative reason is non-relative.  Humeans, on the contrary, say 
that there is no guarantee that we would all converge on the same desires, however well 
we deliberate; what desires we start with does matter. Their conception of a normative 
reason is relative. (For Humeans, not only actual desires, but even  hypothetical ones 
may fail to converge. To use Williams' (1979) famous example, someone who wants to 
drink the contents of a glass thinking it is a gin and tonic would not want it if he knew 
that the glass contains petrol. Her desire to drink from this glass would dissipate had 
she known the relevant facts. However, Humeans hold that such change in our desires 
in no way guarantees that we will all end up with the same desires had we taken 
account of all the relevant facts.)
Smith then argues that if we accept the Humean conception, then we can't disagree 
about reasons.27 When I (a Humean) say that you don't have a reason to go on holiday, I 
am talking about reasons-relative-to-my-desires, and when you (a Humean) say you 
have a good reason to go on holiday, you are talking about reasons-relative-to-your-
desires. Thus, we are not disagreeing, we are talking about different things. According 
to a non-relative conception of reasons, we are talking about reasons simpliciter, so we 
can disagree:
26 As Sobel (1999, p. 139) points out, Smith requires de se convergence, i.e. a situation where we both 
want the biggest piece of cake for ourselves, not a situation when I want the biggest piece and you 
also want me to have it. So, Smith's convergence does not preclude the possibility of egoism: it may 
be that all agents converge on a desire to promote their own interest.
27 Smith offers other arguments for thinking of reasons as Kantian. One of them is that we cannot derive 
normative reasons from desires that are arbitrary. This type of argument is discussed in Chapter 2.
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Suppose someone tells me she has a reason to take a holiday and that I think I 
would have no reason to take a holiday in the circumstances she faces. Provided 
we have taken proper account of the de se considerations that might be relevant to 
her choice, and provided that we have taken proper account of the way in which 
her preferences may constitute a relevant feature of her circumstances, it seems 
that I can straightforwardly disagree with her about the rational justifiability of her 
taking a holiday in the circumstances she faces, a disagreement I can express by 
saying 'She thinks that there is a reason to take a holiday in her circumstances, but 
there is no such reason'. (Ibid., pp. 171-172.)
I'll call the person who thinks she has a good reason to take a holiday Jane, her 
opponent – Bob, and use the holiday example to go through Smith's argument (Ibid., 
pp. 166-167). According to Humeans, when Jane says she has a good (i.e. normative) 
reason to go on holiday, she is talking about normative reasons-relative-to-Jane's-
desires. When Bob says that Jane has no good reason to go on holiday, he is talking 
about normative reasons-relative-to-Bob's-desires. Thus, if we accept that normative 
reasons are relative to our desires, Bob and Jane are talking about different things, and 
can't disagree.  But we ordinarily take them to disagree – we take them to be talking 
about the same thing: a non-relative reason. So, our ordinary concept of a normative 
reason is a non-relative (anti-Humean) one.
We should also note the two provisos in the quotation that describes the holiday 
example above: before disagreeing about normative reasons, we need to take care of de 
se considerations and the agent's personal preferences. This is because such 
considerations and preferences may look relativizing, but actually aren't. Let us go 
through an example of each. 
Seemingly relativizing case 1: de se considerations
A reason 'to save my child from drowning' is not available to me when someone else's 
child is drowning. Even so, this reason is not relative. In the right circumstances (if my 
child were drowning), this reason would be available to me, and it would justify 
simpliciter my action.
Seemingly relativizing case 2: personal preferences
If I say 'I like wine, and that's a good reason for me to go to the bar', and you answer 
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that it's not a good reason for you, you are not relativizing my reason. Rather, the 
reason is tied to my particular circumstances, which include my psychology, and you 
agree that if you were in the same circumstances, including my psychology (i.e. if you 
liked wine), then you also would have a reason to go to the bar. Once all circumstances 
have been taken into account, my reason is not relative to me. (Ibid., pp. 168-171.) 
(This, one cannot help noting, sounds very much like the NRF, and, as we have seen 
above, accepting this constraint on normative reasons does not require us to go beyond 
the level of the sensible knave.)
In response to Smith's argument, Sobel (1999) shows that Bob can be talking about 
reasons-relative-to-Jane's-desires as well. According to Sobel, if Bob says that Jane has 
no reason to go on holiday, he means that Jane would not be motivated to go on holiday 
had she deliberated correctly.28 There is a fact of the matter what Jane would be 
motivated to do. If Jane would be motivated to stay after correct deliberation, then Bob 
is right, and she does not have a good reason to go (Ibid., pp. 143-144).29
Sobel's response is perfectly adequate to Smith's argument as stated. Indeed, this is 
what Humeans should say about disagreement. But maybe Smith's point is better 
interpreted in a different way. Ordinarily, we think that there can be two types of 
disagreement about normative reasons:
a) disagreement about whether one should be taking this particular means to the 
end they pursue
and 
b) disagreement about whether one should pursue a particular end.
28 This response uses Williams' (1979) thesis that nothing counts as a reason unless an agent can be 
motivated by it (internalism about normative reasons). According to this thesis, if Jane is not 
motivated to stay at home rather than take a holiday after correct deliberation, she has no reason to 
stay at home. There are no reasons that a fully rational agent is insensitive to. 
29 As pointed out by Prof. Pink, one can easily see the truth of this point when one is required to give 
advice. If Jane asks Bob for advice about what she should do, then of course he should take Jane's 
motivations into account: if he fails to do so he is either incompetent or immoral. But advice 
situations are different from situations of disagreement. I'll use Dancy's example to illustrate (2000, 
pp. 34-35). Suppose Jane has a project of soundproofing her house so that not even the slightest noise 
penetrates from the outside; Bob thinks it is a silly idea, but he is knowledgeable about different types 
of insulation, and knows that, given what Jane is trying to do, fibreglass insulation is the best choice. 
Armed with this information, Bob can give Jane good advice, even though he still thinks there is no 
good reason for her to soundproof her house. So, giving advice about the best means of achieving a 
goal clearly involves taking into account the motivations of those who seek advice.
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Humeans, however, can accommodate only the first type of disagreement, and Sobel's 
response highlights this. Suppose Jane thinks that she should take a holiday because her 
work has not been going well lately, and she thinks that a holiday will relieve her stress 
and enable her to solve the problem she is facing on her return. (So, Jane's holiday is a 
means to doing her job well.) Bob, however, thinks that Jane is on the brink of solving 
the problem that is plaguing her, and if she goes on holiday now, she will lose her 
momentum. Jane and Bob disagree about the best means to the end Jane pursues. 
However, they cannot genuinely disagree about whether Jane should pursue a particular 
end, say, doing her job well. If Bob thinks that Jane should not pursue the type of work 
that she does, yet he knows that Jane wants no other work, and this desire is not based 
on misinformation, etc., then Bob, on a traditional Humean account, cannot be justified 
in claiming that Jane should not pursue her work. But, as our pre-theoretical 
commitments show, we do not think that someone has a good reason to do something 
just because they want to do it. Nor do we think that someone has no good reason to do 
something just because they don't want to do it. Thus, we ordinarily suppose that there 
is more distance between desires and normative reasons than traditional Humeans 
allow.
One way to create such a distance is to admit that sentiments do not provide normative 
reasons directly, but by enabling mastery of evaluative concepts. Such concepts then 
figure in one's evaluations, which, depending on what metaphysics of value one has, 
either constitute one's good reasons (if values are not real) or represent good reasons (if 
values are real). I defend this account in the following chapters, so for now I shall only 
show how it applies to the debate between Sobel and Smith. If values are real, then we 
can easily accommodate genuine disagreement about ends: either Bob's evaluation of 
Jane's end ('Jane's work is worthless.') or Jane's evaluation of her end ('My work is 
worthy of pursuit.') is correct. What happens is values are not real? Well, if both 
disputants agreed that values are not real, they would be unlikely to criticize each 
other's ends, so the dispute would not even arise. This would include abandoning some 
common-sense commitments, since we ordinarily accept value realism when we argue 
about what one has a good reason to do: I would not ordinarily say 'You have no good 
reason to go on holiday.' unless I thought that there really were such things as good 
reasons. However, even if values are not real, we can still accommodate the point that 
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Smith' argument is bringing out, i.e. the point that traditional Humean theories tie 
normative reasons to desires too closely. This is because, on my account, desires, or, 
more broadly, sentiments, no longer have a direct connection to normative reasons. 
Sentiments only enable mastery of evaluative concepts, which figure in evaluations, 
and evaluations, on an irrealist metaphysics, constitute one's normative reasons. Thus, 
evaluation and motivation can come apart. Jane can evaluate something as good, and 
hence have a normative reason to pursue it, without being motivated to pursue it. So, 
even if we accept an irrealist metaphysics of values, Bob can be justified in saying that 
Jane has a normative reason to do something (say, stay at home), even though she is not 
motivated to do it, as long as Jane positively evaluates staying at home.
One may ask how we can put this distance between motivations and evaluations and 
remain Humean. I spell this out in the next chapter, but here is a preview. The position 
proposed here is (weakly) Humean because I accept that sentiments are still necessary 
for having (access to) normative reasons. What I reject is a traditional explanation of 
why they are necessary. On a traditional Humean account, this necessity is explained in 
terms of promotion: I have a normative reason to do whatever promotes my desires. On 
my account, it is explained in terms of mastery of evaluative concepts.
3. Conclusion
In the first part of this chapter, I have shown that a formal version of a rationalist theory 
fails to provide evaluations, which are necessary for acting for good reasons. In the 
second part, I have explained the appeal of Kantianism: it tries to accommodate our 
intuition that there is nothing special about me as user of reasons, as expressed by the 
Normative Reason Feature. I have also showed that the possibility of disagreement 
about normative reasons points to a problem for traditional Humean theories. The 
problem is that such theories do not distinguish between motivations and normative 




The aim of this chapter is to explain what I consider to be the main problem for a 
sentimentalist theory and provide my solution to it. My example of a sentimentalist 
theory, as in the previous chapter, will be Humeanism. Traditional Humeanism fails to 
explain how desires, which are prime facie non-normative, generate normative reasons 
to do what I want. This problem appears in the literature in different guises. Sometimes 
it is pointed out that Humeans cannot explain why some desires intuitively fail to 
provide normative reasons. Sometimes criticisms fall on the Humean conception of 
instrumental rationality and their inability to explain what provides me with a reason to 
satisfy my desires. In this chapter, I shall concentrate on the first of these, as I think it is 
the most basic formulation of the problem.
I argue that the problem arises because traditional Humeans explain why desires are 
sources of normative reasons in terms of promotion. They say that I have a normative 
reason to do whatever promotes my desires. I offer an alternative theory, according to 
which desires are sources of normative reasons for action because they are necessary 
for mastery of evaluative concepts.
2. The Humean position
Humeans claim that all good reasons depend on our desires. I think the best way to 
understand this claim is to say that Humeans are sceptical about the extent to which 
reasoning can change our desires. In what follows I explain how traditional Humeans 
see the role of reasoning by using Williams' (1981) and Blackburn's (1998, pp. 238-
269) accounts.
Humeans accept that reasoning alone can help us to act well. First, it provides 
information that is relevant to achieving our aims. For example, one wants a gin and 
tonic, and believes this is what's in the glass. But one is wrong: the glass contains 
petrol. In this case, one has no normative reason to drink what's in the glass, and it's 
obvious why – because one's belief that the glass contains gin and tonic is false. 
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Reasoning can also refine our desires in other ways – e.g. by one's thinking through 
what it would be like to do what one wants, or what the consequences of doing it would 
be. Hence, if we want to act on good reasons, we should try to minimize malfunctions 
of reasoning, such as memory lapses, inattention, etc. Secondly, reasoning helps desire-
satisfaction. It does so by requiring us to take means to our ends and alerting us to the 
existence of incompatible desires. For example, if I want to listen to music, I should put 
the player on. If I want to maximally satisfy my desires, reasoning requires balancing 
them. For example, I want to get new shoes and I want to go on holiday. It may be that 
these desires are in conflict: if I bought the shoes, I would not have enough money left 
for the holiday. Reasoning alerts us to such inconsistencies, and may help us find the 
way to maximally satisfy our desires (for example, if I set the money aside now and go 
on holiday to Poland, shoes will be cheaper there, so I might end up both going on 
holiday and buying the shoes). If no such solution is forthcoming, reasoning alerts me 
to the fact that I have to choose satisfaction of one desire over another.
But Humeans circumscribe the role of reasoning. Reasoning alone can't select ends and 
it can't provide criticism of ends. If there are no rationally required ends, it follows that 
whatever ends we have, they cannot be rationally criticized: if I fail to take means to 
some end, I am irrational (taking means to ends is rationally required), but if I fail to 
have a particular end, I am not (since all ends are rationally optional). It is important to 
note what does not follow from the fact that reasoning alone never selects ends. It does 
not follow that ends cannot be criticized at all. Only one type of criticism – rational 
criticism – is ruled out. We can still criticize ends – our own and others' – in the light of 
our desires and concerns. In other words, we evaluate ends, and that, as we have seen in 
the first chapter, is not something that reasoning provides. For example, I may think 
that the pleasure of buying shoes is quite trivial in comparison to knowledge and open-
mindedness that travelling can bring: I can criticize wanting to buy shoes as being too 
materialistic, but not irrational.
There are passages where Humeans and their opponents sound surprisingly similar 
when describing the role of desires in deliberation. Here is an example:
In practical reasoning, we need not only to select among possible plans of action 
but also to select among considerations to be taken into account in deciding what 
to do. … So it may be that the person who “has a desire for coffee ice cream” … 
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has taken the desirability of having ice cream as one of the considerations to be 
taken into account in deciding what to do in the near future. It is, so to speak, “on 
her deliberative agenda”, whether or not she ultimately forms an intention to act 
on it or not. (Scanlon 1998, pp. 46-47.)
Typically, in deliberation what I pay attention to are the relevant features of the 
external world: the cost of alternatives, the quality of food, the durability of the 
cloth, the fact that I made a promise. I don’t also pay attention to my own desires 
… My own concerns and dispositions determine which feature I notice and how I 
react to them. If I am a miser, the cost takes my attention; if I am a gourmet, the 
quality of the food does; if I am prudent, the durability of the cloth; if I am not a 
knave, the fact of the promise. (Blackburn 1998, pp. 253-254, italics in original.)
Both Blackburn and Scanlon agree that we deliberate about features of the world. Both 
agree that desires single out the features we consider salient in deliberation. The 
difference is in the order of explanation. For Blackburn, the existence of reasons is 
dependent on my having a desire: I only treat R1, R2 and R3 as reasons because I have a 
desire. For Scanlon, reasons exist first, and desire comes about as a result of endorsing 
them. Consequently, for Blackburn, deliberation is only possible in the light of some 
desire or another. I can stand back from any particular desire – say, I may wonder 
whether I should really be a gourmet, and whether I should pay so much for a meal 
when I could buy something nice for my family instead. But this evaluation is only 
possible because I have other concerns, such as concern for my family.
For Blackburn, there necessarily is a blind spot in deliberation. This blind spot is the 
standpoint from which I currently evaluate other concerns. The concern from which I 
evaluate other concerns may change, so, in the end, I can survey the whole field, but 
not at the same time. Scanlon would consider the existence of such a blind spot as 
skewing deliberation. For each decision, such as the decision to go to the restaurant or 
to buy ice-cream, there are reasons. And these reasons can be evaluated independently 
of which desires I seek to satisfy; in Backburn's terms, they can be evaluated 
independently of any of my concerns. Scanlon argues that desires are not the starting 
points of practical deliberation (Scanlon 1998, p. 43). Blackburn would agree to some 
extent. It is true of any desire taken individually that it does not have to be such a 
starting point. But it does not follow that the starting point of a deliberation is not some 
desire or another. Desires, for Blackburn, are the only standpoints possible.
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3. Problems for Humeans
As we have seen above, Humeans provide refinements as to which desires would count 
as normative reasons: I have to have relevant true beliefs, no relevant false beliefs, I 
have to balance my ends and take the means to them, etc. But rationalists argue that this 
is not enough to account for the force of normative reasons, as the following problems 
show.
Problem 1: Counter-examples: too many and too few reasons
Too many: having a desire to φ does not automatically provide a good reason to φ (e.g. 
Quinn 1993, Dancy 2000). At least some of my desires don't provide me with a 
normative reason to do what I want. If I want something silly, then my wanting to do it 
does not make it any less silly; in other words, my wanting does not give me a good 
reason to do it. Cutting my finger off is (in normal circumstances) a bad idea. And if I 
develop a liking for it, this does not change the situation in the slightest. This is what 
Schroeder (2007) calls the 'Too Many Reasons Problem'.30, 31
Too few: lacking a desire to φ does not mean one has no good reason to φ. There may 
be some things that anyone has a reason to do even though they don't want to. Moral 
reasons, for example, seem to be like that: 'if murder is genuinely wrong, then there 
must be some reason for anyone not to murder people' (Schroeder 2007, p. 103). Since 
Humeans claim that what we have reason to do depends on what promotes our desires, 
Humeans are unable to explain such reasons, unless they can show that there are some 
desires that any agent necessarily has. This is what Schroeder (2007) calls the 'Too Few 
Reasons Problem'.
Problem 2: Instrumental reasoning (e.g. Quinn 1993, Korsgaard 1997, Dancy 2000). 
Humeans hold that we are rationally required to take means to our ends: if I want to 
30 I picked an unusual desire and gave no good reasons for it, because this is how traditional Humeans 
must think of at least some desires. Admitting that all desires are held for normative reasons is 
admitting that reasons generate desires, which is tantamount to abandoning traditional Humeanism. 
So, traditional Humeans must construe some desires as ones not held for reasons, as inexplicable 
urges. And these urges must, according to traditional Humeans, generate normative reasons. (Quinn 
1993)
31 I should note, following Hampshire (1999), that sometimes it is perfectly acceptable to cite your 
desire as a good reason for action. For example, the fact that I really like this particular painting often 
gives me a good reason to buy it. Yet, there are problematic cases, in which my desire gives me no 
good reason to do as want.
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listen to music, I should put the player on. They also hold that none of the ends we have 
are rationally required: it's not the case that rationality requires me to want to listen to 
music. But how does a non-obligatory end create an obligation to take the means? 
Instrumental reasoning can transfer normative force from ends to means, but it cannot 
create normativity from nowhere.32
Problem 3: A reason to satisfy my desires (e.g. Nagel 1970, Quinn 1993). Humeans 
assume that I have a reason to satisfy my desires – if I want to listen to music, I have a 
reason to put the player on. Why do I have this reason? Well, because putting a player 
on will satisfy my desire for music. If there were no relationship between putting it on 
and the satisfaction of my desire, then I would have no reason to do it. So, in order for a 
Humean theory to work, we need to assume that I have a reason to satisfy my desires. 
Humeans hold that any reason is explained by a desire. But which desire explains a 
reason to satisfy my desires? If this reason is not explained by a desire, then the 
Humean theory is false. So, a Humean must say that the reason to satisfy my desires is 
explained by some desire I have. A desire to satisfy my desires seems an obvious 
candidate. But suppose that I lack this desire. Then, if I have a desire to listen to music, 
I have no reason to put the player on. This seems wrong – surely, for Humeans, the 
desire to listen to music must be capable of generating reasons on its own, without the 
help of a further desire to satisfy my desires. Besides, if in lacking this desire I lack 
reasons altogether (i.e. if I stop being an agent), then it looks like this desire is a 
rationally required one. So Humeanism is false, because it denies that any rationally 
required desires exist. (N.B. A Humean may say that desire is a psychological state that 
disposes one to seek its satisfaction. This may be true, but it fails to give desires any 
normative force, i.e. fails to explain how desires can provide normative reasons.)33
32 One could deny that this is a problem for Humeans. As Lillehammer (2007, Ch.3) argues, Humeans 
can admit instrumental rationality and retain what is distinctive about their view. The battle between 
Humeans and their opponents is not about whether there are any norms of rationality at all, but about 
whether there are any substantive, action-guiding ones. I am sympathetic to this understanding of the 
debate, and it is part of the reason why I concentrate on the more basic problem of counter-examples.
33 As pointed out to me by Prof. Pink, there are two possible Humean views, that are often run together 
both by Humeans and their opponents. According to the first view, there is no such thing as the good, 
and one's desires are evaluated in terms of consistency with each other, but not in terms of what they 
aim at. This is a sort of coherence theory of the good. According to the second view, good is whatever 
the agent wants. This second form of Humeanism does not face the problem about instrumental 
reasoning and the problem of finding a reason to satisfy my desires: if my wanting something makes 
it good, then this goodness of the end transmits itself to the means; it also gives me a reason to satisfy 
my desires, because whatever I want is good. 
Both versions of the view, however, face the problem of counter-examples, and that is the problem I 
concentrate on in the main text. According to the first, coherentist, view, my desire gives me a reason 
to do something as long as it coheres with other desires I have. But, as we shall see in what follows, 
even if what I want coheres with other things, it does not always, intuitively, give me a good reason to 
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In what follows, I shall concentrate on the Too Many Reasons problem, but before 
examining Humean responses to it, I shall sketch a rationalist alternative, so that we can 
see clearly what the problem for Humeanism is and what we have to aim for in our 
solution.
3.1. A rationalist alternative
Anti-Humeans solve all the problems presented above by claiming that desires must be 
explained in terms of reasons, not vice versa. Several authors gave such an explanation: 
Quinn (1993), Scanlon (1998), Dancy (2000). I shall concentrate on Scanlon's version 
(1998, pp. 37-49). The main force of Scanlon's argument comes from the thought that 
'having what is generally called a desire involves a tendency to see something as a 
reason' (1998, p. 39.). He argues for this claim in the following manner.
Scanlon's argument
I. Desires don't provide sources of motivation independently of reasons.
II. Desires don't provide sources of justification independently of reasons.
III. Therefore, desires are to be analysed in terms of reasons.
IV. Humeans claim that reasons are to be analysed in terms of desires.
V. III and IV make Humeanism circular.34, 35
The first premise is supported by the following considerations. Suppose I am motivated 
to act. There are two things we can mean by that, says Scanlon. I may be motivated 
because I have an urge to act. 'An urge' here means that I don't see anything good about 
the action. Scanlon dismisses this, saying that such urges are not what we ordinarily 
do it, so the coherentist view faces the Too Many Reasons problem. There are also cases in which 
doing x does not cohere with my other desires, yet, intuitively, I have a good reason to do x. E.g. I 
want to spend all my money on myself rather than support my young child. This desire coheres better 
with other things I want, yet, intuitively, I still have a reason to support my child. So, the coherentist 
view faces the Too Few Reasons problem. According to the second view, good is whatever I want. 
But just because I want something, it does not automatically make it good (Too Many Reasons 
problem), and just because I don't want something, it does not mean it is not good (Too Few Reasons 
problem).
34 IV and V are not stated in Scanlon's text.
35 Korsagaard (1997) provides a similar argument against Humeanism. She argues that if desires are 
non-normative, then they cannot be sources of normative reasons. But if desires are normative, and 
this normativity derives from the principles of reason, then Humeanism is circular.
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mean by 'desire'. This may be true, but a Humean is not tied to using an ordinary notion 
of desire, so we need to say more in order to exclude this option of desire providing a 
motivation to act. We can exclude it for reasons that Dancy (2000, p. 36) proposes: 
doing something when I see no reason whatsoever to do it is surely a pathological, not 
paradigm, example of motivation. The second thing we may mean by saying that I am 
motivated to act is that I have a desire in the directed-attention sense:
[a] person has a desire in the directed-attention sense that P if the thought that P 
keeps occurring to him or her in a favourable light, that is to say, if the person's 
attention is directed insistently toward considerations that present themselves as 
counting in favour of P. (Scanlon 1998, p. 39.)
It is clear that I can be motivated without having a desire in the directed-attention sense 
– for example, when I am about to drink a foul-tasting medicine. Thus, directed-
attention desires are not necessary for motivation. In addition, when I am motived by a 
desire in the directed-attention sense, I am motivated by reasons that my attention is 
drawn to, not by the desire itself. For example, if I want an ice-cream, my attention is 
drawn to its pleasurable cool taste. It is this expected pleasure that motivates me; there 
is no element of wanting distinct from this perception of pleasure as a reason. So, 
desires do not provide sources of motivation that are independent of seeing things as 
reasons.
Scanlon argues for the second premise in the following manner. Suppose I have a good 
reason to do something because, as we say, I want to do it. There are several things we 
may mean by this. First, I may have a good reason to buy an ice-cream because I think 
that its cool, pleasant taste provides me with a good reason to buy it. Here the 
expectation of pleasure provides a normative reason. But desire does not provide an 
independent reason; rather, it is 'an endorsement of a reason', as Raz puts it (1986, p. 
141). To see this clearly, suppose you wanted an ice-cream whilst not expecting any 
pleasure from its taste;36 then it's difficult to see why you have a good reason to buy it. 
Secondly, I may have a desire in the directed-attention sense. My mind keeps returning 
to all the things that make the object of desire attractive. For example, if I want to buy a 
new computer, I keep thinking about how nice the big new screen would be. As in the 
case of expected enjoyment above, the justificatory work here is done by the features I 
take to be reasons. My desire may be an expression of my positive evaluation of these 
36 Suppose also that you don't have any other reason to eat it apart from the pleasant taste.
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features, but without them it lacks justificatory force. Moreover, making these positive 
evaluations does not automatically give me a good reason to buy a new computer. I 
may have my attention insistently directed at how nice it would be to buy a new 
computer without for a moment thinking that I have a good reason to do so. Thirdly, I 
may have an intention. Intentions can give you reasons that you would not have had 
otherwise. For example, if I decided to buy a computer for reasons R1, R2 and R3, and I 
have no reason to reconsider, then I have a reason to go to the computer shop. If I am as 
yet undecided, I have no reason to go to the computer shop. But intentions are not 
independent sources of reasons. My intention is just a place-holder for the three original 
reasons I had: my intention justifies my action just to the extent that R1, R2 and R3 
justify it. Desires, for traditional Humeans, are meant to be different: they provide 
reasons for action where originally there were none. Thus, in none of the cases 
considered do desires provide a source of justification that is independent of reasons.
The notion of desire identified by Scanlon – desire in the directed-attention sense – 
captures our ordinary notion well.37
 I can do what I have no desire, in this sense, to do, as when I drink a foul-
tasting medicine. I take the medicine without my attention being grabbed by 
its attractive features.
 Desires, even when explained in terms of reasons, may resist one's 
considered judgement. For example, even if I know I have no reason to buy 
a computer, my attention may still turn to the attractiveness of getting one.
 It is true to the phenomenology of desires: when we want something our 
attention is captured by the features of the desired object.




Having a silly desire, i.e. a desire that I have no (all things considered) reason to have, 
is compatible with having no good reason to do what I want. This is because, as noted 
37 N.B. A Humean may use 'desire' not as an ordinary notion, but as a technical term. Hence the 
considerations listed below are further support for Scanlon's understanding of desires, not part of his 
main argument against Humeanism.
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above, desires can persist in the face of contrary reason-judgements.
Too few reasons
We no longer face the Too Few Reasons problem, because normative reasons do not 
depend on the agent's desires: she may have a reason to do something even though she 
does not want to.
Problem 2. Instrumental reasoning. I have a reason to take means to my end only if I 
also have a reason to pursue this end. For example, it is only if I have a reason to listen 
to music (e.g. because I expect to enjoy it) that I have a reason to take a means to doing 
so. Instrumental reasoning does not create its own normativity, but the reasons I have 
for the end are transferred to the means.
Problem 3. A reason to satisfy my desires. We no longer need to look for a reason to 
satisfy my desires because they, contrary to the traditional Humean assumption, do not 
always create reasons to satisfy them. If desires are explained in terms of reasons, I 
want x for reasons R1, R2 and R3, and I may have (or fail to have) a reason to satisfy my 
desire for x depending on how good (or how poor) R1, R2 and R3 are.
So, rationalists say, desires are not independent sources of motivation or justification. 
They depend on reasons for that. Therefore, desires are to be analysed in terms of 
reasons – a claim that Humeans must reject on pain of circularity. How do Humeans 
respond?
4. Humean responses
I shall concentrate on the problem of counter-examples, especially on the Too Many 
Reasons Problem, as it seems to be the basic one. The other two38 problems – about 
instrumental rationality and about a reason to satisfy my desires – can be derived from 
the fact that desires don't automatically give me good reasons for action. 
The Too Many Reasons problem is not easily tackled – it looks like any Humean theory 
will have to insist that in some special cases, we have a good reason to do what we 
want, even if we want something silly. A Humean theory creates good reasons in cases 
38 I do not include the Too Few Reasons problem here as it is, together with the Too Many Reasons 
problem, subsumed under the problem of counter-examples.
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where intuitively there aren't any. Yet,
to the extent that a Humean is willing to admit to accepting results that are 
intuitively false, other philosophers are going to legitimately infer that he has 
simply changed the subject, and is talking about something else entirely. 
(Schroeder 2007, p. 86.)
The Too Many Reasons problem is generated by two claims:
Intuition: silly desires do not provide one with normative reasons.
Traditional Humean claim: desires provide one with normative reasons to do whatever 
promotes them.39
There does not seem to be an obvious way of excluding silly desires from the 
Traditional Humean claim.40 Still, there are several things one can do.
 Reject the Intuition. This option would fall prey to the charge of changing the 
topic. If a Humean says that our intuitions about normative reasons are 
unreliable, then it does look like what Humeans are talking about is not what we 
ordinarily talk about when we say we have a good reason to do something.
 Explain why the Traditional Humean claim does not apply to silly desires. 
 Reject the Traditional Humean claim. If this option is taken, it may be difficult 
to say why one's theory is still Humean. This is the option I favour. The 
resulting theory is certainly a departure from traditional Humeanism, but is 
39 How the promotion relation is to be construed is a matter of debate (Schroeder 2007, pp. 110-113). 
One way to understand it as an identity relation – I have a reason to do A only if I want A. This, as 
Schroeder points out, is too strong: Ronnie may have a reason to go to the party because he wants to 
dance, and there will be dancing at the party. The action – going to the party – is not the same as the 
desire it promotes – wanting to dance. Schroeder weakens the promotion relation: I have a reason to 
do A only if doing A increases the likelihood of the object of my desire obtaining. This, however, 
leads to intuitively unacceptable consequences, as Schroeder himself admits. For example, eating my 
car increases the likelihood of my getting my daily dose of iron. I want to get my required dose of 
iron, so I have a reason to eat my car.
40 Williams' (1979) considerations do not help here. According to Williams, my desires will only give 
me good reasons if they (desires) satisfy the following criteria:
1. My desire is not based on a false belief.
2. I have relevant true beliefs (e.g. I have true beliefs that will help me satisfy my desire).
3. My desire is refined by the process of deliberation in terms of being consistent with my other 
desires and means to their satisfaction.
A silly desire can satisfy all these criteria. If you have doubts about the finger-cutting example, I'll 
use another one, that comes from Schroeder (2007). Aunt Margaret wants to reconstruct a scene from 
a furniture catalogue on Mars, for which she needs a spacecraft. No one will give her a spacecraft, so 
she has to build one herself. According to Humeanism, she has a good reason to build a spacecraft. 
Her desire does not obviously fail any of Williams' constraints, but it is still a silly desire that should 
not, intuitively, give rise to a normative reason.
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inspired by it: it holds onto the claim that sentiments are necessary for having 
(access to) normative reasons.
4.1. Traditional Humean response
There are three different ways of explaining why the Traditional Humean claim does 
not apply to silly desires. The first one is to point out that silly desires are outweighed 
by other desires I have. This is the option I shall concentrate on in detail, since I think it 
is the most viable strategy for traditional Humeans, but I mention the other two briefly. 
The second way of solving the Too Many Reasons problem is to say that there are two 
different types of desires, and that only desires of one type, but not another, provide one 
with normative reasons. Frankfurt (1971), for example, distinguishes between first- and 
second-order desires. He argues that my first-order desire fails to give me a normative 
reason to promote it if I don't have a corresponding second-order desire. My desire to 
cut my finger off, for example, does not give me a good reason to do it if I don't want to 
have this desire. My second-order desires correspond to my values, or things that I have 
reasons to do. The are two general problems with this sort of response.41 First, as Quinn 
(1993) points out, traditional Humeans have to think of at least some desires as 
inexplicable urges (or, in Frankfurt's terminology, as desires lacking corresponding 
second-order desires) which still provide me with normative reasons. This is because 
traditional Humeans hold that desires explain reasons, but not vice versa. If all my 
desires that give me normative reasons do so because they are held for reasons, 
Humeanism is circular. At this point one may say that Frankfurt does not mean that 
second-order desires are desires that are held for good reasons; rather, it is just a brute 
fact that they provide us with normative reasons whilst first-order desires do not. But 
then it is difficult to see why second- rather than first-, or n-order, desires should be 
identified with what I value. It opens up a possibility for having sensible first-order 
desires and silly second-order ones.42 The second problem for the theories that divide 
41 I discuss this response by using Frankfurt (1971) as an an example, but the same problems face 
similar theories developed by other authors. (Schroeder (2007, p. 85, n. 3) mentions Williams (1973) 
and Watson (1975) as proponents of the two types of desire strategy. I am not entirely convinced that 
they are. Williams is not trying to solve the Too Many Reasons problem; he targets utilitarians' 
inability to make space for personal projects. This does not commit Williams to saying that only 
desires that promote my life projects give me good reasons. As for Watson, it is not clear that he is a 
Humean at all, since he admits that value judgements may provide a source of motivation that is 
independent of desires.)
42 This is indeed the criticism made of Frankfurt's view by Watson (1975).
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desires into two qualitatively different types is noted by Schroeder (2007, pp. 85-86). 
Such theories, on the one hand, still allow some silly desires to generate normative 
reasons. For example, it is possible that I may want to cut my finger off and desire to 
have this desire. On the other hand, such theories exclude some sensible desires from 
generating normative reasons. For example, if I want to go to the shops, which, let us 
suppose, is a sensible thing to do in the circumstances, it is possible that I do not have a 
second-order desire to do so. Nor do I normally form second-order desires for every 
sensible first-order desire I have.43 
One could also try to adapt the distinction between wide- and narrow-scope rational 
requirements as a solution to the Too Many Reasons problem.44 Suppose that getting a 
knife from the kitchen is a necessary means for cutting my finger off. So, if I want to 
cut my finger off, I ought to get the knife from the kitchen. This last proposition is 
ambiguous. It can be read as ought having a wide scope, i.e. modifying the whole 
proposition: I ought (if I want to cut my finger off, to get the knife from the kitchen). 
Alternatively, it can be read as ought modifying only the consequent: If I want to cut 
my finger off, I ought (to get the knife from the kitchen). Blackburn (1998, pp. 242-
243) and Broome (1999) argue for the first, wide-scope  reading. On such a reading, I 
am rationally required to either take the means to my crazy end or to abandon the end. 
This may be a way of dealing with silly desires. If oughts are wide-scope in this 
context, then abandoning the desire, rather than promoting it, is an option I have. And 
this is what I should do in the case of a silly desire, although not in the case of a 
sensible one. The problem with this response is obvious: which desires should I 
abandon, and which ones should I promote? In order to answer this question, we need a 
substantive distinction between silly and sensible desires. In which case this response 
collapses into the previous one, which tries to distinguish between different types of 
desires, and the problems for that have already been discussed.
Having briefly considered these two responses, I shall now concentrate on the one that 
43 One may object that I may have an implicit second-order order desire in such cases, and it can be 
made explicit by questioning. However, I still think it is psychologically unrealistic to claim that I 
form an (implicit) second-order desire for every sensible desire I have. Nor can Frankfurt explain 
why this should be the case, given that there is no qualitative difference between desires of different  
orders.
44 The defenders of such a theory disagree about what these rational requirements are. Blackburn (1998, 
pp. 242-243) talks about 'oughts', Broome (1999) says it is a requirement that is distinct from both 
'reasons' and 'oughts' relations. In what follows, I shall talk about oughts, but the debate about what 
rational requirements are does not affect my argument.
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seems most developed and most promising. This is the idea that silly desires fail to 
provide normative reasons to satisfy them because they stop me from satisfying my 
other desires. If I cut my finger off, for example, I would not be able to satisfy any of 
my desires that require a full compliment of fingers. This particular desire does 
generate a reason, but it is outweighed by other desire-generated reasons I have. Any of 
my desires can be evaluated from the point of view of other things I want. E.g. if I want 
to play the piano, then this desire may well outweigh my desire to cut my finger off. 
Such outweighed desires fail to give me normative reasons, even though they would, 
according to Humeans, give rise to normative reasons where they not outweighed.
So, according to this response the Traditional Humean claim that generates the Too 
Many Reasons problem does not apply to silly desires because they are outweighed by 
other desires one has. There are two problems with this solution. The first problem is 
that this response has failed to get rid of the original counter-example.
Silly desires still generate good reasons
This response says that although the silly desire to cut my finger off is outweighed by 
other things I want, there nothing wrong with its reason-producing powers per se. Were 
other desires absent, this desire would give me a good reason to satisfy it. In this case, 
Humeans still say that I do have a normative reason to do something stupid. Someone 
who already has a strong Humean intuition (and I do) will be happy to agree that, since 
my desire is outweighed by other desires, it does not give me a good reason to do as I 
want. But anti-Humeans would not be satisfied with this line of thought; for them, it 
just pinpoints the problem rather than provides a solution. If cutting my finger off was a 
silly idea to start with, why should it make any difference to its silliness whether I have 
desires that outweigh it? The result anti-Humeans want is that my silly desire fails to 
provide me with a reason because it is silly, not because there are some other desires 
that would not be satisfied because of it.
A Humean may respond that we only call a desire 'silly' when it puts one's other desires 
into jeopardy. There is nothing wrong with a desire per se, it is only silly against the 
background of other desires.45 If competing desires are removed, my previously silly 
desire would give me a normative reason to satisfy it. Thus, the Humean theory gives 
us the correct result. This response does not work. To see why, consider a variation on a 
45 Blackburn says something along those lines: my desires can only be evaluated from the point of view 
of my other desires. So, if I only have a single desire, it cannot be evaluated (1998, p. 240).
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famous thought-experiment (Williams 1973). I am offered to kill one of ten prisoners. 
If I do this, the others will be unharmed. If I refuse, then all ten will be killed. In this 
variant, I have the option of sacrificing myself instead of killing one of the prisoners: if 
I die, all ten prisoners will be unharmed. Suppose I have a desire to sacrifice myself in 
these circumstances.46 It is very clear that this desire puts most, if not all, of my other 
desires in jeopardy. There are a lot of competing considerations, I am not someone who 
will give my life gladly and without regrets. Suppose my desire to sacrifice myself is 
outweighed by my desire to live. So, according to the traditional Humean response, my 
desire to sacrifice myself is a silly one and fails to generate a normative reason. But 
even someone who says that I should not sacrifice myself in these circumstances, for 
example, because the demand is too great, would not say that this desire is a silly one, 
of the sort that fails to generate a normative reason. Contrary to the Humean contention, 
some desires that are outweighed are not silly. Conversely, some desires that are not 
outweighed can still be silly. We would ordinarily say that my desire to cut my finger 
off fails to provide me with a good reason to satisfy it even before we are told of 
competing considerations, if any. This latter point can be better brought out by making 
the example more detailed. Suppose that I could help a nearby child, which requires a 
full complement of fingers. I am aware that the child needs help and that I must have 
my fingers intact to help her, yet I do not want to help. In this case, my desire to cut my 
finger off is not outweighed, but it still fails to provide me with a good reason to do as I 
want.
Reasons' weight
The traditional Humean response says that some desires provide no good reasons to 
satisfy them because they are outweighed by other desires. In this case, a Humean owes 
us an account of the reasons' weight. Traditional Humeans account for weight of 
reasons in terms of strength of desire: R1 is weightier than R2 iff I want R1 more. But 
this account of reasons' weight presents at least two problems.
 If I want to cut my finger off more than I want to do anything else, then, 
according to this method of weighting up reasons, I have a good reason to cut 
my finger off. This generates a version of the original counter-example. A 
Humean says that just because I want something silly very much I have a 
normative reason to do it. But ordinarily we think that strength of desire makes 
46 Some may say that we should not talk about my desires here, but I assume that sacrificing myself is 
driven by a desire to do so in order not to beg the question against Humeans.
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no difference here. So, either a Humean is incorrect, and silly but strong desires 
provide no normative reasons, or she is changing the subject and is no longer 
talking about good reasons as we ordinarily understand them.
 Anti-Humeans may justifiably complain that this is not an account of a 
normative reason's weight. The strength of desires may be a good measure for 
motivating reasons, but how good a reason I have to do something just does not 
depend on how much I want to do it.
So, the traditional Humean solution fails to explain why silly desires don't generate 
normative reasons.
4.2. Schroeder's response
The Too Many Reasons problem has often been taken lightly by Humeans. Schroeder 
(2007) is an exception: he both recognizes that it is a problem, and that it requires 
abandoning some traditional Humean assumptions. Schroeder's solution is partially to 
reject the Intuition and to provide an account of reasons' weight that excludes silly 
desires from the Traditional Humean claim. Rejecting the Intuition outright will fall 
prey to the charge of changing the topic, but Schroeder tries to remedy this by making 
all good reasons weighty. On the one hand, he accepts that all desires – even silly ones 
– generate normative reasons. He thinks that, for example, I have a reason to eat my 
car, because doing so will get me my daily portion of iron. He admits that it is not a 
weighty reason, but nonetheless it qualifies as a reason (pp. 95-96). On the other hand, 
Schroeder rescues common-sense talk about normative reasons by holding that what we 
ordinarily mean by a 'good reason' is a 'weighty reason'. And then he proposes an 
account of normative reasons' weight that purports to show that all reasons generated 
by silly desires are not weighty.
So, Schroeder's solution to the Too Many Reasons problem depends on his account of 
reasons' weight (2007, pp. 123-145). He rejects the account of normative reasons' 
weight in terms of desire strength. Instead, Schroeder says, one reason is weightier than 
another if I have more reason to place weight on it. This is not (quite) as trivial as it 
seems. For example,47 suppose Ronnie is deciding whether to go to the party. He has a 
47 Adapted from Schroeder 2007, pp. 127-128, pp. 132-133.
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reason to go – R1  (there'll be good food). He has a reason not to go – R2 (his ex-
girlfriend Isabel will be there). Now suppose he knows that Isabel has a new boyfriend 
who lives in another city. If so, it is just as likely that Isabel will visit him instead of 
turning up at the party, and this consideration (R3) is a reason to place less weight onto 
R2. On the other hand, Isabel's new boyfriend may want to meet Isabel's friends; this 
undercuts consideration R3, etc. At some point, Schroeder insists, these defeaters run 
out, so all we have to do is 'go back through the chain' (Ibid., p. 137) and determine the 
weight of the original reasons – in this case, R1 and R2, by seeing which one of them is 
not undercut.
This analysis, unlike the traditional Humean account of normative reasons' weight, 
makes weight depend on something that is normative – on other reasons. Thus, it does 
not fall prey to the problems raised at the end of the previous section:
 Wanting to cut my finger off more than wanting to do anything else, according 
to Schroeder’s account, does not mean that I have a good reason to cut my 
finger off. A weaker desire of mine can give me a weightier reason than a 
stronger desire. This is because how weighty a reason my desire provides does 
not depend on the strength of my desire; rather, it depends on which of my 
desires are undercut by defeating considerations. If I have a strong desire that is 
undercut, and a weaker desire that is not undercut, then I have a weightier 
reason to do what promotes my weaker desire. 
 It makes normative reason’s weight a normative matter, and so is more plausible 
than an account of normative reasons' weight in terms of desire strength.
So, Schroeder partially rejects the Intuition and provides a different account of reasons’ 
weight; with these bits of his theory in place, I shall now quote his solution to the Too 
Many Reasons problem. His example of a silly desire is Aunt Margaret's desire to 
reconstruct a catalogue scene on Mars, for the satisfaction of which she is building a 
spacecraft. That is, she is taking enormously costly means to fantastically frivolous 
ends.
It is relatively easy to imagine that if it is possible to explain any agent-neutral 
reasons, it will be possible to explain an agent-neutral reason not to place weight 
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on merely agent-relational reasons in favour of actions that merely promote 
enormously costly, financially frivolous ends. Even Aunt Margaret has such a 
reason – for consider anything else that Aunt Margaret desires. Placing 
inordinate weight on idiosyncratic reasons to take enormously costly means to 
fantastically frivolous ends is a great way to undertake too many costs in order to 
accomplish the other things she wants. Of course, it may be that on balance what 
Aunt Margaret wants most is simply to reconstruct her catalogue scene on Mars, 
even at the cost of everything else she wants. But as long as there are some 
things she desires to at least some degree, and which are at least put in jeopardy 
by the action of placing great weight on reasons to take enormously costly means 
to fantastically frivolous ends, then we should be able to successfully run this 
explanation even in Aunt Margaret’s case. (Schroeder 2007, p. 143, italics in 
original, bold emphasis added.)
The quotation mentions agent-neutral reasons. An agent-neutral reason, for Schroeder, 
is a reason that is 'explained by any possible desire' (Ibid., p. 109): independently of 
what you want, as long as you want anything at all, you would have this reason. But 
agent-neutral reasons do not play a crucial role in Schroeder’s response. Schroeder does 
not believe that there definitely are agent-neutral reasons, he is just trying to show that 
their existence is compatible with Humeanism (Ibid., pp. 118-119). And even if agent-
neutral reasons exist, Schroeder does not tell us what they may be. (It is telling that in 
the quotation above a purported agent-neutral reason is mentioned within the scope of 
the conditional.) The real work in Schroeder’s response in done by his account of 
reasons' weight. As we have seen, his account is more attractive than the traditional 
account in terms of desire strength: Schroeder’s account allows for weaker desires to 
provide better, weightier reasons than stronger desires. Suppose Aunt Margaret's desire 
to recreate the catalogue scene on Mars is stronger than any of the desires she has that 
are incompatible with it (as Schroeder puts it, this is what she wants 'on balance'). If we 
account for reasons’ weight in terms of desire strength, then we have to conclude that 
this is the weightiest reason Aunt Margaret has. Schroeder’s account avoids this 
conclusion. According to Schroeder, Aunt Margaret’s strongest desire does not give her 
a weighty reason, as long as the weaker desires are not undercut by some defeating 
considerations. If weaker, competing desires, are not undercut, then Aunt Margaret's 
silly desire does not give her a good (i.e. weighty) reason. Schroeder's account of 
reasons’ weight is better than the one that Humeans have traditionally offered. 
However, there are two problems with Schroeder’s solution.
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Silly desires still generate good reasons
Even though Schroeder’s account of reasons’ weight is superior to the traditional one, 
because it allows weaker desires to provide better reasons, it faces the same problem as 
the traditional response: it relies on the presence of other desires. According to 
Schroeder’s account, although my desire to do something silly is outweighed by other 
desires, there is nothing wrong with its reason-producing powers per se. Aunt 
Margaret’s silly desire fails to generate normative reasons 'as long as there are some 
things she desires to at least some degree' (Ibid., p. 143). If at least some of these 
desires are not undercut, they can turn the silly desire into a bad (not weighty) reason. 
But were these other desires absent, Aunt Margaret's desire would give her a good 
reason to build a spacecraft. So, Schroeder still says that Aunt Margaret has a normative 
reason to do something stupid. Which, again, will dissatisfy someone without a 
Humean intuition. The result anti-Humeans want is that silly desires fail to provide 
normative reasons because they are silly, not because there are some other desires 
would not be satisfied.
This is not an advance on the traditional solution. Schroeder cannot make this advance 
because he still accepts that any desire, even a silly one, automatically gives me a 
normative reason. This reason is not very weighty, but it is a normative reason. And 
even though he accounts for weights of reasons in a different way, we have the same 
result: when one’s silly desire is not outweighed by other desires, it still gives me a 
normative reason to do as I want.
Schroeder's account of reasons’ weight is trivial
Although Schroeder’s account of weight is an improvement on the traditional account, 
because it accepts that I can have a weightier reason to do something even if I don't 
want it most, it faces a problem. Schroeder’s account of reasons’ weight is trivial: it 
says that we should put weight on the weightier reason without explaining what weight 
is. This is a serious difficulty, because Schroeder’s solution to the Too Many Reasons 
problem depends on identifying desires to do silly things as providing reasons that are 
not weighty. So, if he fails to specify what a reason's weight is, he fails to distinguish 
desires to do silly things from other desires.
I shall now show that Schroeder’s account of weight is trivial. As in the case above, 
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Ronnie has a reason to go to the party because there is good food there (R1). And he has 
a reason not to go because he believes he'll be killed at this party (R4). Suppose Ronnie 
believes this because he hired a hitman who will kill everyone who goes to this party. 
Now consider two possibilities:
First case: Ronnie goes through all the defeaters, and neither R1 nor R4 is 
undercut. According to Schroeder, this means that R1 and R4 are of equal 
weight. But this is clearly not true: not being killed outweighs having good 
food.
Second case: Ronnie goes through all the defeaters, and R1 is not undercut, 
whereas R4 is. R4 is undercut by the consideration that the hitman Ronnie has 
hired is unreliable, so it is likely there'll be no killings at the party after all. 
According to Schroeder, this means that R1 is weightier than R4. But this is 
clearly not true: probably not being killed still outweighs having good food.
Counting undercutting considerations is not enough to tell one which reasons are 
weighty. It does play a part in determining the weight, but it fails to distinguish reasons 
that are, intuitively, weightier than others. So, Schroeder's account of reasons' weight 
does not actually tell you which of your desires give you weighty, i.e. good, reasons. In 
which case, we can't conclude that my desire to cut my finger off or Aunt Margaret's 
desire to recreate a catalogue scene on Mars fail to provide us with good (weighty) 
reasons. Schroeder's solution to the Too Many Reasons problem depended on 
distinguishing weighty reasons from non-weighty ones. So, if his account of reasons' 
weight it trivial, he no longer has a solution to this problem.
We have seen that Humean responses – either the traditional one or Schroeder's 
innovative one – fail to solve the Too Many Reasons Problem. Humeans are still 
committed to saying that there are good reasons in cases where we ordinarily think 
there are none. I think this shows that, if we want to avoid changing the topic, we must 
reject the
Traditional Humean claim: desires provide one with normative reasons to do 
whatever promotes them.
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This claim throws up the counter-examples, and it leads to the vicious circularity 
exploited by Scanlon's argument (section 3.1). The lesson I draw from the trouble 
Humeans have with the Too Many Reasons problem is that we should reject the claim 
about promotion, and find another way of explaining why desires, or, more broadly, 
sentiments, are necessary for having (access to) normative reasons. Promotion relation 
is not the only way in which this necessity can be explained. And, as I have argued, this 
is not a good way, either. I propose, instead, that sentiments are necessary for having 
normative reasons because sentiments are necessary for mastery of evaluative concepts. 
This proposal is further explained in the next section.
5. My response: indirect sentimentalism
My proposal is the following. Normative reasons are evaluations (if values are not real) 
or what evaluations represent (if values are real). Evaluations include evaluative 
concepts. Sentiments are necessary for mastery of such concepts. One may call this 
account 'indirect sentimentalism', because good reasons are not provided by sentiments 
themselves, but via mastery of evaluative concepts. Once we get such mastery, we can 
make fully-fledged evaluations, which serve as our reasons for action. Good reasons are 
not sentiments themselves, but evaluations or what these evaluations represent.
My defence of this position takes up the next two chapters. In the next chapter, I argue 
that  psychopaths, who have various emotional deficiencies, have a worse 
understanding of moral concepts than the general population. For example, they cannot 
distinguish between conventional and moral norms (Blair 1995, replicated in Blair et 
al. 1995). This suggests that one needs emotions (specifically guilt and remorse) for 
mastery of moral concepts. Psychopaths may be in the same situation with regard to 
moral concepts as a colour-blind person is with regard to colours. The colour-blind 
person lacks mastery of the phenomenal concept of, say, red, and the only way (at least 
for humans) to acquire this mastery is to have an experience of red. This is the analogy 
I develop in Chapter 4. For now, I show how my theory copes with the problems 
discussed above.
Problem 1: Counter-examples: too many and too few reasons
Too many: having a desire to φ does not automatically provide good reason to φ. At 
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least some of my desires don't provide me with a normative reason to do what I want. If 
I want something silly, then my wanting to do it does not make it any less silly.
Here is my solution to the Too Many Reasons problem. My desire to do something silly 
fails automatically to give me a normative reason, because normative reasons are not 
generated by desires themselves, but consist in, or are represented by, positive 
evaluations. If I (or someone else) evaluate the action as silly, the evaluation is not 
positive, hence, I don't have a normative reason to do it (by my own or another's lights 
– depending on who the evaluator is). The Too Many Reasons problem arose because 
of the Traditional Humean claim that desires automatically give one a good reason to 
promote what one wants. According to my account, this is not so: normative reasons are 
evaluations, which are independent of desires to some extent.
However, as noted above, this independence is not complete. The truth of traditional 
Humeanism is that sentiments are necessary for having normative reasons, although not 
for the reasons usually given. Traditional Humeans hold that my normative reasons 
depend on desires because I have a normative reason to do whatever promotes my 
desires. But the Too Many Reasons problem shows that this is false. I argue, instead, 
that sentiments are necessary for having (access to) normative reasons because they 
(sentiments) give one mastery of evaluative concepts.
Too few: lacking a desire to φ does not mean one has no good reason to φ. There seem 
to be some things anyone has a reason to do even though they don't want to.
Since I reject the traditional Humean claim that one has a reason to do whatever 
promotes her desires, I can solve the Too Few Reasons problem as well. According to 
my account it is literally true that I can have a reason to do what I don't want to do. 
This is because I deny that any action must promote some desire. Instead, desires are 
necessary for getting mastery of evaluative concepts. Once I have mastered these 
concepts, I may do something – say, provide help to someone, –  because I think that 
helping her is a good thing (i.e. because of my evaluation), not because helping her 
promotes one of my desires, and not because I actually have a desire to help her: once I 
master evaluative concepts, I can occasionally use them without having any sentiments.
Problem 2: Instrumental reasoning. Traditional Humeans hold that we are rationally 
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required to take means to our ends, and they also hold that the ends we have are not 
rationally required. But how does a non-obligatory end create an obligation to take the 
means? Instrumental reasoning can transfer normative force from ends to means, but it 
cannot create normativity from nowhere.
If values are objective, instrumental reasoning is not required to create normativity 
from nowhere, it simply transfers the normativity of the objective value, which I access 
via my desires, to whatever means I take to pursue this value. My desire is still not 
rationally required, because a rational creature would not have it purely in virtue of its 
rationality. If values are subjective, then my evaluation of the end as good transfers the 
normativity of evaluation of my end to whatever means I take to it.
Problem 3: A reason to satisfy my desires. Traditional Humeans assume that I have a 
reason to satisfy my desires. But where does this reason come from?
I don't have to assume that I have a good reason to satisfy my desires, because good 
reasons are not generated by an agent's desires directly. Instead, reasons are generated 
by desires indirectly, via mastery of evaluative concepts. To return to the example 
above, I have a good reason to help someone as long as I make an evaluation that 
helping her is a good thing to do, even if there is no desire of mine that is promoted by 
helping her.
5.1. Still sentimentalist?
My theory is clearly a departure from traditional sentimentalist theories. I take 
Humeanism to be compatible with objective values, and I abandoned the claim that I 
only have a normative reason to do whatever promotes my desires. Instead, I say that 
desires are necessary because they make one master evaluative concepts. These are 
significant modifications, so I adduce some reasons why I still consider my theory to be 
a species of sentimentalism.
Objective values
It may be surprising that Humeanism is compatible with objective values. Dancy 
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(2000), for example, takes Humeanism, which he calls a 'desire-based theory of 
normative reasons', to oppose value-based theories of normative reasons. This is true of 
traditional Humean theories. But what I take to be the main claim of Humeanism –  that 
reasoning alone cannot motivate – by itself does not specify why Humeanism should be 
opposed to the existence of objective values. I take this claim to be the minimal 
commitment of any Humean theory. Having desires is a necessary condition for having 
reasons. Understood as this minimal commitment, Humeanism is clearly compatible 
with the claim that desires are necessary because they provide access to objective 
values. In fact, as we have seen in the previous chapter, formal rationalism, not 
Humeanism, is ill-suited to be combined with objective values. There I have argued that 
reasoning alone, understood as coherence and consistency, fails to provide us with 
definite courses of action because it fails to provide evaluations.
A weakening is in order. I think it is possible (in principle, though not in practice, for 
reasons discussed in the next chapter) that someone who had sentiments in the past, but 
no longer has then, can still act for good reasons. Suppose some creature has 
sentiments, and this allows it to gain  mastery of evaluative concepts. Then, in one way 
or another, it loses its capacity for sentiment.   This does not make it lose mastery of 
evaluative concepts – for all I have said, mastery of evaluate concepts is independent of 
sentiments, once acquired. At this point the minimal commitment of Humeans requires 
disambiguation. It may mean what both sides of the debate have usually taken it to 
mean: a) that I can't now have a reason to act without now having some desire. But 
another disambiguation is possible: it may mean b) that I can't now have a reason to act 
without having had some desire in the past. (Compare: having been laid by a chicken is 
a necessary (and sufficient, but put it to one side) condition for this being a chicken 
egg. The fact that the chicken that laid the egg may not be around any more does not 
mean that this condition is not necessary.) According to the first disambiguation, 
desires are necessary for each act. According to the second, they are necessary in order 
to acquire a capacity for action, and this is the main claim of my account. But I also 
think that the creature described above is not a human agent. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, empirical literature suggests that humans need their evaluative concepts 
refreshed and reinforced by sentiments, even after mastery has been acquired.
Still opposing rationalism
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My theory is not something rationalists would accept, because there are still no desires 
that one has purely in virtue of her rationality. For rationalists, inability to make some 
evaluations, or making incorrect evaluations must be 'open to rational criticism' 
(Scanlon 1998, p. 27). But it is not so according to my account. Inability to make some 
evaluations, or making incorrect evaluations is, in Blackburn's words, 'a defect of 
passion' (Blackburn 1998, p. 239). Psychopaths, for example, are unable to master 
some evaluative concepts because they lacks such sentiments as guilt and remorse.
One may object48 that, on my story, rational criticism may be appropriate. Once I 
master an evaluative concept, I may misapply it, i.e. make incorrect evaluations. 
Having seen red, I then go around saying that post boxes are green. Having had 
sentiments, I go around saying that stones taste nice and that education has never done 
any good to anyone. If I make such colour judgements and evaluations, why am I not 
open to rational criticism? And if I am, my theory is no longer in opposition to 
rationalism.
This objection requires me to spell out first, the strength of the link between sentiments 
and evaluations, secondly, what content one's sentiments have and thirdly, what makes 
evaluations correct or incorrect, i.e. their underlying metaphysics. So, first the link. 
Above I admitted that it is in principle possible for a creature with sentiments to acquire 
mastery of evaluative concepts, then lose all sentiments, yet retain concept mastery. I 
still wish to leave this possibility open, since there may be creatures which are 
infinitely more complex and capable than us. However, in the human case, I believe 
that mastery of concepts will not survive absence or severe irregularity of sentiment for 
long. Our evaluative concepts need to be periodically refreshed by feelings – cases of 
sentiment disorders, discussed in the next chapter, show as much. Thus, in humans, the 
link between sentiments and evaluations is more than just initial production: sentiments 
continue to be necessary for masterful evaluations. A human who is making masterful 
evaluations will, typically, have the feelings associated with them. Secondly, what 
content do sentiments have? Continuing with the colour analogy, sentiments are quasi-
perceptual states. As such, sentiments are not subject to rational criticism: if I see red 
as green, my perceptual apparatus is malfunctioning, but I am not open to rational 
criticism if I say that postboxes are green.49 So, if stones taste nice to me, and I declare 
48 This objection is due to Prof. Pink.
49 I am, of course, open to such criticism if I know that my perceptual apparatus is not tracking colours 
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that they are nice, I am not open to rational criticism either. This takes us to the third 
point – what makes my evaluations correct or incorrect? My colour vision apparatus 
tracks colours, and it is due to this that we can say when the malfunction of this 
apparatus occurs. So, in order to justifiably call some evaluations correct and some 
incorrect, they have to also track things in the world, i.e. we need objective, in some 
sense, values. They may be primary (Platonic) qualities, or secondary (McDowellian) 
ones. I do not take a stance on metaphysics here, but I believe that in order to justify 
most of our everyday talk of values and good reasons, we need values to be objective 
either in Platonic, or in more austere, McDowellian way.50 If we were to adopt such a 
metaphysics, we would have a straightforward standard of correctness for evaluations. 
This would not yet be enough to be in opposition to rationalism. We would also need an 
additional thesis about epistemology, which says that our awareness of these values is 
not (purely) a matter of rationality. I have argued for this thesis in the previous chapter. 
This epistemological thesis can take different forms. We may follow McDowell in 
claiming that it is a matter of sensitivity, or Plato, who (at least according to the reading 
of his work presented in Chapter 1, section 3.2) names a particular sensitivity, eros, to 
fulfil this role. What is important for my purposes is that in neither case our awareness 
of values is achieved (purely) via our rational capacity, and hence someone who is not 
aware of values is not irrational, as rationalists would claim, but insensitive.
However, now I face another objection.51 Above I have said that sentiments are quasi-
perceptual states. My being afraid of the spider usually tells me that the spider is 
dangerous, just like my seeing a red rose usually tells me that the rose is red. But if 
sentiments have this content, it is difficult to see why they fail to give me reasons to do 
in the way that it should do, yet continue to make confident colour judgements.
50 Another option is to reject correspondence theory of truth as, for example, Skorupski (1999) does. He 
suggests that one is warranted in judging that something is admirable, for example, iff i) I admire it in 
a non-alienating way (i.e. not due to indoctrination, etc.) and ii) my evidence gives me no warrant to 
think that other rational people with the same evidence will fail to admire it (Skorupski 1999, p. 446). 
I do not find this option attractive for two reasons. First, I think that when we disagree about whether 
something is admirable, we pre-philosophically think that we disagree about properties it has, and 
although the fact that you disagree with me may make me pause for thought, it will not necessarily 
make me give up my opinion, even though I think you are fully rational and your factual evidence is 
as good as mine. That is, I have a hunch that we have a pre-philosophical commitment to the 
correspondence theory of truth. If this is indeed correct (and that is something that would be 
interesting to investigate), rejecting correspondence theory of truth will not be able to justify ordinary 
practice. Secondly, Skoruski's filling out of his own positive view depends on rationality's being a 
non-receptive faculty. I think, however, that rational capacity is a classic receptive capacity – I do not 
have a choice, in so far as I am rational, not to believe something that I think I have most reason to 
believe. No do I have a choice, in so far as I am rational, to intend something other than that which I 
think is most reasonable.
51 Made by Prof. Pink.
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things, without any need for evaluations. If my sentiment tells me that a spider is 
dangerous, then I do not need an evaluation that tells me the same thing again: 
sentiments do generate normative reasons directly, without the help of evaluations. If 
this is so, then the Too Many Reasons problem and its cognates re-appear, and no 
progress has been made beyond traditional Humeanism. I shall now put the same point 
more formally. Indirect sentimentalism holds that:
(1) Sentiments give us mastery of evaluative concepts, because sentiments are 
quasi-perceptions of value.
(2) Sentiments do not automatically give us a normative reason to do something; 
only evaluations do this.
(1) explains why sentiments give us evaluative concepts. (2) is there to avoid traditional 
problems for sentimentalism, discussed earlier in this chapter. (1) and (2) are 
inconsistent, yet it seems that my account requires both (1) and (2), as is shown by the 
following dilemma:
First horn: deny (1) and affirm (2). Sentiments are not representations of value, so they 
do not automatically give us normative reasons to do things. But if they are not 
representations of value, why do they give us mastery of evaluative concepts?
Second horn: affirm (1) and deny (2). Sentiments are representations of value, which 
explains why they give us mastery of evaluative concepts. However, given that they are 
representations of value, they do automatically give us normative reasons, and hence 
my account faces all the problems of traditional sentimentalism.
Yet another way of putting this is to ask: which of these two states – sentiments or 
evaluations – really track values? In my account they seems to be a rivalry between the 
two.
The solution to this problem requires putting some distance between sentiments and 
evaluations, and explaining their respective roles in agency. One way of doing it is to 
point out that sentiments are necessarily localized and perspectival, whilst evaluations 
(and hence normative reasons) are not. Oddie makes this point well:
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Imagine I have a badly fractured limb caused by a skiing accident … A stranger 
skiing on the same slope just behind me has suffered a similar fracture, and he is 
now lying in the snow alongside me, suffering what appears to be the same degree 
of pain. I would like his pain to cease, naturally, but I am even more desirous of 
the cessation of my own pain. When the stretcher team appears, it turns out that 
they only have one shot of morphine left. Since the relief of stranger's pain is just 
as valuable as the relief of my own pain, the merit principle [p is good just to the 
degree that p merits being desired] demands that I be indifferent as to whose pain 
is treated. But I am not. (Oddie 2005, p. 60.)
In this case, Oddie notes, my desires are not at fault. This is because they, just like other 
quasi-perceptual states, are perspectival. The moon looks the same size as than the sun, 
even though the sun is bigger, and I know that it is. Yet my perception of the moon as 
the larger object is not defective – this is how a normally functioning human visual 
system represents objects that are closer to me. How big objects look depends on my 
perspective. The same applies to desires – even though the relief of my pain is just as 
valuable as the relief of another skier's pain, I am differently situated with respect to my 
pain, so it is perfectly normal for me to desire cessation of my pain more. Sentiments, 
then, being closely tied to my perspective, are unsuited for the job of generating 
normative reasons without the help of evaluations. The lesson of the second half of 
Chapter 1 was that my normative reasons are as good as anyone else's. To account for 
this, we need evaluations, because they are not tied to my particular perspective.
Yet there is a certain rivalry between sentiments and evaluations, which, on a correct 
account, should not be eliminated if we are trying to give an account of human agency. 
In the usual case, evaluations track values and sentiments do not, because sentiments 
are necessarily perspectival. However, suppose values are real. Then, on occasion, 
sentiments, and not evaluations, may provide access to them. This is restricted to cases 
when evaluations are the result of indoctrination and similar practices. For example, 
when Huckleberry Finn decides to protect Jim, a runaway slave, even though he thinks 
it's the wrong thing to do, his evaluations conflict with his sentiments, yet he does well 
to follow the latter.52 Sometimes sentiments do provide normative reasons. But even if 
this is the case, they don't provide a normative reason automatically, because we need 
to work out whether they do. We need to work out, for example, whether the divergence 
between my sentiments and evaluations is due to my being indoctrinated. If it is, then I 
52  This good example is mentioned in McIntyre's (1990) article.
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have a good reason to distrust my evaluation and follow my sentiments.
Beliefs
I allow evaluations alone (which are at least prima facie beliefs) to motivate. So, what 
of the traditional formulation of the Humean theory: beliefs alone cannot motivate? I 
think we have good reasons to reject the formulation of Humeanism in terms of beliefs 
lacking motivational power.
First, let us take an example. Suppose I like chocolate and I believe that milk chocolate 
is better than dark. So, next time I'm at Thornton's I buy milk chocolate. In this case I 
have been motivated by my belief that milk chocolate is better than dark. So, if a 
Humean theory claims that I can't be motivated by beliefs, it is false. Insisting that there 
is a concealed desire is each of these cases is not a good option, because it is 
implausible and because it makes Humeanism impossible to disprove. Perhaps 
surprisingly, this is not a good result for Kantians. The defeat is so easy that one doubts 
that there is anything amounting to a theory opposing Kantianism at all. And a theory 
unopposed is trivial. Moreover, it fails to do justice to Humean (and Hume's) contention 
that reasoning alone cannot motivate. Reasoning is not, prima facie at least, the same as 
'beliefs'. (If we take 'desire' to mean 'everything that is not reasoning', then we can still 
formulate the Humean theory in the traditional way, but then the word 'desire' would 
clearly be a term of art.) A Humean must claim that evaluative beliefs, since they 
plainly can motivate, are not acquired through the process of reasoning alone. A 
Humean thinks that we don't work out what we have reason to do just by deliberating. 
This claim is independent of what reasons are – desires or evaluative beliefs. It 
contrasts with the Kantian claim that one does work out what we have good reasons to 
do by the process of reasoning alone. And this Kantian claim is independent of what 
reasons are – desires or evaluative beliefs.
The second reason to reject the formulation in terms of beliefs is to see what the 
original (Kant's) response to Hume's arguments was. Kant tries to show how 
universalizations can be sufficient for providing good reasons for action. Of course, I 
will have a belief about whether something is universalizable or not. But the important 
bit is not that I arrive at a belief, as opposed to a desire. (In fact, I do arrive at a desire – 
once I find that some course of action is universalizable, I, in so far as I am rational, 
want to follow it.) What is important is the process by which the belief is arrived at: 
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reasoning alone. Universalization and consistency are the provinces of reasoning. The 
faculty of reasoning, for Kant, functions not just by producing beliefs, but also by 
producing rational desires, i.e. desires arrived at purely by the process of reasoning.
My modifications are certainly unusual. Still, I conclude with Schroeder that 
'commitments of typical Humeans need not be commitments of any given central 
Humean thesis' (2007, p. 163). My theory does emphasize sentiments over reasoning in 
agency, which is why I call myself sentimentalist. Someone who thinks that more 
specific commitments are needed to distinguish sentimentalist theories from others 
would disagree with this self-classification, but I think this is a terminological point 
which bears no substantive implications.
6. Conclusion
I have argued that the traditional way of explaining why sentiments are needed for good 
reasons should be rejected. The traditional explanation was in terms of promotion: I 
have a good reason to do whatever promotes my desires. This claim leads to problems 
of explaining how desires generate good reasons, most notably the Too Many Reasons 
problem. Instead, I proposed an alternative way of explaining why sentiments are 
necessary for normative reasons. Sentiments provide mastery of evaluative concepts, 
and our normative reasons are, depending on one's metaphysical stance, evaluations or 
what evaluations represent. This claim – that sentiments are necessary for mastery of 
evaluative concepts – is defended in the following two chapters.
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Chapter 3. Real Cases
1. Introduction53
In this chapter, I examine whether sentimentalism enjoys empirical support. I 
concentrate on two conditions – people with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (VMPFC) and psychopaths. Patients with the first condition exhibit reduced 
emotions and act irrationally. Patients with the second condition exhibit deficiencies in 
particular emotions, such as guilt and remorse, and behave immorally. There are two 
competing explanations for these conditions. A rationalist explanation says that these 
patients have a cognitive deficit that is responsible both for abnormal emotions and 
unusual behaviour. A sentimentalist explanation says that the explanatory link goes the 
other way: it is a deficiency in sentiments54 that explains the cognitive deficits in 
question and unusual behaviour. Such a sentimentalist explanation is congenial to my 
thesis that sentiments are necessary for conceptual mastery, and thus for making good 
evaluations. According to my version of sentimentalism, the general disruption of 
sentiment seen in cases of VMPFC damage makes one's evaluations deficient and one's 
actions irrational. The disruption of specific emotions seen in cases of psychopathy 
makes psychopaths unable to master specific evaluative concepts – the ones relating to 
morality. Hence, psychopaths make no (or deficient) moral evaluations and pursue 
immoral courses of action. However, as I argue below, according to the current data, 
cases of VMPFC damage are compatible with rationalism. On the other hand, 
sentimentalism provides a better explanation of psychopathy. In particular, it explains 
why psychopaths can't distinguish between moral and conventional norms, their use of 
aggression to achieve their aims, and the existence of 'white-collar' psychopaths. The 
best available explanation for psychopathy posits a connection between sentiments and 
mastery of moral concepts.
1.1. A note about skin conductance response
Before I go on to discuss empirical studies, I want to clarify a point on measuring 
53 I thank Dr Matteo Mameli for his comments on this chapter.
54 I shall use 'emotion' and 'sentiment' interchangeably for stylistic reasons. I do not think it introduces a 
substantive issue.
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emotions. Our skin, or, more specifically, the sweat on our skin, conducts electricity. As 
we sweat more, skin conductance goes up, as we sweat less, it goes down. These 
changes in skin conductance are called skin conductance response (SCR). It is routinely 
used in empirical studies to measure emotional arousal. This may seem implausible to 
some philosophers, but once the points below are borne in mind, this worry should 
disappear. 
Not all sweating is 'emotional sweating': clearly, one can sweat more (and thus have 
higher skin conductance) if it is hot. However, sweating of palm and soles, where SCR 
is measured, is not just thermoregulatory. Apart from regulating temperature, it 
responds to emotional stimuli (Figner and Murphy 2011). No one, to the best of my 
knowledge, holds that SCRs are emotions. They are just a convenient, cheap and fairly 
reliable way of measuring emotional arousal. Emotions, in most cases, will involve 
certain bodily changes: blushing, tensing of muscles, heart rate and SCR changes. The 
fact that these changes are used to detect the presence of emotion does not imply a 
theory which equates emotions with bodily changes. If one takes skin conductance 
response to be a measurement, or indication, of emotional arousal, it does not follow 
that that's all there is to emotion. In fact, emotions and skin conductance response are 
doubly dissociable. On the one hand, SCR can be present in the absence of an emotion. 
In healthy people, skin conductance changes in response to a loud noise or a deep 
breath. Even people whose emotions are not easily aroused have a change in skin 
conductance in the presence of such non-emotional stimuli (Damasio 1996). Only 
certain changes in SCR are interpreted as representing emotional arousal. These 
changes are the ones elicited by stimuli that are uncontroversially emotion-provoking, 
such as erotic images or images of disasters. Moreover, SCR tells you that there is an 
emotion, but it does not tell you which emotion is present, although some work is being 
done (e.g. Levenson et al. 1990) to see if each of the basic emotions has its own 
distinctive profile of bodily changes, including SCR. Thus, SCR can occur in the 
absence of an emotion. On the other hand, SCR can be absent even if one is having an 
emotion. This happens with people whose autonomic nervous system (which, amongst 
other things, produces SCR) has failed. They still have emotional experiences, yet, 
because of their physical condition, they do not produces SCRs (Heims et al. 2004).
So, there is no equating SCR with emotion. Rather, SRC is a measure of emotion that is 
not always appropriate, and requires a particular experimental set up to ensure that what 
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is measured is indeed emotional arousal.
2. Patients with VMPFC damage
2.1. Description of the condition
Damasio (1994) tells a story of Elliot, whose successful life has been completely 
changed by a brain tumour operation. Some tissue, damaged by the tumour, had to be 
removed as well, and Elliot ended up with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC). Before the operation Elliot held a responsible job, was a model father and 
husband. After the operation, whilst apparently retaining his memory and intelligence 
(his IQ scores were in the top 1-2% as reported in Damasio et al. 1991), he became a 
paradigm of practical irrationality. For example, when performing a simple task of 
sorting documents, Elliot would deliberate: should one do it in date order, size order, 
relevance, or should one use some other criterion? Sometimes he would spend the 
whole day deliberating about such trivial matters, at other times he would act with 
excess impulsiveness. He embarked on a series of ill-fated ventures, was unable to hold 
down a job, and started having personal difficulties. Such behaviour was markedly 
different from his behaviour before the operation.
Remarkably, Elliot's deficits were fairly circumscribed. He passed all the usual tests of 
intelligence and memory. For example, he could bring together disparate bits of 
information to answer questions such as 'How many piano tuners are there in London?' 
–  and this requires 'normal logical competence, normal attention, and normal working 
memory' (Damasio 1994, p. 43). He even passed the tests designed specifically for 
finding defects in decision making. In such tests, several scenarios are given to the 
patient which test her ability to solve social problems ('If you have broken your wife's 
flower pot, what can you do to stop her from being angry?'), her awareness of the 
consequences of her choices, her means-end reasoning, and her ethical judgement (e.g. 
by asking whether one should steal a drug to prevent one's wife from dying). Elliot 
passed all these tests, yet admitted, as he was producing more and more options for 
action, that he himself would not know what to do. 
So why would someone who passes all these tests make disastrous decisions in his own 
77
life? The only other noticeable post-operation change in Elliot was a change in his 
sentiments: his emotions have dulled. This was verified in the laboratory when SCRs 
were measured for him and four other subjects with VMPFC lesions. The study had two 
control groups – one of healthy volunteers and one of patients with brain damage in 
areas other than VMPFC. All participants a) looked at emotionally charged images 
(such as depictions of catastrophes) and b) looked at emotionally charged images and 
described the images and their feelings towards them. Unlike healthy people and 
patients with damage in other areas of the brain, patients with VMPFC damage showed 
no emotional arousal when simply looking at the images. They did respond normally, 
however, when they were asked to describe the image and its impact (Damasio et al. 
1991). This shows that  patients with VMPFC damage are not entirely lacking in 
sentiment, but have a higher threshold of arousal.55 
In the absence of any other hallmarks of the condition, emotional deficiency exhibited 
by patients with damage to VMPFC lead Damasio to formulate his sentimentalist 
account, known as the somatic marker hypothesis:
before you reason toward the solution of the problem, something quite important 
happens: When the bad outcome connected with a given response option comes to 
mind, however fleetingly, you experience an unpleasant gut feeling. (Damasio 
1994, p. 173.)
This gut feeling is the somatic maker, which 'marks a particular future outcome with a 
negative or positive value', and enables an easy decision (Bechara et al. 1994, p. 14).56
In order to test this hypothesis, Damasio and colleagues designed a new way to 
approximate real-life decision making in the laboratory – the Iowa Gambling Task. In 
this task a participant can pick a card from any of the four decks, labelled A, B, C and 
D. Each card brings a monetary gain – some big, some small, and some cards also bring 
a monetary loss. Gains and losses are announced after each card is turned. The game is 
stopped after 100 plays. Decks A and B have high rewards and high punishments, and 
55 Patients with VMPFC damage are also bad at discriminating emotional faces and voices, which is 
positively correlated with inappropriate behaviour: the worse they are at emotion recognition, the 
more inappropriate behaviour they exhibit (Rolls 2000, p. 290).
56 Somatic markers do not have to be conscious. For Damasio, it is a bodily state of a particular kind 
that may cause unconscious biasing towards or against a particular way of acting (Damasio et al. 
1996). Yet, more recently he and colleagues emphasized somatic markers as 'emotion-related signals' 
that can be, and often are, conscious (Bechara et al. 2005).
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lead to a long-term loss. Decks C and D have more modest payouts, but also have 
smaller losses, so are beneficial in the long term. Participants' SCRs were measured 
throughout the experiment. Damasio and colleagues predicted that as the game 
progresses, healthy people would generate somatic markers (as evidenced by changes 
in SCR), and avoid the disadvantageous decks, whilst patients with VMPFC damage 
would fail to do so. This prediction was confirmed (Bechara et al. 1994 and 1997). All 
participants begin by sampling the decks, but then healthy participants as well as 
patients with brain damage in other areas move to advantageous decks, whilst patients 
with VMPFC damage do not. As the experiment progressed, participants were asked 
what they thought was going on in the game and how they felt about it. Around the 
time the 50th card was turned, normal participants said they thought that A and B were 
more risky. By the 80th card, most normal participants could explain why A and B were 
bad and why picking cards form C and D was better in the long run. Some control 
group participants failed to provide explanations, but still performed well. Remarkably, 
three out of six patients with VMPFC damage could say which decks were better, yet 
failed to choose advantageously (Bechara et al. 1994). An analysis of SCRs showed 
that all participants had increased skin conductance just after the won/lost amount was 
announced, so patients were sensitive to reward and punishment. But only controls 
(both the ones without brain damage and with damage to other brain regions) developed 
anticipatory SCRs – their skin conductance increased as they were about to pick a card 
from disadvantageous decks. Patients with VMPFC damage failed to develop 
anticipatory SCRs, and this was taken as evidence that 
the representations of future outcomes … would not be marked with a negative or 
positive value, and thus could not be easily rejected or accepted. This account 
invokes the somatic marker hypothesis which posits that the overt or covert 
[conscious or unconscious] processing of somatic states provides the value mark 
for a cognitive scenario. (Bechara et al. 1994, p. 14, italics in original.)57
This explanation is congenial to my thesis that sentiments are necessary for mastery of 
evaluative concepts. In fact, it supports an even stronger claim: not only are sentiments 
necessary for such mastery, but they are also necessary for the normal functioning of 
evaluative concepts after these concepts have been mastered. Disrupted emotions, it 
seems, make one unable to act on one's evaluations. To use an example that pre-empts 
57 Bechara et al. (1994) also mention an alternative interpretation – that representations of future 
outcomes are not held in the working memory for long enough. They note that preliminary data 
supports the somatic marker account and the alternative is not discussed further.
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the parallel between phenomenal concepts and evaluative ones, made in Chapter 4, a 
colour-blind person may, through some prosthetic colour identifier, have extensionally 
correct colour concepts, but misses out on phenomenology. Similarly, patients with 
VMPFC damage can say what they have a good reason to do, but miss out on 
emotional access to values, and hence on the connection between evaluations and 
actions. However, as I argue below, a sentimentalist account of what is wrong with 
people with VMPFC damage has a rationalist rival, which provides an equally good 
explanation. Before I discuss this, however, I shall clarify some issues which could 
otherwise be distracting. 
2.2. Preliminary problems
2.2.1. Is the hypothesis unfalsifiable?
The somatic marker hypothesis has been criticized as untestable, and hence 
unfalsifiable (Colombetti 2008, Dunn et al. 2006). It is hard to disprove the somatic 
marker hypothesis
because somatic markers are very broadly characterized …  It follows from this 
broad characterization of somatic markers that if a subject turns out to be able to 
make decisions despite abnormalities in some measures of somatic markers, it is 
still possible that some other, undetected source of somatic markers might 
implement the subjects’ preferences. The large and vaguely specified number of 
such sources makes it virtually impossible to disprove [the somatic marker 
hypothesis]. (Colombetti 2008, pp. 67-67, footnote omitted.) 
Indeed, Damasio accepts that there are many different somatic markers. Moreover, they 
can be activated in two different ways. If I am in a situation which has been marked 
with an emotional response, there will be a 're-activation of the somatosensory pattern 
that describes the appropriate emotion' (Damasio et al. 1996, p. 1415). The re-
activation may occur as changes in brain activity accompanied by bodily changes; this 
is what Damasio calls the body loop. Re-activation may also occur as changes in brain 
activity only; this is the 'as-if' loop. So, it is not enough to look at the bodily changes, 
since my emotion can be activated in just the brain, without these changes occurring. 
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This does not mean, contrary to the criticisms advanced by Colombetti and Dunn, that 
the somatic marker hypothesis is impossible to disprove. What it means is that in order 
to disprove it, one needs to look at brain activation, not just at bodily changes. We need 
to check whether there is activation in the somatosensory cortex, and whether it is 
reliably correlated with decision making. If there is, then we do rely on emotions to 
make decisions, and the hypothesis is confirmed; if there is not, then the hypothesis is 
falsified. (Rolls 1999, p. 73.)58 This testing, however, will be difficult and expensive, 
hence the tests for the hypothesis often rely on changes in heart rate and SCR.59
2.2.2. Patients with VMPFC damage do make evaluations
Sometimes Damasio makes it sound as if his patients are completely incapable of 
making evaluations and acting. This is clearly not true: patients with VMPFC damage 
do make evaluations and act on them. Indeed, the very test for deficiency in somatic 
markers – the Iowa Gambling Task – depends on them having such an ability. What is 
important is that their evaluations are not good, in the following sense:
[t]he choices these patients make are no longer personally advantageous, [are] 
socially inadequate and are demonstrably different from the choices the patients 
were known to have made in the premorbid period. (Damasio et al.1996, p. 1413.)
As Blackburn puts it, the problem is not a complete lack of sentiment, but a defect in 
one's sentimental reactions – they seem to 'light up randomly', making evaluations 
random as well (Blackburn 1998, p. 126, note 4). As a result, patients exhibit an 
unusual combination of practical irrationality: sometimes they act impulsively and 
sometimes they are unable to conclude deliberation by deciding what to do. Blackburn's 
hypothesis is interesting, but there has been, so far, no controlled testing of the claim 
that patients' emotions 'light up randomly'. One could, of course, take their 
58 As Guy Fletcher noted, even if we found activation in the somatosensory cortex, this may not be 
enough to prove that we rely on emotions to make decisions. This remark points out the limitations of 
empirical science, where correlation is routinely taken to imply a stronger relation. Discovering that 
changes in somatosensory cortex are reliably correlated with making decisions is enough, for an 
empirical scientist, to conclude that we do rely on emotions in decision-making, as long as there are 
no other known factors that may point to a mere correlation in this case.
59 Damasio et al. (2000) have confirmed that there is activation in somatosensory cortex when people 
remember emotional episodes. That is, they have confirmed that the as-if loop is activated (at least in 
healthy people) when they experience emotions. The study, however, did not address the issue as to 
whether such activation occurs when people are making decisions, so it is no help to somatic marker 
hypothesis as such.
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impulsiveness outside the laboratory setting as evidence for this. Elliot, for example, 
made several uncharacteristically bad financial and social decisions after the operation. 
This may be explained by his emotions being random, but more research on 
impulsiveness is needed to see whether this is true.60 So, for the rest of the chapter, I 
shall concentrate on indecision, rather than impulsiveness, since the former is better 
studied, although we need to remember that patients with VMPFC damage can make 
evaluations and act.
2.3. My disagreement with Damasio
2.3.1. Jamesian theory of emotions
Apart from arguing for a particular role for emotions – that they are needed for rational 
action – Damasio also defends a Jamesian view of these mental states. I agree with the 
first, but not the second claim: whilst I think that emotions, or, more broadly, 
sentiments are necessary for rational action, I am no Jamesian. The James-Lange theory 
states that emotions are awareness of bodily changes. I see a bear, my heart rate goes 
up, I tremble, and then (and because of that) I feel afraid. Damasio's theory (1994 and 
1996) is self-consciously a variant of this. For him, we have certain bodily changes 
which are emotions, and we feel the emotions when we become conscious of these. 
Objections to such a theory are well-rehearsed. For example, emotions have intentional 
objects, which sets them apart from bodily changes.61 Fine discriminations that we 
make between emotions cannot be done simply by looking at what bodily changes they 
produce. There are patients with pure autonomic failure, who produce no bodily 
changes, yet feel emotions (Heims et al. 2004). This latter point requires elaboration. 
The autonomic nervous systems regulates such things as heart rate, blood pressure and 
sweat gland activity (responsible for a change in skin conductance). Patients in whom 
this system has failed do not generate SCRs or exhibit changes in heart rate. Moreover, 
brain scans of these patients suggest that their 'as-if' loop is compromised as well (Dunn 
et al. 2006). Yet their emotions are normal and they do not act irrationally. For 
60 Many thanks to Guy Fletcher for his comments here.
61 Although see Prinz (2004) for a Jamesian theory that tries to accommodate this challenge. Prinz 
distinguishes between what emotions register (bodily changes) and what they represent (formal 
objects). For example, my sadness registers bodily changes characteristic of this emotion, yet it 
represents a loss. See Goldie (2006) for a review.
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example, they pass the Iowa Gambling Task. This result directly contradicts Damasio's 
identification of emotions with bodily changes.62
In short, there is more to emotions than the bodily changes. However, the claim about 
the nature of emotion is independent of the real puzzle that gave rise to Damasio's 
(1994) book – why do people like Elliot, who pass all the intelligence tests, make such 
disastrous decisions? Damasio says that it is a failure to mark the value of outcomes 
because of emotional flatness, and that is a thesis about the role of emotions, which can 
be divorced from Jamesianism.
It is interesting to note, however, that there is a correlation between how intensive 
bodily changes are in normal subjects and how well they perform on Iowa Gambling 
Task. Good performers have greater changes in skin conductance and heart rate than 
those who perform less well (Dunn et al. 2006). This suggests that bodily changes are 
important at least in the normal case.
2.3.2. Sentiments are necessary, but not sufficient for rational choices
Secondly, and this is related to my rejection of Jamesianism, I read the somatic marker 
hypothesis as specifying a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for making good 
evaluations and acting on them. That is, if one's emotions are intact (which will usually 
be indicated by somatic markers), one may still fail to make good evaluations, but if 
one has disrupted emotions, then one is unable to make good evaluations. The 
hypothesis is best understood as specifying a necessary, but not sufficient condition for 
several reasons. First, having normal sentiments is not enough to make good 
evaluations, as cases of non-human animals and infants show: both animals and infants 
have sentiments, yet do not (always) make good evaluations. Secondly, accepting that 
sentiments are necessary, but not sufficient, is enough to defend my thesis that 
sentiments are necessary for making good evaluations. Thirdly, there are patients who 
have normal sentiments, but fail the Iowa Gambling Task, as described by Naccache et 
62 There are other changes which happen in the body when one is aroused, such as startles, joint tension, 
muscle relaxation and contraction. These are not brought about by the autonomic nervous system. So, 
Damasio could argue that in the case of patients with pure autonomic failure these non-autonomic 
changes are responsible for rational choices. But it is difficult to see how non-autonomic changes 
could help if the as-if loop is damaged, i.e. if the activation in the somatosensory cortex is 
compromised. And such activation, according to Damasio, necessarily occurs when emotion is 
present.
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al. (2005). The patient in this study has normal SCRs to reward, but does not generate 
anticipatory SCRs to bad decks. Interestingly, she says during the experiment that A 
and B are bad, and she should not be picking from them, but still does.63
2.3.3. Are rationalists and sentimentalists both wrong?
Maibom (2005) notes that if reason and emotions are intertwined, as Damasio suggests, 
both rationalism and sentimentalism need updating. Both camps devised their theories 
on the assumption that reasoning and emotions are distinct, which means that both of 
these theories need to be modified if this assumption is wrong. But this does not change 
the fact that Damasio's hypothesis is opposing rationalism in spirit. Sentimentalists 
emphasize the importance of emotions in making good evaluations, whereas rationalists 
say that emotions are unnecessary for this. On this understanding of the debate, 
Damasio's theory is clearly sentimentalist.
2.4. A rationalist alternative
Damasio's interpretation of why patients with VMPFC damage are acting irrationally – 
the somatic marker hypothesis – supports the thesis that sentiments are necessary for 
evaluations. These patients are unable to make correct evaluations because their 
sentiments are deficient. However, as I argue below, the rival, rationalist, interpretation 
provides an equally good explanation of this condition.
The somatic marker hypothesis does not claim just a correlation between emotions and 
rationality. It claims a causal link with a particular direction: having sentiments 
causally contributes to rational action. An alternative, rationalist, hypothesis is that 
knowledge of what is going on in the task is causing both the rational action and the 
emotional response. Participants without VMPFC damage work out that decks C and D 
are advantageous, this knowledge makes them opt for C and D, and makes them 
respond emotionally when contemplating picking cards from more risky decks, A and 
B.
Such a rationalist explanation is proposed by Maia and McClelland (2004), who tested 
63 The patients with pure autonomic failure discussed above do not present counter-examples to the 
necessity claim, because they have normal sentiments. They just lack somatic markers and their as-if 
loop is damaged, which Damasio (but not I) identifies with emotions.
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how much knowledge participants have when performing Iowa Gambling Task. Instead 
of asking open-ended questions, they used more specific ones, such as: 'On the scale of 
1-10, rate how good this deck is. Why?', 'On the scale of 1-100 tell me how much do 
you think you know what you should do to win the maximum amount of money?', etc.64 
Maia and McClelland concluded that participants had some knowledge about what was 
going on in the game quite early on (after the 20th card was turned). Most importantly, 
they found that advantageous behaviour can be explained by the knowledge participants 
possess. If so, there is no need to appeal to somatic markers; knowledge of strategy is 
enough to guide rational action.
Maia and McClelland's study used participants without brain damage. But the somatic 
marker hypothesis originated to explain the behaviour of people with VMPFC damage. 
In particular, Bechara et al. (1994) discovered the remarkable fact that 50% of patients 
with such damage acquired knowledge of strategy by the end of the task, yet failed to 
follow that strategy and failed to generate SCR to the knowledge they possessed. This 
is readily explained by a sentimentalist. According to the somatic marker hypothesis, 
normal sentiments are necessary for making good evaluations; patients with VMPFC 
damage have deficiency in sentiments which causes their deficient evaluations. One 
may say that their evaluations are extensionally correct (they know which strategy is 
the best one), but do not engage the patients' capacity to act in the way evaluations of 
those with normal sentiments do. A rationalist theory of Maia and McClelland may 
initially seem ill-suited to explaining why patients with VMPFC damage could say 
what the correct strategy for making the most money was, yet failed to follow it. 
However, contrary to first appearances, Maia and McClelland can explain this: 
the dissociation …  between these patients' conscious knowledge and both their 
behavior and their anticipatory SCRs could occur under many different models of 
the basis for behavior in the IGT [Iowa Gambling Task], including models in 
which, in the normal case, conscious knowledge guides both behavior and 
autonomic responses in the task. For example, such a dissociation could occur if 
the VMPFC lesions caused a disconnect anywhere in the pathways from conscious 
knowledge to behavior and to the mechanisms that generate autonomic responses. 
(Maia and McClelland 2004, p. 16080.)
64 In order to check that such questioning did not lead participants to gain more knowledge than they 
would have gained otherwise, Maia and McClelland had a control group in which no such questions 
were asked. The performance of the two groups did not differ.
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So, according to rationalists, in the normal case, one's knowledge of the advantageous 
strategy will cause both the emotional response to this knowledge and the behaviour in 
accordance with this strategy. But in the case of damage to the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, these causal links are disrupted. In order to rival the somatic marker hypothesis, 
a rationalist must say why this disruption takes place. They also have to argue that this 
disruption itself does not rely on a sentimental deficit. If it does, then it is still true that 
the irrational actions of patients with VMPFC damage are caused by deficiency of 
sentiment, not of knowledge.
The specific deficit that Maia and McClelland (2004) think is responsible for the 
disruption is difficulty in response reversal. Once a patient learnt a particular response 
(e.g. that decks A and B are good), they have difficulty un-learning it: they keep 
picking cards from these decks even when it is no longer advantageous. This 
interpretation is supported by Fellows and Farah's (2005) study. In the original Iowa 
Gambling Task, decks A and B, although disadvantageous in the long term, appeared 
good initially: the gains they offered were high, and the first big loss was on card five 
in A and on card nine in B. So, in order to pass the original Iowa Gambling Task, one 
had to reverse the initial preference for decks A and B. In this case, difficulty in 
response reversal, and not disrupted emotions may be responsible for patients' bad 
performance on the task. To test this possibility, Fellows and Farah shuffled the original 
decks so that A and B did not initially appear advantageous. Patients with VMPFC 
damage passed the shuffled test, suggesting that difficulty in response reversal is indeed 
the problem.65
So, the proposed explanation of patients' irrational behaviour is a deficit in response 
reversal. But does this deficit itself depend on deficiencies in sentiment? In their 
response to Maia and McClelland, Bechara et al. (2005) claim that it does. On its own, 
response reversal does not explain why patients are able to conceptualize the 
advantageous strategy, yet fail to follow it. It can explain it when complemented by the 
somatic marker hypothesis. In fact, Bechara and colleagues argue, a deficit in response 
reversal can itself be explained in terms of somatic markers: somatic markers provide a 
'stop signal', which patients with VMPFC damage are missing, hence their reversal 
learning deficit. 
65 There are also other tests that confirm that patients with VMPFC damage have response reversal 
difficulties (Rolls et al. 1994).
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Maia and McClelland (2005) deny that response reversal has anything to do with 
somatic markers and emotions. They deny this because response reversal deficit can 
occur with lesions to striatum (Ibid., p. 163). Primary functions of striatum include 
motor response regulation and cognitive function (Yum et al. (2011)). It is not primarily 
implicated in the processing of emotions.66 This observation is indeed a threat to the 
somatic marker hypothesis. However, it poses no danger to a version of sentimentalism 
that makes normal sentiments a necessary, rather than sufficient, condition for response 
reversal. Someone who has no emotional deficits, yet exhibits response reversal 
difficulties does not threaten the claim that normal sentiments are necessarily for the 
ability to reverse previously learnt responses. The counter-example to the necessity 
claim is a creature who has deficiencies of sentiment, yet exhibits no response reversal 
difficulties. Luckily for the defenders of the rationalist account, a study by Izquierdo 
and Murray (2007) presents just such a counter-example. These researchers found that 
rhesus monkeys with amygdala lesions have blunted emotional reactions: they were 
less afraid of snakes (Izquierdo et al. 2005), yet these same monkeys were no worse 
than non-operated controls at reversing their responses (Izquierdo and Murray 2007).67
Thus, rationalists can explain the difficulties of patients with VMPFC damage by 
reference to response reversal, and they can show that difficulties in response reversal 
themselves do not depend on normally functioning sentiments. So far there is no reason 
to prefer a sentimentalist explanation. However, I argue below that rationalism has less 
explanatory power than sentimentalism when we look at cases of psychopathy.
3. Psychopaths
3.1. Description of the condition
Psychopathy is one of the conditions in which sentiments are disrupted. Psychopaths 
are characterized by high scores (25 and over in Europe, 30 and over in the US) on both 
66 Although it might be implicated. Calder et al. (2004) found that damage to striatum impaired 
recognition of anger. Striatum also receives input from amygdala, which is one of the centres of 
emotional processing in the brain (Rolls 1999, pp. 53-56).
67 However, the monkeys with amygdala damage still made unusual (in comparison to controls) choices. 
Having had a particular food till satiated, controls would chose a different food; the monkeys with 
amygdala damage did not. (Izquierdo et al. 2007). This suggests that although deficient sentiments 
fail to affect response reversal, they still provide deviant 'evaluations'.
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factors of Hare's Psychopathy Checklist–Revised, presented below.
 
Factor 1: Interpersonal/Affective
 Glib and superficial charm
 Grandiose sense of self-worth
 Pathological lying
 Conning/manipulative




 Failure to accept responsibility for own actions
 Factor 2: Social deviance
 Need for stimulation/proneness to boredom
 Parasitic lifestyle
 Poor behavioural controls
 Early behavioural problems




 Revocation of conditional release
 Additional items
 Promiscuous sexual behaviour
 Many short-term marital relationships
 Criminal versatility 
(Hare 1991)68
68 It is fairly uncontroversial to use Hare's checklist rather than DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual for Mental Disorders) criteria. First, DSM-IV has no separate listing for 'psychopathy': it is 
subsumed under Antisocial Personality Disorder. Secondly, DSM relies on such 'observable and 
measurable' factors as behaviour, not on traits such as callousness and unemotionality. This makes 
DSM's criteria useless for my purposes, since I am  investigating the influence of disrupted emotions 
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Psychopaths notoriously lack some emotions, both basic ones (such as fear), and 
complex ones (such as guilt and remorse). There is a lot of evidence for psychopaths' 
emotional deficits. Here are just a few examples.
 Psychopaths are worse than ordinary people at recognizing facial expressions of 
fear and sadness; the same goes for fearful, and (to a lesser extent) sad voices. 
They also show reduced skin conductance responses to the images of others' 
distress. (Blair et al. 2005, pp. 54-56.)
 Psychopaths have difficulty in attributing some complex emotions, such as 
guilt, but not in attributing other complex emotions, such as embarrassment 
(Ibid., p. 59).
 In one study participants read an emotionally charged sentence (e.g. 'A man was 
thrown overboard a sinking ship.') and were asked to pick a sentence with 
matching emotion out of several presented (e.g. 'A man surfing on a large 
wave.', 'A woman standing on the yacht.'). Psychopaths were more likely to 
mismatch the emotional tone of the phrases. (Blair et al. 2005, pp. 60-61.) 
 When non-psychopaths hear a sudden noise after seeing threatening images, 
they get startled more than after seeing neutral or pleasant images. Psychopaths 
do not get startled more, which suggests that they are worse at processing 
negative emotional information. (Patrick 2007.)
 When asked to say whether the presented stimulus (a series of letters) is a word 
or non-word, non-psychopaths respond quicker to emotional words, such as 
'death', than non-emotional ones, such as  'paper'. Psychopaths do not. (Hare 
1993, p. 130.)
Hare (1993, p. 53-54) provides a vivid illustration of psychopaths' emotional lack. One 
of them was describing bank robberies he participated in, and seemed completely at a 
loss as to why the tellers became shaky or tongue-tied, and one was so scared that she 
vomited. He then said that sure, he’ll be scared if someone pointed a gun at him, but 
why would he be so 'messed up inside' that he'd throw up? Here is how Hare and 
Cleckley, influential doctors who studied psychopaths, describe the condition:
Like the colour-blind person, the psychopath lacks an important element of 
experience – in this case, emotional experience – but may have learned the words 
on reasoning.
89
that others use to describe or mimic experiences that he cannot really understand. 
(Hare 1993, p. 129.)
He is unfamiliar with the primary facts or data of what might be called personal 
values and is altogether incapable of understanding such matters. It is impossible 
for him to take even a slight interest in the tragedy or joy or the striving of 
humanity as presented in serious literature or art. He is also indifferent to all these 
matters in life itself. Beauty and ugliness, except in a very superficial sense, 
goodness, evil, love, horror, and humor have no actual meaning, no power to move 
him.
He is, furthermore, lacking in the ability to see that others are moved. It is as 
though he were colour-blind, despite his sharp intelligence, to this aspect of human 
existence. It cannot be explained to him because there is nothing in his orbit of 
awareness that can bridge the gap with comparison. He can repeat the words and 
say glibly that he understands, and there is no way for him to realize that he does 
not understand. (Cleckley 1988, p. 40.)
At the same time, psychopaths' cognitive abilities seem undisturbed. They do not suffer 
from delusions, do not show deficits in IQ or general cognitive functioning. This 
picture of psychopathy portrays the psychopath as Hume's 'sensible knave' (Hume 
1777), i.e. as someone who understands the requirements of reason, yet does not act 
morally. It also provides support for the thesis that sentiments are necessary for mastery 
of evaluative concepts, because psychopaths have a limited understanding of morality.
The latter claim was substantiated in a study by Blair (1995) and replicated by Blair et 
al. (1995). People differentiate between violations of conventional norms (such as a 
boy wearing a skirt) and violations of moral norms (such as hitting someone).69 Moral 
69 This terminology (moral vs. conventional norms) used by Blair and colleagues can be misleading. 
Morality, after all, does not exclude convention. Hume (1738-1740, 3.3.1), for example, distinguishes 
between natural and artificial virtues. Natural virtues, such as meekness, charity, generosity, 
clemency, moderation and equity are the ones that we naturally approve of. Artificial virtues, such as 
justice, allegiance, laws of nations, modesty and good manners have arisen by convention (Ibid., pp. 
577-578). However, artificial virtues, although conventional, are nonetheless a part of morality. What 
Blair and colleagues are after is a distinction between morality and purely matters of etiquette.
The issue would be purely terminological had the 'conventional' norms chosen for Blair and 
colleagues' study were merely norms of etiquette. Unfortunately, not all of them, according to Hume, 
at least, were merely norms of etiquette. The norms chosen by Blair and colleagues were a boy 
wearing a skirt, a child walking out of the classroom, a child turning her back on the teacher and two 
children talking in class. All but the first one are part of good manners, hence, according to Hume, are 
artificial virtues, and are part of morality. Therefore, they should not be used as something that is 
opposed to moral norms.
There are two ways to respond to this challenge. The first way is to reject Hume's inclusion of good 
manners under the heading of artificial moral virtues. After all, one naturally thinks of at least some 
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violations are judged to be more serious, less permissible, less dependent on authority 
and more generalizable. (Authority dependency was measured by the question: 'If the 
teacher said it was OK for a boy to wear a skirt, would it be OK?', and generalizability 
by asking whether it was OK for boys in other countries to wear skirts.) Moral and 
conventional norms also differ by the type of justification offered by normal subjects. 
Conventional norm violations are 'not the done thing', but moral violations often elicit a 
response relating to the victim's welfare. These results are robust. They have been 
replicated with different groups of people – Amish teenagers, autistic children and 
children with Down syndrome. Normally developing children begin to distinguish 
between moral and conventional norm violations shortly after their third birthday. 
(Nichols 2004, pp. 5-11.) In fact, children as young as four and a half make a 
moral/conventional distinction between unspecified transgressions. In this study, 
nonsense words, such as 'frammel', 'wuffle' and 'piggle', were used to identify a 
transgression. Children were presented with short stories in which these transgressions 
were distinguished by generalizability (you can't frammel at school, but you can at 
home) and the result of violating the norm (appeal to rules vs. a child crying). Children 
tended to say that transgressions that were non-generalizable and resulted in a child 
crying were not dependent on authority and would be wrong even if there was no rule 
against them. (Smetana 1985, quoted in Nichols 2004, pp. 104-105.) 
Psychopaths, on the contrary, fail to make the distinction between moral and 
conventional norm violations (Blair 1995, replicated in Blair et al. 1995). Unlike other 
prisoners,70 psychopaths tended to say that conventional transgressions are authority-
independent, with some of them failing to distinguish between moral and conventional 
norm violations on all criteria (i.e. on permissibility, seriousness and dependence on 
polite things as being amoral. Foot (1972) provides a good example: one should use the third person 
when answering an invitation written in the third person. This is a polite thing to do, yet failing to do 
it is not immoral. The second way to defend Blair et al.'s study is to accept that their distinction does 
not track the moral/non-moral divide, but insist that normal people distinguish between the natural 
and the artificial virtues. This is part of moral competence, and psychopaths, in failing to distinguish 
between the two, show a lack of moral understanding. Thus, the main point of the study, at least for 
my thesis, is preserved: psychopaths are worse at understanding moral concepts than normal people 
are, and this requires explanation, which my thesis provides by connecting mastery of moral concepts 
with sentiments.
It would also be interesting to see whether non-psychopaths scored the mere etiquette violation of a 
boy wearing a skirt differently from the violations of good manners, but the data presented in the 
study is not sorted by individual questions, so it is impossible to find this out. (I thank Prof. Pink for 
attracting my attention to the importance of the distinction between the natural and artificial virtues in 
the context of Blair et al.'s study.)
70 The majority of studies involving psychopaths are conducted in prisons, so non-psychopathic 
criminals are used as controls.
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authority). They were also less likely to justify moral norms by appeal to the victim's 
welfare. Rather, hitting someone was not the done thing. As usual in the empirical 
sciences, although the results were highly significant, they recorded a tendency that 
admits of exceptions: not all psychopaths failed to make the distinction. Two of them 
made it in the first study, and five – in the second. However, Blair also found that the 
higher psychopaths scored on any items of Psychopathy Checklist, the less likely they 
were to make victim welfare justifications, with the 'lack of guilt and remorse' item 
having the largest correlation. In addition, three of the five psychopaths who did make 
the distinction in the second study reported experiencing remorse, so they may be 
secondary psychopaths. (A true, or primary, psychopath is distinguished by inability to 
feel such emotions as guilt, remorse and empathy, very likely due to genetic factors. A 
secondary psychopath is able to feel them, but they are stunted due to developmental 
factors.) These findings are also similar for children with psychopathic tendencies. 
Blair (1997) found that such children do make the moral/conventional distinction, but 
they make less of a distinction than controls. In a larger study, Blair et al. (2001) found 
that the higher these children scored on the psychopathy scale, the less of a distinction 
they made. 71
One should note, that, contrary to Blair's initial predictions, psychopaths did not just 
think that moral transgressions were conventional. Instead, they seemed to think both 
that conventional transgressions were moral and that moral transgressions were 
conventional. The evidence in support of the first claim (that psychopaths treat 
conventional transgressions as moral) comes from their ratings. They rated 
conventional transgressions as just as serious, as impermissible and authority 
independent as moral ones.72 The evidence for the second claim (that psychopaths treat 
moral transgressions as conventional) comes from the justifications that psychopaths 
offered for moral claims. They justified moral transgressions as if they were 
71 I would like to note here that I am not adopting Blair's (1995) explanation of the data. He postulates a 
particular affective mechanism – violence inhibition mechanism (VIM) – as the one responsible for 
moral judgements. This mechanism is activated by distress cues. But, as Nichols (2002b, 2004) points 
out, there are times when we respond to someone's distress without making moral judgements. For 
example, images of natural disasters activate distress cues in healthy people, yet we do not (normally) 
regard natural disasters as morally wrong. 
72 Blair (1995) explains this by the fact that his sample was incarcerated. All psychopaths were 
imprisoned for moral, rather than conventional transgressions. Given this severe punishment, it is no 
wonder they thought that moral transgressions were serious and impermissible. Because of their 
emotional deficits, they could not tell the difference between morality and convention, so they rated 
all transgressions as equally serious and impermissible. They were also keen to show that they have 
learned the rules of society and were ready to be freed.
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conventional: hitting someone was wrong because it was not socially acceptable.
So, psychopaths fail to distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions. And 
the mix-up seems to go both ways. On the one hand, they think that conventional 
transgressions are moral. On the other hand, they also think that moral transgressions 
are conventional. Psychopaths have no clear idea of what distinguishes the moral from 
the conventional. My version of sentimentalism provides a ready explanation for this 
mix-up: it is because psychopaths lack mastery of moral concepts, as you would expect 
in the case of someone who fails to experience a whole family of emotions. Thus, you 
get people who use moral terms learnt from others, yet their normative force escapes 
them: they are not motivated by moral concerns, nor are they able to distinguish 
between morality and convention. (One should mention, however, that non-psychopaths 
also rate disgusting conventional violations as just as serious, impermissible and 
authority-independent as moral ones. That is, while psychopaths over-extend ratings of 
moral transgressions to conventional ones, non-psychopaths over-extend ratings of 
disgusting transgressions to moral ones. However, non-psychopaths do distinguish 
between disgusting conventional violations and moral violations by offering different 
justifications. Justifications of why moral transgressions are wrong mention the victim's 
welfare, whereas justifications of why conventional disgusting transgressions are wrong 
mention disgust (Nichols 2000b). So, non-psychopaths do make a distinction between 
moral and conventional transgressions at least by providing different justifications for 
each, whereas psychopaths do not even do that.)73
So, the existence of psychopaths prima facie supports the thesis that sentiments are 
necessary for evaluative concepts. They have deficits in specific emotions – guilt, 
remorse and empathy, which is why they do not understand certain evaluative concepts, 
as shown by the fact that they fail to distinguish between moral and conventional 
norms. However, as in the case of patients with VMPFC damage, there is a competing, 
rationalist explanation of psychopathy.
3.2. A rationalist alternative
Rationalists portray psychopaths as deficient not only in sentiments, but also as 
73 As Blair (2008) notes, psychopaths have normal feelings of disgust, so they may be sensitive to some 
moral considerations, i.e. the ones based on disgust responses. (Judgements about what is wrong in 
sexual behaviour, for example, are supposed to be based on disgust.)
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irrational, and this irrationality is said to be the origin of their moral deficiencies. 
Psychopaths do appear to be less rational than other people:
 Psychopaths have problems paying attention to factors that other people 
automatically pay attention to. There is some evidence that once their attention 
is engaged, they concentrate on the goal to such an extent that they fail to take 
into account important peripheral information (Newman et al. 2007). A striking 
example of this comes from Hare (1993, p. 77). During World War II 
psychopathic pilots were known for their fearlessness and ability to closely 
follow their targets. Yet they often failed to keep track of such 'peripheral' 
information as how much fuel was left in the tank.
 Psychopaths are worse than normal people at matching words to abstract 
categories when the words are presented to the right visual field, suggesting 
some irregularity in the connection between the hemispheres (Blair et al. 2005, 
p. 151).
 They often make contradictory statements (Hare 1993, p. 125).
 They lack a life plan. (This indeed is one of the diagnostic criteria for the 
condition: it is on Hare's Psychopathy Checklist–Revised presented at the 
beginning.)
 They are often impulsive, e.g. violate parole.
 They are grandiose and have an inflated self-esteem. This often makes then act 
in their own worse interests. E.g. one of them blamed his lawyer for getting him 
a long sentence, handled his appeal himself and had his sentence increased as a 
result (Hare 1993).74
 Psychopaths also suffer from response reversal difficulties (Budhani et al. 
2006).
Maibom (2005) argues that such rational deficits can easily lead to deficiency in 
practical reasoning, which, for rationalists, is the basis of moral behaviour.75 If 
psychopaths suffer from attention deficit, impulsiveness and response reversal 
difficulties, amongst other things, it is no wonder that they do not act rationally. If 
psychopaths fail to pay attention to peripheral information, they do not take into 
74 It is true that healthy humans also have an inflated view of their abilities (Taylor 1989). Yet they, 
unlike psychopaths, are sensitive to negative feedback.
75 Kennett (2006) offers a similar argument.
94
account foreseeable, but undesirable, consequences of their actions and lose sight of 
their aims. Their inflated self-esteem may prevent them from choosing appropriate 
means to an end. Their response reversal difficulties mean that they will continue doing 
things that no longer further their aims. Given such practical irrationality, it is no 
wonder, rationalists say, that psychopaths are immoral. However, this rationalist theory 
faces several problems.
3.3. Problems for a rationalist alternative
3.3.1. The moral/conventional distinction
Maibom has to explain why psychopaths don't distinguish between the moral and the 
conventional, even though people known for their irrationality – three-year-olds and 
children with Down syndrome – do so. In response to this challenge, Maibom argues 
that the moral/conventional distinction fails to track moral demands as understood by 
rationalists (Maibom 2005, pp. 249-250). Some violations of conventional norms 
cannot be consistently universalized. Consistent universalization is, for a rationalist, a 
test of whether something is permissible. If a conventional norm violation cannot be 
universalized consistently, it is just as serious, as impermissible and authority-
independent as a violation of a moral norm. To use Maibom's example, suppose there is 
a norm of staying at your seat in the theatre until the applause has died down. If I intend 
to leave earlier in order to get to my car quicker, my intention is inconsistent, as it relies 
on everyone else obeying the norm. So, if conventional norms used in the study were 
commands of reason, a rationalist can deny that the distinction that non-psychopaths 
made was indeed between morality and convention. Maibom still needs to explain the 
study's results: after all, non-psychopaths do make a distinction between the two sets of 
norms. She thinks that the distinction found in the study is between affect-backed 
norms vs. non-affect-backed ones, because
norms concerning what is disgusting or offensive give rise to judgements 
concerning seriousness, etc. that are similar to the judgements to which moral 
norms give rise (Haidt et al.(1993). (Maibom 2005, p. 249.)
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This remark is somewhat cryptic, so I'll try to reconstruct what Maibom may have in 
mind. Haight et al. (1993) showed that people tend to judge actions to be morally 
impermissible if they are disgusted or offended by them. This was confirmed in a later 
study (Schnall et al. 2008), which found that people placed in a filthy room judged 
actions presented to them in a series of vignettes as less morally permissible than those 
who weren't disgusted. This experiment is usually presented as a case for 
sentimentalism (e.g. Blackburn, in conversation). But, in fact, it is a point against it: it 
really does look like affect leads us astray from moral competence, just as Kantians 
suppose!76 For example, if one realized that one's thinking that something is 
impermissible was due to being in a dirty room, one would admit that she made a 
mistake. (There is a simpler way to show this conceptual independence: one could be 
disgusted by things that one does not consider impermissible.) So, if the sets of norms 
used in the study tracked affect-backed vs. non-affect-backed distinction, rationalists 
have no reason to admit that making it constitutes moral competence, and failing to 
make it shows moral incompetence. Psychopaths, rationalists insist, fail to make the 
distinction because their emotions are abnormal, but this has no bearing on their moral 
aptitude. So, Maibom's response is two-pronged. First, she argues that psychopaths do 
not distinguish between moral and conventional norms because both may fail to 
universalize consistently, and so both can be commands of reason. Secondly, she says 
that the ability to draw the distinction between moral and conventional transgressions is 
due to our emotions, and so, according to rationalists, has nothing to do with moral 
competence.
The problem with the first prong of Maibom's response is that only some, not all, 
conventional norm violations cannot be universalized consistently, and the convention 
violations used Blair et al.'s (1995) study were universalizable. The study used the 
following conventional norm violations: a boy wearing a skirt, a child walking out of 
the classroom without permission, a child turning her back on the teacher and two 
children talking in class. The intention of wearing a skirt and walking out of the 
classroom without permission are not inconsistent, as they do not rely on all other boys 
wearing trousers or staying in the classroom. The same goes for the child who stops 
paying attention to the lesson and turns her back on the teacher. Two children talking in 
class do not need others to be silent. It is only if we add that 'I want to talk and listen to 
76 This experiment could also support error theory (our moral judgements do depend on sentiments, yet 
we erroneously suppose that they do not), or a sentimentalist theory with a significant normative 
component (e.g. Nichols 2002b and 2004).
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the teacher at the same time.', or ' I want to talk yet not disturb the lesson.', that the 
intention becomes inconsistent. Thus, the norms chosen for the study were not 
commands of reason, so they should have been treated differently from moral norms, 
which are commands of reason, according to rationalists. Thus, Maibom's rationalist 
theory fails to explain why psychopaths do not distinguish between moral and 
conventional norms.
There is also another problem for Maibom' claim that psychopaths rated conventional 
norms as moral because they were both commands of reason. Earlier, she argued that 
psychopaths are irrational, and that is indeed something that a rationalist is committed 
to. Yet now she says that psychopaths give the same ratings to conventional and moral 
norms because both can be commands of reason (i.e. both can be universalized 
consistently). If so, then psychopaths can tell what reason commands, which means that 
they satisfy the requirement for moral competence set by rationalists. Put simply, if  
psychopaths can tell what is consistently universalizable and what is not, they must be 
moral, by rationalists' lights! 
What about the second part of Maibom's response, i.e. the claim that making the 
moral/conventional distinction has nothing to do with moral competence? This 
approach looks more promising: earlier, I mentioned a study by Nichols (2002b), which 
shows that normal, non-psychopathic people rate disgusting conventional 
transgressions as more serious, impermissible and authority-independent than 
conventional transgressions that are not disgusting. This study suggests that when 
people distinguish between 'moral' and 'conventional', they are actually distinguishing 
between norms that are accompanied by affect and the ones that are not. Psychopaths, 
whose emotions are dulled, cannot make this distinction, but why should a rationalist 
accept that this makes psychopaths morally incompetent? Sentimentalists make 
morality depend on emotions, but rationalists explicitly deny this dependence. 
In order to respond to this challenge, one has to remember that norms are distinguished 
not only by ratings of seriousness, etc., but also by justification type. Non-psychopaths 
offer different justifications for all three types of norms. They say that moral norm 
violations are wrong because of the harm this brings to the victim. Conventional affect-
backed norm violations are wrong because of the feelings they evoke (e.g. 'It is 
disgusting!'). Conventional non-affect-backed norm violations are justified by reference 
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to rules (e.g. 'It is bad manners.', 'It is rude.').77 Psychopaths, however, do not 
distinguish between morality and convention either by their rankings or by 
justifications: they offer conventional justifications for moral norms. This shows that 
they lack some moral competence, for suppose you met someone who sincerely says 
that moral norm violations are simply not the done thing, and this is why they are 
wrong; this person also behaves immorally. It is natural to conclude that such a person 
is failing to appreciate what is distinctive about moral norms. If a rationalist wants to 
reject this sensible conclusion, she has to explain why, and to explain it in a way that is 
not theory-driven, i.e. she has to give us an independent (of rationalism) reason to think 
that the conclusion we made is wrong. Until such reason has been offered, rationalists 
cannot deny that distinguishing between moral and conventional norms by providing a 
different justification for each is part of moral competence.
One may try to argue that psychopaths are irrational in a different way.78 The following 
argument is reminiscent of Nagel (1970) and Smith (1994), and is adapted specifically 
for my version of sentimentalism. According to indirect sentimentalism, having 
sentiments is necessary for mastering evaluative concepts. A psychopath does have 
some sentiments – she, for example, does not want others to harm her, and is angry 
when they do. So, she judges 'others should not harm me', yet fails to extend this 
judgement to others. In doing so, she is putting herself in a privileged position, and that 
is irrational. The objection has two steps: first, it claims that psychopaths have the 
requisite sentiments and, hence, master moral concepts; secondly, it claims that when 
they apply these concepts they exhibit irrationality. Each of these steps can be 
questioned.
First, one can deny that psychopath masters requisite concepts. As noted above, 
psychopaths are deficient in specific sentiments, such as guilt and remorse, and, 
specifically in the case of white collar psychopaths, shame (Mullins-Nelson et al. 
2006). Lack of these emotions means that psychopaths will fail to master some 
evaluative concepts. This is supported by the experiment on the moral/conventional 
77 Nichols' study compared two types of norms: conventional affect-backed and conventional non-
affect-backed. It would be interesting to compare all three types of norms: conventional affect-
backed, conventional non-affect-backed, and moral. It may yet be the case that non-psychopaths 
distinguish between the rankings of conventional affect-backed norms and moral norms: although 
they rate conventional affect-backed violations as serious, impermissible, etc., they might give still 
higher ratings to violations of moral norms.
78 I thank Prof. Pink for this objection.
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distinction cited above.79 There we have seen that psychopaths fail to distinguish 
between moral and conventional norm violations. If so, their moral concepts are not 
even extensionally correct, in which case it is questionable whether psychopaths even 
possess moral concepts, let alone have mastery of them. For example, psychopaths are 
masterful in evaluating pleasure as good, since they can experience it, but they cannot 
make moral evaluation that it is wrong to hurt someone for pleasure, since she lacks 
such emotions as empathy, guilt and remorse. Thus, psychopaths are not making a 
judgement using moral concepts at all. But now my opponent can ask, if they are not 
using moral concepts, what sort of judgement are they making? Presumably it is 
something along the lines of 'this hurts me, I want it to stop'. If psychopaths are making 
this sort of judgement, it does not look like they are irrationally favouring themselves, 
since it is, as one way put it, essentially an agent-relative judgement. However, now 
rationalists may object that, since psychopaths seem unable to make a certain type of 
judgement – an agent-neutral one – they must, surely, have a rational deficit: making 
agent-relative judgements all the time is irrational. Fortunately for the sentimentalist, 
psychopaths are generally capable of making agent-neutral judgements. To use Nichols' 
(2002a) examples, they know that arsenic is a poison and that eating too much fat will 
make one overweight. So, psychopaths have no general deficit in the ability to make 
agent-neutral judgements. 
Secondly, I can accept that psychopaths make moral judgements, but deny that it has 
implications that favour rationalism. Suppose that psychopaths do make moral 
judgements. Both sides agree that these judgements are somehow deficient, but 
disagree about the source of this deficiency: sentimentalists say that it is due to 
emotional abnormalities, rationalists – due to rational deficits. However, as I have 
shown above, rationalists failed to specify the cognitive deficit that is responsible for 
misapplication of concepts. And doing so is a tall order, given that
[P]resumably this general rational deficit should be absent in the groups that can 
draw the moral/conventional distinction [i.e. apply the concepts correctly]. And it 
seems unlikely that psychopaths diverge from the ideal of the fully rational 
79 To the best of my knowledge there is, as yet, no study of whether successful, or 'white collar' 
psychopaths make the moral/conventional distinction; I assume here that they, like their incarcerated 
counterparts, fail to make it. This assumption is not unwarranted, given that Glenn et al. (2009) found 
that 'even within nonincarcerated populations, individual differences in psychopathic personality 
impact how moral judgements are made' (Ibid., p. 396). In particular, higher psychopathy scores are 
positively correlated with readiness to harm and behave unfairly, as well as with readiness to 
disregard moral concerns for monetary rewards.
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individual more than three-year-old children, children with autism, and children 
with Down syndrome. (Nichols 2004, p. 80.)80
There may be another cognitive deficit, not discussed above, that will help the 
objection à la Nagel and Smith (i.e. the objection that a psychopath is irrationally 
favouring herself): a perspective taking deficit. If a psychopath cannot take someone 
else's perspective, then it is no wonder that she fails to apply moral judgements to 
others. And this is, prima facie at least, a cognitive deficit. However, as Nichols notes 
(2004, p. 79), perspective taking deficit cannot be responsible for psychopaths' 
misapplication of moral concepts for two reasons. First, psychopaths can take other 
people's perspectives (e.g. Jones et al. 2010). In fact, this ability is required for 
successful manipulation of others, and 'conning and manipulative' is one of Hare's 
diagnostic criteria for the condition. Secondly and, perhaps, surprisingly, lacking the 
perspective taking ability does not lead to misapplication of moral concepts. Autistic 
children find it difficult to take perspectives of others, as evidenced by failing the false 
belief test (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). In a false belief test one doll, named Sally, places 
some object – say, a bag of sweets – into a desk drawer, and then goes out of the room. 
In her absence, another doll, Ann, takes the sweets out of the drawer and puts them into 
a basket. Children are then asked where Sally will look for her sweets when she returns. 
Normally developing children provide the correct answer at around four years of age. 
Autistic children as old as 11 fail this test, thus showing difficulty in perspective taking. 
However, autistic children, unlike psychopaths, make the distinction between moral and 
conventional norm violations. Thus, the deficit in the perspective taking ability cannot 
be responsible for psychopaths' misapplication of moral concepts. 
A rationalist may offer yet another objection.81 I discussed Maibom's view in 
considerable detail. She thinks, like Kantians do, that we detect good reasons by 
making consistent universalizations. Yet, there are other forms of rationalism, not all of 
which are based on consistent universalization. Smith's (1994) view, discussed at the 
end of Chapter 1, is an example. In response to this objection, I point out that Maibom's 
view is the obvious one to consider, since she explicitly addresses Blair's study. But, as 
should be evident from my discussion of the objection à la Nagel and Smith, similar 
worries (as well as a worry about instrumental aggression and 'white collar' 
80 Although Zalla et al. (2011) found that individuals with autism are failing to make the distinction 
between morality and convention on dimensions of seriousness and justification.
81 This objection is due to Guy Fletcher.
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psychopaths, discussed below) apply to rationalist theories that do not endorse 
universalization. Any rationalist theory will have to show that psychopaths are 
irrational. They then need to argue that 
a) the rational deficit(s) in question is (are) responsible for the specific pattern 
of action that psychopaths display,
b) this deficit itself is not dependent on an emotional deficit,
c) this deficit is not present in the groups that make the moral/conventional 
distinction. 
I have discussed the known candidates – the group of deficits mentioned by Maibom 
(2005) and a purported deficit in perspective taking – and showed that they cannot do 
the job of explaining what's wrong with psychopaths. Thus, the burden of proof is 
placed back onto rationalists.
3.3.2. Instrumental aggression
Another fact that supports sentimentalism over rationalism is the high instrumental 
aggression that psychopaths display. Instrumental aggression is aggression used as a 
means to achieving some end. Reactive aggression, on the other hand, is a crime 
passionnel: it is not a means to a specific goal, but an emotional response to a 
frustrating event. Psychopaths have higher levels of both reactive and instrumental 
aggression than non-psychopaths, but they are much more likely to engage in 
instrumental aggression. For example, 93% of all murders committed by psychopaths 
were instrumental, compared to 48% of murders committed by non-psychopathic 
criminals (Porter and Porter 2007). This would suggest that psychopaths are rational 
people who see violence as an acceptable means of achieving their goals. These are 
means that a non-psychopath would discount almost automatically. Here is a striking 
example of just how different their reasoning is from other people’s. A suspect was 
arrested for murder, and the interrogating officers were trying to get him to confess to 
other murders. At first they appealed to his conscience and the feelings of the victim's 
families, which was fruitless. Once the officers realized that the suspect is a 
psychopath, they appealed to his pride instead, pointing out how famous he would be if 
he confessed; and so he did. (Hare 2007, p. 19.)
Psychopaths do not engage in certain types of actions, such as acting out of 
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compassion, and tend to pursue egoistic goals through instrumental aggression. Even 
though they possess the rational deficits described above, it is not clear why these 
deficits would give rise to this particular pattern of intentional action. Rationalists fail 
to explain an increase in instrumental aggression, whereas sentimentalists predict this 
result. According to my version of sentimentalism, psychopaths are rational people 
who, through deficiency in such emotions as guilt, remorse and empathy (which one 
may call 'the moral sentiments'), fail to master moral concepts. Psychopaths lack moral 
sentiments, so they do not think it valuable to help others, and thus they fail to consider 
actions with the goal of helping others. At the same time, they have a healthy dose of 
egocentrism. Hence they are uninhibited in using aggression as a means to their ends.
3.3.3.'White collar' psychopaths
'White collar' psychopaths present yet another problem for rationalists. Most studies of 
psychopaths are conducted on those imprisoned, often for serious crimes. This is 
because imprisoned psychopaths are easily accessible and often willing to participate in 
the study. Psychopaths outside prisons do not seek medical help, as they see nothing 
wrong with themselves, so one cannot recruit them as participants from, say, an 
outpatient treatment group. However, there are a few studies of white collar 
psychopaths (e.g. Babiak 2007, Hare 1993, pp. 102–123). These individuals manage to 
hold responsible and well-paid jobs. They may be lawyers, financiers, teachers. They 
may have a family (more often several consecutive families). They are charming and 
have good interpersonal skills, so that if something untoward does happen, it may look 
to all but those who know them well like an honest mistake.
Rationalist say that all psychopaths are irrational, and this irrationality gives rise to 
their immoral behaviour. This sits ill with the very idea of a psychopath who is 
successful. Sentimentalists have no such problem. For them, acting well is not the same 
as acting rationally: they admit that psychopaths are bad, but not irrational. According 
to my thesis, psychopaths lack mastery of moral concepts, and hence can't make good 
moral evaluations. One could see that such insensitivity to moral concerns, far from 
being a predicament, can help with worldly success. The same cannot be said about 
irrationality.82 Indeed, some psychopathic qualities are often mistaken for 'leadership 
82 It does not follow that being perfectly rational is a requirement for success. Psychopaths, for 
rationalists, are not just irrational, but more so than other people (Maibom 2005, p. 244). Their 
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potential', as shown in the table below.
Psychopathic Features and Leadership Labels We Give Them
Psychopathic Features Corporate Labels
Charm and charisma 'Leadership'
Talking about loft ideals/goals 'Visioning'
Conning and manipulation 'Motivating', 'Influential', 'Persuasive'
Lack of remorse or guilt for hurtful 
behaviour
'Can make hard decisions', 'Action 
oriented'
Impulsivity; no fear 'High Energy'; 'Courage'
Has no emotions (affect) 'Controls Emotions', 'Strong'
Grandiose self-appraisal 'Self-confidence'
Thrill-seeking and need for 
stimulation
'Ability to multi-task'
       Copyright 2001 by Paul Babiak, PhD. (Babiak 2007, p. 419.)
It is easy to see how someone described like that can be successful in the job market. 
The same cannot be said of a job candidate that is described as 'irrational'.
However, there may be a problem for sentimentalists here are well. The Psychopathy 
Checklist–Revised, presented in section 3.1, is divided into two factors: Factor 1 
measures how much one's emotions are affected, whilst Factor 2 concentrates on 
behaviour. Successful psychopaths score lower than unsuccessful ones on Factor 2 
(Behavioural), but their Factor 1 (Affective/Interpersonal) scores are similar (Babiak 
2007, p. 415). In other words, they do not exhibit as much antisocial behaviour as 
unsuccessful psychopaths, but their emotions are just as deficient. This would 
contradict my thesis that psychopaths lack mastery of moral concepts due to emotional 
deficiencies. If successful psychopaths have emotions which are just as shallow as 
those of unsuccessful psychopaths, they should, according to my thesis, be just as 
unable to make masterful moral evaluations. If so, then they should display as much 
immoral behaviour as unsuccessful psychopaths do. There are several points to make in 
response. 
cognitive deficits are not tested against the standard of perfect rationality, but against healthy human 
controls.
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First, there is some evidence that the behavioural, but not the emotional, factor of 
psychopathy is dependent on the environment. If one is well off and intelligent, one can 
find more routes to satisfy one's goals. Yet again, if a psychopath is well off, there is no 
need to mug someone to get £50 – an option which will be very attractive to a 
psychopath who does not have a high economic status (Blair et al. 2005, p. 38). For a 
normal person, violence is not considered to be an option because of normal emotional 
functioning. A successful psychopath may fail to take the violent option just because of 
her repertoire of available actions. 
Secondly, according to self-reports, successful psychopaths still engaged in illegal 
activity, including violence, as often as unsuccessful ones. They were just unlikely to be 
caught (Porter and Porter 2007, p. 295). Successful psychopaths are more educated, 
more intelligent, more likely to have financial resources. They are often bailed out by 
family, friends, or even their employer who wants to avoid a scandal. One study found 
that although successful psychopaths have never been incarcerated, 60% of them had a 
history of arrests (Gao and Raine 2010, pp. 197-198).
Thirdly, there is some evidence that successful psychopaths have 'greater emotional 
reactivity' than unsuccessful ones (Ishikawa et al. 2001). Obviously, this finding is hard 
to square with high Factor 1 scores, since Factor 1 includes such items as callousness, 
lack of empathy, lack of remorse and emotional shallowness. One way of reconciling 
high Factor 1 scores and greater emotional reactivity is to note that Psychopathy 
Checklist–Revised was tested on incarcerated psychopaths, and it may be inappropriate 
for measuring other types of psychopathy. It may be not sensitive enough, as only 
particular emotions can be affected. E.g. Mullins-Nelson et al. (2006) found that the 
only deficient emotion in successful psychopaths was shame, which does not figure on 
Psychopathy Checklist–Revised.
So, there are things that a rationalist theory fails to explain about psychopathy: the fact 
that psychopaths fail to make the moral/conventional distinction, their increased 
instrumental aggression, and the existence of 'white-collar' psychopaths. A 
sentimentalist theory has no trouble with these, and hence provides a better explanation 
of psychopathy. My thesis, in particular, explains all these facts. I hold that sentiments 
are necessary for mastery of evaluative concepts. Thus, it is not surprising that 
psychopaths, who have deficiencies of moral sentiments, fail to understand the 
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difference between morality and convention, use aggression as a means to their ends, 
and enjoy worldly success.
4. Conclusion
Sentimentalism provides the best explanation of the current data. However, this 
explanation concentrates on human agents, rather than agents per se.  In the next 
chapter, I also provide arguments for my theory that do not rely on empirical evidence.
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Chapter 4. Phenomenal Concepts and Evaluations
1. Introduction
In Chapter 2, I argued that we should abandon the way in which traditional Humeans 
connect desires and normative reasons. Traditional Humeans claim that normative 
reasons depend on desires because one has a normative reason to do something only if 
doing it promotes one's desires. Instead, I suggested that desires, or, more broadly, 
sentiments, are necessary for having normative reasons because such mental states give 
us mastery of evaluative concepts. In Chapter 3, I have defended this claim with the 
help of empirical studies. In this chapter, I shall further defend the link between 
sentiments and evaluative concepts by using a version of a famous thought experiment 
in philosophy of mind – the Knowledge Argument (Jackson 1982). To show how 
Jackson's point matters for philosophy of action, I offer arguments that tie together 
themes from the previous chapters (section 5). The first argument is based on the 
connection between motivation and value, discussed in Chapter 1. The second 
argument further explores the indirect dependence of normative reasons on sentiments, 
the need for which was shown in Chapter 2. 
2. Spock and Mary
In this section, I shall explain the parallel between mastery of evaluative and colour 
concepts. The Knowledge Argument is a famous thought experiment in philosophy of 
mind, proposed by Frank Jackson (1982). Below I provide a variation of his story about 
Mary, the colour-blind neuroscientist.83 The original knowledge argument and the 
debate that followed were about experiences of colour, and phenomenal concepts of 
such experiences. I, on the other hand, am talking about colours, not experiences of 
them, and phenomenal concepts of colours, i.e. observable properties of the world, not 
phenomenal concepts of colour experiences. Phenomenal concepts, as understood 
83 Jackson's story was about knowledge of colour experiences, whilst mine is about knowledge of 
colours. Jackson originally concluded that since Mary had all the physical information about colour 
experiences in her black-and-white room, she must have learnt a new, non-physical fact when she saw 
colour for the first time. If there are such facts, then physicalism, i.e. the thesis that everything is 
physical or supervenes on the physical, is false. This has generated a lot of discussion, but I am not 
interested in whether this case tells for truth or falsity of physicalism. What I am interested in is the 
idea that when Mary leaves her black-and-white room, she gains a better grasp of the concept 'red'.
(N.B. Jackson no longer believes that this argument is a good argument against physicalism because 
'Mary’s transition from not knowing what it is like to see red to knowing what it is like to see red will 
have a causal explanation in purely physical terms.' (Jackson 1998, p. 418.))
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traditionally, are concepts used to think about experiences in a special way, acquired 
through having had the relevant experience. The common example is the thought 'Red 
looks like this.', where 'this' refers to perceiving or imagining red. My use of the term 
'phenomenal concept' deviates from this tradition: I emphasize the experiential 
requirement. According to my usage, any concept that one cannot master without 
having had the relevant experience is a phenomenal concept. Below, I draw on the 
literature on phenomenal concepts as traditionally understood (i.e. as concepts of colour 
experiences), and make the adjustments necessary for accommodating my, broader, 
understanding of phenomenal concepts as concepts mastery of which requires having 
had the relevant experience. I shall call the former 'phenomenal concepts of experience' 
and the latter simply 'phenomenal concepts'. But first, I present my modified case of 
Mary, and a parallel case of Spock.
The Mary 
Case
Mary is a brilliant scientist working on colour. She knows that ripe 
tomatoes cause sensations of red in normal observers under normal 
conditions. She knows that they do so in virtue of certain reflectance 
characteristics of their surfaces. She can tell by looking at the subject's 
brain what colour they are seeing. She knows all this and lots more. In 
short, Mary knows everything about colours, apart from one thing: Mary 
has spent her whole life in a black-and-white room, and has never seen 
colours herself. 
One day Mary leaves her black-and-white room and sees a red rose. 
From then on, she can think about colours in a way that was previously 
unavailable to her. 
The Spock 
Case
Mr Spock is a perfectly rational creature: he makes no mistakes 
regarding  consistency or coherence, he is immune to forgetting or not 
following through to logical conclusions. He knows a lot about human 
values and sentiments. He knows, for example, that people will normally 
get indignant at being unjustly treated. He can tell by looking at the 
subject's brain what sentiment the subject is undergoing. He knows all 
this and lots more. In short, Spock knows all there is to know about 
sentiments, apart from one thing: Spock is an alien who is incapable of 
experiencing sentiments. 
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One day Spock is changed (say, by God) so that he no longer has this 
lack. He is unfairly treated and feels indignant. From then on, he can 
think about values in a way that was previously unavailable to him. 
It is widely agreed that Mary, on her release, gains something that she did not have 
before.84 There  are different theories as to what it is – a new ability (e.g. Lewis 1983 
and 1988, Nemirow 1980 and 2007), a new concept (e.g. Loar 1997, Papineau 2002 
and 2007) or a better grasp of an old concept (Rabin 2011).85 A popular explanation of 
what happens to Mary after her release evokes phenomenal concepts of experiences. 
Possession of such concepts requires one to have undergone the relevant experience. 
However much I know about the colour red, if I have never experienced red, I will lack 
mastery of the concept 'red'. Phenomenal concepts of colours are what Mary lacks in 
her black-and-white room. Once she leaves the room and sees colours, she gains these 
concepts, and hence can think about colours in a new way. This new way of thinking, 
i.e. making such judgements as 'This is green.' by looking at it rather than using her 
scientific instruments, affords a more immediate way of identifying colours and 
expands her grasp of colour concepts. This special type of concept – a concept that one 
can master only through having had the relevant experience – helps us to describe the 
before-after change in Spock as well. In what follows, I try to show that evaluative 
concepts are phenomenal concepts, in that having had the relevant experience expands 
one's grasp of such concepts. Mary gains a new way of thinking about colours; Spock 
gains a new way of making evaluations – a way that leads him to acquire normative 
reasons. I give two arguments for this claim in section 5. The first argument relies on 
our concept of value. Value and motivation are conceptually linked, and, since Spock is 
not motivated to do anything, as I have shown in Chapter 1, he lacks normative reasons. 
The second argument relies on the claim that sentiments are necessary for making 
evaluations. I defend this claim by showing that traditional reasons to oppose it don't 
apply to my weakly sentimentalist account, which links sentiments and normative 
84 The consensus is not universal. I discuss those who disagree in section 6.1. below.
85 As noted above, my usage of 'phenomenal concept' deviates from these authors': they are talking 
about phenomenal concepts of experience, I am talking about any concept, mastery of which requires 
having had the relevant experience. They concentrate on phenomenal concepts of experiences, I 
concentrate on phenomenal concepts of colours. This is because their aims are different from mine: 
all these authors aim to defend physicalism against Jackson's original argument, whereas I am trying 
to show how appeal to phenomenal concepts can be useful in philosophy of action. The differences 
are spelt out further below, where I modify the arguments in this debate to fit my own usage of the 
term 'phenomenal concept'.
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reasons indirectly. However, before offering these arguments I discuss phenomenal 
concepts in more detail.
3. Phenomenal concepts
A very popular explanation of the before-after change in Mary evokes phenomenal 
concepts of colour experiences.86 Such concepts are usually described as enabling one 
to recognize and imagine experiences that fall under the concept, and these concepts 
must be acquired by having undergone an experience they refer to. When Mary leaves 
her black-and-white room and sees a red rose, she acquires a new – phenomenal – 
concept of colour experience, which she uses to think about colour experiences in a 
new way. There are different accounts of phenomenal concepts of colour experiences. 
Loar (1997) puts the emphasis on recognition. Levin (2007) likens phenomenal 
concepts of colour experiences to demonstrative ones: 'that's one of those experiences 
again'. Papineau (2007) makes them a species of perceptual concept. By 'perceptual 
concept' Papineau means that same thing as I mean by 'phenomenal concept' – i.e. a 
concept, mastery, or even possession of which requires having had the relevant 
experience – so I find his account more congenial than others, but what I say below 
could be applied, mutatis mutandis, to other accounts of phenomenal concepts of 
experience.
Papineau's (2007) account highlights the experiential requirement well, as it makes 
phenomenal concepts of experiences a type of perceptual concept.87 When I perceive a 
bird for the first time, a sensory template is created. This template carries information 
slots which are different  depending on whether it refers to tokens of a particular bird or 
to its species. A token template will have slots for this bird's particular colouring, for 
example. A type (species) template will carry information about whether it eats seeds. 
Such concepts are not demonstrative, although their linguistic expression will often 
include demonstratives ('that bird is in my garden again'). Perceptual concepts are not 
demonstrative, because the referent of a demonstrative concept changes in different 
contexts. This is not so with perceptual concepts – when I use a perceptual concept to 
refer to that bird in a different context, it is still the same bird I am referring to. This is 
86 This is not the only explanation. Competing explanations are the ability hypothesis and the denial that 
there is a change in Mary after she sees colour, so there is nothing to explain. The ability hypothesis is 
also compatible with my thesis, although, then, of course, I would not talk about Spock's concepts, 
but about his impaired ability to imagine and recognize values. I discuss the denial of a need for 
explanation in section 6.1.
87 Papineau (2007) is a revised version of his earlier quotational account (2002). The main change is 
that he now abandons the idea that phenomenal concepts are demonstrative.
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unsurprising, since Papineau thinks that the function of perceptual concepts is to 
accumulate information about their referents. As I learn more about the bird (or the 
species), more slots of the sensory template get filled in. This information would be lost 
if the referent of my concept changed each time the context changed.
When I am thinking about a bird using a perceptual concept, my sensory template gets 
activated – either because I am imagining a bird or because I am perceiving it. 
However, it is possible that I have encountered a bird, formed the perceptual concept, 
but then think about the bird without either perceiving it or re-creating its image. Once 
the concept is acquired, it can be used in thought without imagining or perceiving. This 
is what Papineau calls 'perceptually derived concepts'.
Papineau's account of perceptual concepts can easily be applied to my use of 
phenomenal concepts, i.e. concepts, the mastery of which requires having had the 
relevant experience. (I put what follows in terms of mastery, rather than possession, for 
reasons discussed in section 4.2 below.) Mastery of phenomenal concepts, in my sense, 
requires having had the experience, because when one uses phenomenal concepts in 
thought, they are accompanied by the experience they were mastered with. When Mary, 
after her release, thinks 'This is red.' using her newly acquired mastery of phenomenal 
concept of red, she has a red sensation – either because she is seeing something red or 
because she is imagining it. When Spock, having had sentiments, thinks 'This is 
unjust.', using his newly acquired mastery of evaluative concept of injustice, he has a 
sensation of indignation. One may object that not every thought that uses a phenomenal 
concept is accompanied by the requisite experience. This is where phenomenally 
derived concepts come in, in exact parallel to a similar challenge in philosophy of 
mind. As we have seen above, Papineau (2007) introduces perceptually derived 
concepts in order to allow one to think about what I have perceived without invoking 
images. Similarly, phenomenally derived concepts allow one to think about colours and 
values without invoking experiences usually associated with such things.
To recapitulate, my use of the term 'phenomenal concept' is a broad one: it includes 
what Papineau calls 'perceptual' and 'perceptually derived' concepts. Traditional usage 
calls phenomenal concepts phenomenal because they are used to think about one's 
experiences. I call phenomenal concepts phenomenal because one can only master them 
after having had the relevant experience. My broad usage can be justified as follows. 
When Mary sees a red rose, she can think about colour experiences in a new way. I 
want to add: not only can she think about colour experiences, but she can also think 
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about colours themselves in a new way, in particular, by identifying them simply by 
looking, rather than by less immediate ways (measuring wavelengths or getting test 
subjects and looking at their brains). The same applies to Spock. On acquiring 
sentiments, not only can he think about sentiments in a new way, but he also acquires a 
new way of thinking about types of action as a result of this new experience. He can 
now know that such and such an act is unjust in an immediate way – by experiencing 
indignation, rather than by getting test subjects and seeing what they experience. Mary, 
before her release, could think about colours, and her concepts were extensionally 
correct. Yet she was not able to identify them by experiencing them. The same applies 
to Spock – before experiencing sentiments, his evaluative concepts may have been 
extensionally correct. (I say 'may' because the study of psychopaths, discussed in 
Chapter 3, shows that sentiments may be necessary even for gaining a concept with the 
correct extension. Psychopaths, as we have seen, do not have moral concepts with the 
correct extension: on the one hand, they over-extend moral concepts by applying them 
to conventional ones, on the other, they under-extend moral concepts, since they 
provide conventional, rather than moral, justifications for moral norm violations.) Yet, 
Spock was not able to identify values by experiencing them – a lack which, as I argue 
in section 5, is important for agency.
4. Analogy glossed
In this section, I aim to explain the parallel I am making in more detail. First, I discuss 
a plausible version of empiricism about phenomenal concepts. Then I take up a 
challenge from those who don't think that phenomenal concepts exist.
4.1. Weakening the empiricists' principle
The Mary case has its roots in a long-standing empirical tradition. Empiricists claim 
that all knowledge is triggered by experience. In particular, they hold that the mind 
cannot invent simple ideas. A simple idea 'contains in it nothing but one uniform 
appearance' (Locke 1689, 2.2.1, p. 121), a complex idea is created by a combination of 
simple ones. Examples of simple ideas are coldness of ice, smell of a rose, taste of 
sugar (Ibid.). The empiricists' principle of all knowledge being triggered by experience 
applies only to simple ideas:
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I think it would be granted easily, that if a child were kept in a place, where he 
never saw any other colour but black and white, till he were a man, he would have 
no more ideas of scarlet or green, than he that from his childhood never tasted an 
oyster, or a pineapple, has of those particular relishes. (Locke 1689, 2.1.6 p. 111.)
But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by 
any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the 
mind … I would have any one try to fancy any taste which had never affected his 
palate; or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt: and when he can do this, I 
will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colours, and a deaf man true 
distinct notions of sounds. (Locke 1689, 2.2.2, p.122.)





I have never tasted 
pineapple.
– I can't have a concept of pineapple's 
taste. 
The problem with this principle is that it only plausibly applies to simple ideas, and it is 
not easy to tell which ones they are. Locke gives tastes and smells of individual 
foodstuffs as examples of simple ideas, Hume says that each distinct shade of blue is a 
simple idea. Both of these examples can be questioned.88 I can't think of a good 
comparison in the case of pineapples, but I remember that when I had a kiwi fruit for 
the first time, I thought that it tasted like strawberries with lemon juice. This makes the 
taste of kiwi a complex idea, involving the combination of strawberry's texture, 
strawberry's smell, lemon's taste, possibly other ideas. The same can be said about the 
missing shade of blue. The missing shade example goes as follows. Suppose someone 
has seen all the different shades of blue but one. The shades she experienced are 
presented to her in order from darker to lighter. She will notice that one shade is 
missing, since she'll be able to tell that in one place the shades go from darker to lighter 
quicker. And then, Hume says, she will be able to form an impression of the missing 
shade, even though she has never perceived it. (Hume 1777, pp. 20-21.) Hume says that 
this counter-example is too unusual to make us abandon our general principle that one 
88 I have benefited here from discussion with my supervisors, Prof. Pink and Prof. Papineau.
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can't acquire simple ideas without having had the relevant experience. But one can 
argue, instead, that the missing shade of blue is a complex idea produced by the 
combination of blueness and lightness or darkness. Both of these are simple ideas 
which have already been experienced and are now combined into a complex idea of a 
new shade. Since the idea is complex, one can form an impression of it without 
experience.89
The examples above show that it is not easy to distinguish between complex and simple 
ideas. But the Strong Empiricists' Principle is only plausible when applied to simple 
ideas, so it requires such a distinction. Once we accept that Hume's missing shade of 
blue is a complex idea, then it is doubtful whether there are any simple ones, or, at 
least, whether there is a good criterion for identifying them. For any purported simple 
idea one could find complexes to which the empiricists' principle does not apply. So, 
instead of making a distinction between simple and complex ideas, required for the 
plausibility of the Strong Empiricists' Principle, I propose a weakening of the principle 
itself. Such a weakening is found in Locke's second quotation above. There, Locke runs 
two theses together. The first one is about particular simple ideas: someone who has not 
seen scarlet cannot have an idea of scarlet. The second one is about simple ideas 
obtained from a particular sense: someone who has never seen any colours cannot have 
an idea of colour. One can accept the second thesis without accepting the first. Even if 
we admitted that someone who has seen colours can supply the missing shade, we are 
not thereby committed to saying that someone who has never seen colours can have 
ideas of those. This is because supplying the shade of blue depends on having seen 
other such shades, and imagining the taste of kiwi depends on having tasted 
strawberries and lemons. If someone has never had experiences delivered by a 




I have never tasted 
pineapple.
– I can't have a concept of pineapple's 
taste. 
89 Both Locke and Hume are talking about our ideas, i.e. about experiences, rather than colours and 
tastes themselves, which are secondary qualities, i.e. powers of objects to produce experiences in us. 
But one can see how their line of thought can be applied to secondary qualities themselves rather than 
just experiences. Once I acquire an idea of red from having seen red objects, I can identify red in an 
immediate way, i.e. I can tell, without using any scientific measuring, which objects have the power 





I have never tasted 
anything at all. –
I can't have a concept of tastes.
So, I am accepting the weak empiricist's principle because it does not require spelling 
out the distinction between simple and complex ideas. It also serves my purposes, so 
there is no need for a stronger claim. Spock can't have sentiments in general, he is not 
missing a particular type – say, remorse (but even that can have a profound effect, as 
was shown in the previous chapter). 
4.2. Are there phenomenal concepts?
Phenomenal concepts of experiences have recently come under attack. Ball (2009) and 
Tye (2009) argue that there are no such things. They are against the existence of 
phenomenal concepts of experience, but their line of thought threatens the existence of 
any concepts which can only be acquired after having had the relevant experience. I 
define phenomenal concepts as having such experiential requirement, so Ball and Tye's 
argument is a problem for my thesis. These authors argue that since Mary is a member 
of a community of speakers, the community teaches her all the concepts she needs. This 
relies on Burge's (1979) idea that one can possess a concept even if one knows very 
little about its referent. Such a person has the concept because she interacts with other 
speakers and is willing to be corrected in her concept application; her possession of the 
concept is called 'deferential' (Ball 2009, p. 947). This view is sometimes called 'social 
externalism' (Howell 2001, p. 463). Alter (forthcoming) provides a succinct statement 
of the social externalist argument against phenomenal concepts:
Phenomenal concepts have strong possession conditions. Social externalist 
arguments show that none of our concepts of experience satisfy those conditions. 
Therefore, there are no phenomenal concepts … . (Alter, forthcoming, p. 3.)
The phrase 'strong possession conditions' refers to the claim that one cannot acquire 
phenomenal concepts without having had the relevant experience. (Alter is talking 
about phenomenal concepts of experience, but the same applies to phenomenal 
concepts of colour and value.) There are several social externalist arguments which 
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purport to show that concepts must have weak possession conditions. One of them 
relies on the possibility of sharing thoughts. Suppose I know that arthritis is a disease 
that affects the joints. Apart from this I know very little about arthritis. In fact, I 
erroneously think that it affects thighs as well. Still, if my doctor and I both think 'Mary 
has arthritis in her knee.', we are thinking the same thing. In spite of my limited 
knowledge, I can share beliefs with people who have the concept 'arthritis', hence I 
must have the concept as well. The other argument is from negation. When my doctor 
corrects my erroneous belief, I can say 'I used to think that one can get arthritis in the 
thigh, but I was wrong.' That is, I accept that my previous belief was false, which shows 
that I had the concept of arthritis all along.90 
Ball (2009) and Tye (2009) apply these considerations to Mary's case. They argue that 
she possesses all the concepts we use to think about our experiences when she is in her 
room. She can know, to use Stoljar's (2005) example, that experiencing red is not like a 
number. She can also think truly before her release:
(4.1) I don’t know what it’s like to see red.
And after her release she can truly think:
(4.2) I know what it’s like to see red.91
The thought expressed by [the first claim] is the negation of the thought expressed 
by [the second]. But the phenomenal concept theorist cannot admit this, since on 
the phenomenal concept theorist’s view, the thoughts expressed by [the first claim] 
and [the second claim] involve distinct concepts. (Ball 2009, p. 952.)
Not only does Mary before her release possess all the concepts she needs, she can also 
possess them without deferring to other speakers: she may acquire them through 
stipulation. Someone who is not a member of a community of speakers can stipulate, 
for example, that 'water' refers to anything that is composed of H2O molecules. Suppose 
this lonely Mary, who has no one to talk to, researches colour experiences. She knows, 
or at least theorizes, that this particular brain state C would correlate with some 
phenomenal state, even though she have never been in brain state C herself. So, she 
90 Both these arguments are offered by Burge (1979) and cited by Ball (2009). There are other 
arguments for social externalism that I do not discuss.
91 As pointed out to me by Prof. Papineau, it is difficult to re-cast the first claim in propositional form. 
Those sharing this worry can concentrate on the example given immediately above – that Mary can 
think, before her release, that experiencing red is not like a number.
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makes a stipulation: she calls the phenomenal state that correlates with this brain state 
Q. Thus, Mary can possess all concepts non-deferentially, since there was no one she 
could defer to in this scenario. (Ball 2009, pp. 955-956.) A phenomenal concept 
strategist can deny that Q is a phenomenal concept of experience – it is only a 
shorthand for referring to a physical state of the brain. It is unclear what Ball would say 
in response, so I shall leave non-deferential concept possession out of later discussion, 
concentrating on the case when Mary gains her concept from other speaker rather than 
by stipulation.
So, according to Ball and Tye, Mary possesses the concepts we use to talk about our 
experiences before her release. This extrapolates to concepts of colours and evaluative 
concepts. Mary picks up the concepts of colours from other speakers in her community, 
so she possesses these concepts without having seen colour. Spock picks up evaluative 
concepts from other speakers in his community, so he possesses these concepts without 
having had sentiments. When Mary and Spock come to experience colours and 
sentiments, respectively, they don't thereby gain a new concept.
However, this is not a threat to what I've said about Mary and Spock. I said that they 
lack knowledge that others have. Burgean idea that one can possess a concept whilst 
being very confused about its referent actually reinforces this claim: someone who is 
confused does lack knowledge. A good articulation of this can be found in Rabin 
(2011),92 who uses a distinction between concept possession and concept mastery. 
Concept possession is easy to come by – one can get concepts from other speakers, by 
stipulation, even reliable identification may be enough. For example, if Mary is 
completely colour-bind, but reliably identifies red objects by measuring their 
wavelengths, she has, on some theories, the concept 'phenomenal red'. Mastery of 
concepts is harder to come by: one has mastered the concept 'phenomenal red' only if 
one can identify a red sensation when experiencing one (Rabin 2011, p. 131). Mary 
before her release cannot do this, so she lacks conceptual mastery.93
So, we can admit that Mary and Spock have phenomenal concepts, but insist that they 
lack conceptual mastery – they cannot identify colour sensations and sentiments, 
respectively, when they experience them. Mary can say truly 'This is red.', Spock can 
say truly 'This is good.' Their concepts may be extensionally correct, yet lack all the 
92 See also Alter (forthcoming).
93 Again, since Rabin (2011) is defending the claim that all experience is physical, he is talking about 
phenomenal concepts of colour experiences, not about phenomenal concepts of colours themselves. 
But what he says can easily by adapted for my understanding of phenomenal concepts as concepts 
mastery of which requires having undergone the relevant experience.
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features of normal colour identification and evaluations. Mary cannot identify colours 
by looking at them, Spock cannot identify values (say, injustice) by the way it makes 
him feel.
Even though I put my thesis in terms of mastery rather than possession for reasons 
discussed below, I would point out two problems for the defender of social externalism 
in the Mary case. The first problem is that externalists fail to explain how Mary gains 
new knowledge after seeing colours for the first time. Ball (2009) does not provide an 
explanation in his article, but Tye (2009) uses Russell's distinction between knowledge 
by acquaintance and knowledge by description. (As above, I shall continue to talk 
about colours rather than colour experiences, whilst Tye is talking about the latter.) The 
usual example of this distinction is knowing people and places. For example, I know 
Socrates by description, but I am not acquainted with him; I know Barcelona both by 
description (I know it's a city in Spain, etc.) and by acquaintance (I've been there). 
According to Tye, one is acquainted with something if one is encountering, or has 
encountered, it in experience (Tye 2009, p. 101). Before leaving her room, Mary had 
the knowledge of colours by description. On leaving the room, she sees colours and 
thus gains knowledge by acquaintance. Tye's line of thought has met with criticism that 
can be summarized as follows: in order to explain Mary's situation, knowledge by 
acquaintance must come with factual knowledge (e.g. Alter 2011, Coleman 
forthcoming). If Mary gets no new factual knowledge, then she would not be surprised 
on seeing colours for the first time. If she is surprised, then she gains factual 
knowledge. But how can gaining new factual knowledge be explained, if Mary gains no 
new concepts? Social externalists are unable to answer.
This problem for social externalism is best illustrated by yet another variant of the 
Mary scenario,  proposed by Nida-Rumelin (1996).94 Her heroine, Marianna, is taken to 
a room painted with random splashes of colour. She is prevented from measuring the 
wavelengths of reflected light or using other ways of finding out what these colours are 
called. Looking at a particular patch of colour, Marianna wonders whether it is red or 
not. When she is allowed to use her instruments, she learns that the patch is indeed red, 
thus acquiring a new piece of knowledge that is clearly propositional in form: she now 
knows that the patch is red. This new knowledge is gained after Marianna has been 
acquainted with the patch, so Tye's use of Russell's distinction is inadequate in 
explaining how this knowledge is acquired. Thus, the proponents of social externalism 
94 I thank Prof. Papineau for pointing out that Nida-Rulemin's scenario can be used in this way. Yet 
again, Nida-Rumelin talks about colour experiences, whilst I talk about colours.
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fail to explain why Marianna gains a new piece of knowledge.95
The second problem about social externalism is a question of just how little one can 
know, according to social externalists, in order to count as possessing a concept. In the 
examples above, even though one does not know much about the concept's referent, 
one has some substantial knowledge. For example, the patient who is confused about 
the referent of 'arthritis' still knows that it is a disease, and Mary knows quite a lot 
about colours. But what if I have no substantive information about the concepts' 
referent? Suppose I hear two people talking about 'bules'. I don't hear the rest of the 
conversation, yet, according to social externalists, I have the concept, since I can 
exercise it in thought: I can think that these people are talking about bules, I can wonder 
what bules are. However, I have no substantial knowledge about the referent; all I know 
is that these people are talking about bules. This looks like a limiting case of an 
externalist theory, and I, for one, am less happy to say that I have the concept 'bule' – 
after all, I know nothing substantial about bules. This can be brought out by extending 
the example – I overhear not one, but two unfamiliar words – 'bules' and 'domma'. 
These, for me, are co-extensional: 'bules' and 'domma' are what these two people are 
talking about. I cannot tell bules and domma apart, and if someone asks me what they 
are, I'll honestly say 'I don't know'. Yet I can exercise these concepts in thoughts – I can 
wonder what these things are (or what this thing is, since I don't know whether 'bules' 
and 'domma' refer to the same thing). This example pushes the intuition that I must 
have some substantial knowledge about the referent in order to have a concept; ability 
to think using the word does not suffice for concept possession. Social externalists have 
to say just how much I have to know about the concept's referent in order to count as 
possessing a concept.
Even though social externalism is problematic, I have two reasons to talk about mastery 
rather than possession. The first reason is that this makes my claim about lack of 
knowledge compatible with minimal conditions for concept possession, such as, for 
example, being disposed to identify red in the presence of red objects. Mary can do this 
using her instruments, Spock can do this if he has some sort of prosthetic sentiment 
identifier or test subjects with normal sentiments. The second reason to use a weaker, 
mastery condition, is that sometimes it is difficult to decide whether one lacks a concept 
95 The case of Marianna shows that there is a further complication to the story: experiencing colours or 
sentiments for the first time may not be enough for conceptual mastery. Marianna cannot identify a 
colour sensation as 'red', so she does not have mastery. A similar problem would face Spock – having 
sentiments for the first time would not automatically reveal how these experiences map onto the 
things he already knows.
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or just lacks mastery of it. Take the case of psychopaths, described in the previous 
chapter. They fail to distinguish between moral norms and conventional norms: they 
rate conventional norm violations as just as serious, as impermissible and authority-
independent as moral norm violations, and they offer conventional justifications for 
moral norms. It is unclear whether they lack the concept of a moral norm or whether 
they do possess it, yet misapply it. But it is clear that psychopaths lack mastery of 
moral concepts.
It may be useful to say what mastery involves for Mary and Spock. Mastering a colour 
concept includes being able to, in normal circumstances, recognize a given colour when 
one sees it, being able to re-create it in one's imagination, and being able to identify 
similarity and determinate/determinable relationships between colour patches. 
Mastering an evaluative concept includes, in normal circumstances, being typically (but 
not necessarily) motivated when one uses a positive evaluative concept in a sincere 
assertion, being able to re-create in one's imagination and recognize in others 
sentiments associated with a particular evaluative concept (such as 'tasty' or 'indignant'), 
and being able to identify similarity and determinate/determinable relationships 
between evaluative concepts (e.g. indignation is closer to anger than elation; 'tasty' falls 
under 'good').
So, it is not necessary for my argument that Mary and Spock get a completely new 
concept; a better grasp of an old concept is sufficient. In the next section, I'll show why 
the fact that Mary and Spock have no conceptual mastery is important.
5. Why lack of knowledge is important
Above I have shown that Mary and Spock lack conceptual mastery of colour concepts 
and evaluative concepts, respectively. Now I shall ague that, in Spock's case, this lack is 
important for philosophy of action. It is important because Spock's lack of conceptual 
mastery makes him incapable of having normative reasons. I have two arguments for 
this claim.96
96 The parallel between evaluative concepts and the story of Mary has been made before. In his version 
of the open question argument, Prinz imagines a Moral Mary – someone who has no emotions yet 
learns Kant's and Mill's moral theories. Prinz argues the she would not have the concepts of right and 
wrong because the question 'Is this (e.g.) utility-maximizing property good?' is open. (Prinz 2007, pp. 
38-42.) There are important differences between my account and that of Prinz. First, my arguments in 
this section are not versions of the open-question argument. Secondly, it is not Prinz's aim to provide 
a theory of normative reasons. As such, he does not discuss the problems that occupy me in the first 
two chapters, and would probably reject the concessions I made to anti-Humeans in Chapter 2.
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5.1. Argument 1
The first argument relies on conclusions reached in the first chapter, so I'll be brief. (I 
assume that 'values' and 'normative reasons' are interchangeable.)
It is part of our concept of value that it motivates.
Spock is not motivated to do anything.
Therefore, Spock (by himself)97 cannot recognize values, i.e. does not know 
what he has a normative reason to do.
I support the first premise with the following considerations. It is easy to see that 
someone can make a value judgement and fail to be motivated by it on a particular 
occasion. Stocker's (1979) article is full of examples when we are unmotivated by our 
value judgements: procrastinating and feeling down to the point of not wanting to do 
anything are a part of everyone's experience. However, if someone has never been 
motivated, it is hard to see how she can tell values from other things. She may be able 
to talk about values with reference to other people: they get motivated by x, so x is a 
value. But how would she know which values there are? By remembering which things 
people tend to be motivated by. And if she finds a new 'thing' she may well try to work 
out whether it is a value or not, but would not be able to know for sure until she gets a 
couple of test subjects.
The second premise relies on conclusions reached in the first chapter. I shall summarize 
the argument here. When we deliberate, we are choosing between some possible 
courses of action. If we assess courses of action only in terms of consistency, we'll end 
up with at least two equally consistent but opposing courses of action, which we should 
be equally motivated to do. E.g. I can treat the needy consistently in two ways: divide 
the money between them equally or give nothing to any of them. Rationality alone 
(understood as coherence and consistency) fails to select between these two courses of 
action. What is missing, I argued, is an evaluation of the action.
97 Mary can identify colours by using her scientific instruments. We can imagine that she designs some 
sort of 'prosthetic eye', that tells her (in words) the colours of objects around her. We can also imagine 
that Spock has a similar device, which tells him what sentiments others are experiencing by, say, 
looking up their brain states. However, for such prosthetic senses to be created, Mary and Spock will 
need test subjects with normal phenomenology. Such devices are not a counter-examples to my claim, 
as the identification of colours and sentiments still relies on people who can experience them. This is 
why I add 'by himself' in the premise.
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5.2. Argument 2
Sentiments are necessary for evaluations.
Evaluations are necessary for having normative reasons.
Spock does not have sentiments.
Therefore, Spock does not have normative reasons.
5.2.1. Defence of the second premise
First, I'll defend the second premise. I'll start with an example. Why do I have a good 
reason to write a PhD? Because I think I have something to say about human nature and 
because I value education. These things are my normative reasons. Depending on what 
metaphysics one has, my normative reasons are my evaluations or what they represent. 
This is the usual case. Are there any cases in which one does something for a good 
reason, yet, when questioned, does not come up with an evaluation? Say, someone has 
gone to the shop. When you ask her why she did that, she does not come up with 
anything resembling an evaluation. She may say she went to the shop to buy a new 
dress. In this case, evaluation is implicit, which can be shown in two ways. One can 
either question her further, and very soon her answers will reveal what she values about 
the action ('so that I will look nice' or 'just because I enjoy looking nice'). The second 
way is explaining one's actions to a child, or someone from a very different culture. As 
adults from the same culture as our shopper, we generally appreciate how buying a new 
dress can be a good thing – it makes one look nice, it may improve one's mood, or it 
may be a means to something else, such as having an outfit for the party one is invited 
to. Someone who has not yet absorbed these implications – a child or a foreigner – will 
need to be told explicitly about one's evaluations in order to see that your action was 
done in response to a good reason.98
The thesis that evaluations are necessary for having good reasons is also supported by 
the argument in Chapter 1. There, we found that reasoning alone does not discover the 
normative reasons we have, precisely because it fails to provide evaluations.
The second premise is hardly controversial. However, it merits discussion because it is 
similar to a thesis advanced by Anscombe and Quinn and attacked by Velleman and 
Stocker. So, below I point out the dissimilarities. Anscombe (1957) and Quinn (1993) 
98 Of course, one may not accept that another's action was in fact a response to a good reason. A 
foreigner may say, for example, that in her culture the way one dresses is not at all important. But in 
order for this disagreement to be possible, the foreigner will need to see why you thought you had a 
good reason to buy a new dress, and that is achieved with citing an evaluation.
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argue that desires must involve some positive evaluation of their objects. Suppose, 
Anscombe says, someone wants a saucer of mud. Unless we can come up with 
something good that this person sees about mud or the having of it, we would not say 
she wants it. (Anscombe 1957, pp. 70-71.) Quinn makes the same point using an 
example of the man who is disposed to turn on any radio he sees, but not in order to 
hear anything; nor does he have any other positive evaluation of his action. A state like 
that cannot rationalize action, Quinn contends. (Quinn 1993, pp. 236-237.) 
The proposal that desires must involve positive evaluations (if they are to be desires at 
all, as Anscombe supposes, or if they are to rationalize action, as Quinn puts it) came 
under attack from Stocker (1979) and Velleman (1992). Velleman argues that someone 
who is preoccupied with positive evaluations can only explain one type of agency 
whilst ignoring those who are silly, satanic or depressed. Satan, for example, does bad 
things because they are bad, and finding a positive evaluation of some action is, for 
him, a reason not to do it. I am more sympathetic to Anscombe and Quinn than I am to 
Velleman.99 However, I do not think I can show that Velleman is wrong, so I shall only 
point out that his criticism does not apply to my proposal. The first reason Velleman's 
criticism fails to apply is that I am not claiming that one's evaluation must be a positive 
one. My thesis is only that in order to make evaluations – positive or negative – one has 
to have sentiments. Such sentiments might not always be positive: I can do something 
out of envy, for example, and further argument is needed to show that harming another 
is not a 'proper and direct object of attraction', and that there is a need for evaluation of 
the matter in a positive light (Stocker 1979, p. 748). The option that I am ruling out is 
that one can respond to good (or bad) reasons without the faculty of sentiment; whether 
the evaluation of my action is always positive is left open. The second reason that my 
thesis does not face the same problems as those that confront Anscombe and Quinn, is 
that these authors, but not I, can be accused of over-intellectualizing desires. This is 
because their thesis is about desires, while mine is about normative reasons. Why can't 
I, for example, want something whilst thinking that there is nothing good about it 
whatsoever? It happens.100 And even if this never happened in the case of adult humans, 
there are lower animals and infants, who, prima facie, want things, yet, prima facie, do 
not make evaluations. So, the proponents of desires as evaluations would say that 
99 I am, for example, inclined to say that either Satan has some positive evaluation, such as 'it is a good 
idea to do bad things', or that he is incapable of responding to reasons at all.
100 An example: Pica syndrome sufferers eat chalk, soil, paper, washing powder and other non-food 
substances. They see nothing good about that. In fact, they think that 'what they are eating is, at the 
very least, odd and possibly harmful.' (Morissey 2012). Anscombe and Quinn presumably would say 
that what Pica sufferers experience is a mere urge, but this seems entirely theory-driven.
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animals and infants cannot want things, which seems theory-, rather than evidence-
driven. According to my thesis, animals and babies can want things, since I take desires 
to be perception-like states, and one can have perceptions without having concepts. 
Babies and animals can also make evaluations, although the range of their evaluations 
will be limited in comparison to adult human agents, since the domains that babies and 
animals care about are fairly limited. (Cf. psychopaths: they can make evaluations, but 
the range of evaluations they make is limited, corresponding to their diminished range 
of sentiments. White collar psychopaths, for example, are very good at responding to 
normative reasons provided by self-interest, but are unable to respond to moral 
reasons.) Making evaluations does depend on concept possession and mastery, but both 
of these are not overly intellectual matters. I agree with Michael Tye, who says the 
following about animals' concepts:
Consider my dog, Quigley. I show him a bone, and then I pretend to bury it in the 
ground in a corner of the garden. Quigley watches me do this from a distance. 
When I have finished, I release him and he rushes over to where I was and begins 
digging. Quigley saw the bone. He wants it. He believes that it is in the ground. … 
To the extent that it is agreed that such attitudes require concepts, Quigley has 
concepts. To be sure, Quigley does not have the concept bone, for he cannot draw 
any distinctions between bones and fool's bones. Thus, Quigley's concepts need 
not be the same as ours. Not is this needed for us to correctly ascribe attitudes to 
Quigley using the concepts he lacks. It suffices for such ascriptions to be true that 
Quigley's concepts are sufficiently like ours. Furthermore, for Quigley to wonder 
where that is, where that is the bone, his conceptual resources can be slim indeed.
What goes for Quigley goes for many other non-human animals. (Tye 2009, 
p.102.)
And, I would add, in order for Quigley to make evaluations, all he has to do is connect, 
say, the nice smell of the bone with its object. Most of his evaluations will be no more 
than dog's equivalent of 'yummy' with what Ayer called 'special exclamation marks' 
(Ayer 1936, p.107). The same is probably true of babies. This sort of view allows for 
both a) attributing concepts to animals and babies and b) making a distinction between 
sophisticated agency of most human adults and that of creatures with less developed 
cognitive capacities.
5.2.2. Defence of the first premise
The first premise is obviously the crucial one to defend. My tactic will be to show that, 
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first, there is wide agreement that one would not be making evaluations if one did not 
have sentiments. Secondly, I shall show why some were reluctant to accept this, and 
argue that my thesis does not face the same objections, so we have no reason to 
disbelieve the connection between sentiments and evaluations as I present it here.
Examples of evaluations include:
This cake is tasty.
Sitting in the same position for a long time is uncomfortable.
Murder is wrong.
It is impermissible to use people merely as a means.
Mastery claim seems fairly uncontroversial in the case of personal tastes: it seems 
obvious that I can't evaluate the tastiness of something without having had varied 
experience of tastes (an 'educated palate', as one may put it). But, as we get to more 
abstract evaluative concepts, the claim becomes contested: it seems that I can 
understand this claim without having had sentiments. This is, indeed, what Kantians 
and other rationalists tend to say, and this is a challenge I take up below. Rationalism 
apart, theorists of very different persuasions believe that sentiments are necessary for 
evaluations. The obvious examples are sentimentalists old and new (e.g. Hume 1738-
1740,101 Blackburn 1998, Prinz 2006), but the idea takes hold in many different types of 
theories. For example, the claim that sentiments are necessary for evaluations is well-
established among psychologists and neuroscientists, whose work was discussed in the 
previous chapter. Damasio (1994), for example, thinks that emotions mark value, and 
abnormal emotions lead to abnormal evaluations. (See also Stocker with Hegeman 
1996.) Virtue ethicists (e.g. Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics, McDowell 1978 and 
1979) also emphasize the importance of sentiment. A virtuous person acquires and 
maintains her distinctive view of the world due to her attuned sensibilities. The idea 
that sentiments are necessary for evaluations is even compatible with value realism. 
E.g. Oddie (2005) argues that desires provide data for what is valuable, just like 
perceptions provide data for what is true. Seeing a red rose gives me a prima facie 
reason to believe that it is red. Wanting a bit of cake gives me a prima facie reason to 
believe that it is good. Desires are necessary for evaluations because they are  a mode 
101 In Hume's case, our sentimental evaluations are corrected by the common point of view. When I 
occupy it, I can judge that the virtues of someone far removed from me in space and time are no less 
valuable than virtues of someone next to me, and that a beautiful face that does not look it from 
twenty paces is beautiful nonetheless. (1738-1740, 3.3.1, pp. 581-582.) It is unclear from this short 
passage whether Hume thinks it is possible to occupy the common point of view and have correct 
evaluations without having accompanying sentiments on each occasion of judging.
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of accessing values that are out there in the world.102
Before I continue, I wish to clarify what I mean by the claim that sentiments are 
necessary for evaluations. According to my thesis, sentiments are necessary for 
evaluations because they are necessary for mastery of evaluative concepts. There are 
several possibilities in spelling out the strength of the link between sentiments and 
mastery of evaluative concepts:
Acquisition Feelings are necessary only for acquisition of mastery. It is possible 
to acquire mastery of evaluative concepts, then become incapable of feelings, 
yet retain conceptual mastery.
Maintenance Feelings are necessarily for both acquisition and maintenance of 
mastery, but do not accompany each tokening of evaluative concepts. It is 
possible to acquire mastery of evaluative concepts and have the feelings 
associated with them only periodically, but not each time one is tokening the 
concept.
Necessary connection Feelings are necessary for acquisition and maintenance of 
mastery, and  also accompany each tokening of evaluative concepts. One must 
have the feelings associated with evaluative concept each time one is using it in 
thought.
I hold the middle one of these three theses. As is shown by the cases described in 
Chapter 3, mastery of concepts in humans does not survive absence or severe 
irregularity of sentiment for long. Our evaluative concepts need to be periodically 
refreshed by feelings. However, we have good reasons to think that sometimes I can 
102 One may ask (as Prof. Pink did) why, on a value realist position like Oddie's, sentiments are 
necessary for accessing values. For secondary quality theories, like McDowell's, the necessity is there 
because of a metaphysical link: one cannot describe what values are without reference to our 
sensibilities. But on a value realist view that sees values as primary qualities, there could be values 
even if our sensibilities were out of tune with them.
One could respond, on behalf of the primary quality value realist, that the same move is available to 
them, just at a different modal level and at the level of epistemology rather than metaphysics. Even if 
values are primary qualities, which exist independently of our sensibilities, their full description 
would involve a reference to potential sensibilities: values are such things that would motivate 
creatures with appropriate sensitivities. Primary quality values can exist independently of us, but if 
they exist and if creatures who respond to them exist, the description of epistemology would involve 
sentiments. This is brought out very well in Mackie's (1977) argument from queerness: the 'to-be-
pursuedness' of Platonic values is an essential ingredient in their description. (Mackie, of course, used 
this queerness as a reason to reject the existence of such values. But an alternative reading of his 
argument is to say that he, instead, has succeeded in identifying the distinguishing feature of values. 
Platonic values, if they exist, are a kind of thing that is unlike any other kind of thing – nothing 
counts as a value unless creatures which perceive it will pursue it. Cf. solid objects – nothing counts 
as one unless it has the feature of being extended.)
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token evaluative concepts without any sort of feeling.
5.2.2.1. Motivation to deny the first premise – contingency of sentiments makes moral 
demands contingent
The agreement that sentiments are important for evaluations among theorists who differ 
so much should make us think that there is, indeed, a link here. But, having shown how 
much agreement there is, one should also note eminent dissenters. Kant and various 
Kant-inspired theories (e.g. Korsgaard 1996) deny that sentiments are necessary for 
evaluations, and, in particular, for moral judgements. The main motivation for this 
denial is that morality based on sentiment is contingent: if sentiments are necessary for 
evaluations, and, in particular, for moral judgements, then hard-hearted or selfish 
people are excluded from moral demands. However, Kant-inspired theorists say that no 
one should be excluded from morality, lack as they might an adequate sensibility. This 
is a problem for traditional Humeanism, i.e. a theory which makes normative reasons 
depend on desires in such a way that if you don't want to do something, you don't have 
a reason to. For example, Derek is a selfish guy, who learns that it is in his interest to 
kill his business partner. Derek, driven by acquisition of gain and insensitive to moral 
concerns, wants to kill his business partner. If normative reasons depend on desires in 
the way that Humeans traditionally thought them to, Derek has a normative reason to 
kill his partner and he has no competing reason to refrain from doing so. This is very 
counter-intuitive: surely, Derek has a reason to refrain from killing, no matter what he 
wants. At this point one can see the appeal of a theory which denies that sentiments 
make a difference to what normative reasons one has.
There are actually two problems here. The first is that we have a clear intuition that 
sometimes I have a reason to do something even though I don't want to (and this lack of 
desire is not based on misunderstanding, bad reasoning, etc.). This is the Too Few 
Reasons problem, discussed, together with its counterpart, the Too Many Reasons 
problem, in Chapter 2. The second is a problem that specifically concerns Kant and 
Kantians: a moral insensitivity (selfishness, for example) should not excuse someone 
from doing what morality demands.
I have discussed the first problem in Chapter 2, and here I summarize my solution. I 
argued that normative reasons depend on sentiments indirectly, via evaluative concepts. 
Sentiments are necessary for mastery of evaluative concepts; these evaluative concepts 
then figure in evaluations. Our evaluations either constitute (on an irrealist account of 
value) or represent (on a realist account of value) our normative reasons. As a 
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consequence of spelling out the link between sentiments and evaluations in this way, it 
is literally true that I can have a reason to do what I don't want to do. Once I have 
mastery of evaluative concepts, I may do something – say, refrain from murder – 
because I think that murder is bad (i.e. because of my evaluation), not because 
refraining from murder promotes one of my current desires, and not because I actually 
have a desire to refrain from murder.
This does not yet solve the second problem, and one may object that although my 
account provides some distance between sentiments and normative reasons, the gap is 
not big enough to explain all problematic cases. According to my account, one still 
needs specific sentiments in order to master a range of evaluative concepts, so someone 
who has never felt guilt, remorse, etc. – and let's suppose Derek is like that – cannot 
make masterful moral evaluations, so still would not think that killing someone is a bad 
thing. In order to answer this objection, we need to explain why the evaluations of 
people with normal sentiments are better than evaluations made by those who have no 
guilt or remorse. The parallel with colour straightforwardly provides such an 
opportunity. Someone who can see colours can identify them in an immediate, 
phenomenal way simply by looking at them; a colour-blind person cannot. Here the 
fault is with someone who lacks the requisite sensibility, not with the world. If someone 
fails to perceive roses as red and murders as wrong, it does not mean that roses are 
devoid of colour and murders – of wrongness. Thus, we can explain what is wrong with 
the evaluations of a morally insensitive person if values are features of the world. The 
explanation would only run into trouble if we accepted that values were constituted by 
each person's individual sensibilities. So, as long as we are not forced to accept the 
latter view, we can explain why the moral judgements of a selfish person and the colour 
judgements of a colour-blind person are inferior to those of moral and sighted people.
Once we have a sentimentalist account that accepts that one can literally have a 
normative reason to do what they don't want to, and that someone who lacks moral 
sentiments is not automatically excluded from moral demands, we lose the motivation 
for denial of sentiments' importance.
5.2.2.2. Motivation to deny the first premise – problems for traditional theories
There may be still some reluctance to accept that sentiments are necessarily for 
evaluations because of the problems that sentimentalist theories traditionally face. I 
shall discuss two of them. First, I discuss the claim that our evaluations are constituted 
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by attitudes we hold, then I discuss non-cognitivism, and show that my account implies 
neither.
Constitutive Claim
There is a strong claim about the relationship between sentiments and evaluations.
Constitutive Claim: sentiments are necessary for evaluations because 
evaluations are constituted by sentiments.
Those who make evaluations depend on sentiments usually make a strong claim – that 
evaluations are constituted by sentiments (e.g. Hume 1738-1740,103 Ridge 2006). 
Whenever I sincerely say that killing is wrong, my declaration is necessarily 
accompanied by some sentiment which expresses my disapprobation. On the one hand, 
this is an advantage of the account, because it explains why evaluative judgements 
move us to act. On the other hand, it does not seem right: we ordinarily think that I can 
pass evaluative judgement sincerely and cold-headedly. I can say that murder is wrong, 
truly believe it, and feel nothing.
A limited Constitutive Claim is also defended by Sturgeon (2007), who, like myself, 
makes a parallel between phenomenal concepts and normative ones. According to 
Sturgeon, phenomenal concepts are realized by experiences they refer to, and normative 
concepts are realized by desire-like states of mind. If I am thinking about red 
phenomenally, I shall necessarily have the experience of red. If I am thinking about 
some normative things using normative concepts, I shall necessarily be in a desire-like 
state. For example, if I sincerely say 'One ought to be kind to children.', then I have a 
desire to be kind to children. I have this desire necessarily if my belief is individuated 
finely, i.e. by saying which concepts were used in it. There may be another way of 
referring to the same thing which does not use normative concepts; in this case, no 
desire necessarily follows. (Sturgeon 2007, p. 580.)
I do not wish to defend the Constitutive Claim. Although I agree with its proponents 
that sentiments are necessary for evaluations, I provide a different explanation of this 
necessity. I therefore hold a
Mastery Thesis: sentiments are necessary for evaluations because they 
provide evaluative concepts.
This thesis does not imply that I necessarily have a sentiment when I make an 
evaluation, and this, I think, is the correct result. It is shown very well by Stocker 
103 But see note 98.
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(1979) with his everyday examples of depression and procrastination. There is an even 
simpler way to bring this out. Suppose I say 'This girl is attractive, but I'm not attracted 
to her.' If the Constitutive Claim is correct, then I am talking nonsense: in the second 
clause I am denying exactly the sort of sentiment that the first clause implies. But it is a 
perfectly intelligible thing to say.
There is another reason to reject the Constitutive Claim, provided by the discussion of 
concept possession and concept mastery above. On some accounts of concept 
possession, Spock does have value concepts, he just does have mastery of them. If one 
accepts a theory with weak possession conditions for concepts, then nothing prevents 
Spock from making evaluative judgements without having the accompanying 
sentiments. Moreover, even when one has conceptual mastery, sentiments don't 
necessarily follow in each case. Occasionally I may use phenomenally derived 
concepts, which do not activate experiential templates. I can say that the girl is 
attractive without being attracted to her, because I have had an experience of being 
attracted to someone, and know what it feels like. Phenomenally derived concepts were 
introduced to solve the parallel problem in philosophy of mind. Someone can think 
truly, using a phenomenal concept: 'I am not perceiving or imagining this experience.' 
This made Papineau (2007) conclude that once acquired, phenomenal concepts do not 
necessarily activate a sensory template each time they are entertained. Thus, it is 
entirely possible that, having had sentiments, one can then use phenomenal concepts 
associated with them without necessarily feeling anything on that particular occasion.
So, my account does not force one to accept the Constitutive Claim. As noted earlier 
(Chapter 1, Part I, section 3.2), the token claim that each time I make a sincere 
evaluative judgement I must (to some extent) be motivated to act in accordance with it 
is false. Yet, the type claim that when I make a sincere evaluative judgement, this type 
of judgement is distinguished from other types by the fact that it will, when things go 
well, motivate me, is true. As Prinz (2006) notes, sometimes one can judge that killing 
is wrong without feeling any emotion whatsoever. But one cannot sincerely make this 
judgement without being disposed, under the right circumstances, to have a negative 
sentiment towards killing.
Non-cognitivism
Theories that emphasized the importance of sentiments in evaluation have often been 
accompanied by non-cognitivism, i.e. by rejection of the claim that our evaluative 
judgements are genuine beliefs. It should already be obvious that not everyone who 
129
makes sentiments necessary for evaluations is a non-cognitivist: virtue ethicists and 
value realists are not. Still, I'll go through the main problem for non-cognitivists – the 
Frege-Geach problem (Geach 1965, esp. pp. 463-464) to show that it does not apply to 
my account. The Frege-Geach problem is the following. If one thinks, as non-
cognitivists do, that evaluative judgements are expressions of sentiment rather than 
belief, then it is difficult to make sense of embedded clauses containing evaluations. 
For example, this is a valid piece of reasoning:
If lying is wrong, then getting your brother to lie is wrong.
Lying is wrong.
Therefore, getting you brother to lie is wrong.
The second premise is an assertion, and is interpreted by non-cognitivists as expressing 
disapproval of lying. But how is the first premise to be interpreted? There, a negative 
evaluation of lying is not asserted. One could hold the first premise to be true and 
approve of lying. The problem generalizes: how can a non-cognitivist explain anything 
other than non-embedded assertions? What about commands, questions and negations 
containing evaluative language?
Non-cognitivists develop responses to this problem, but I shall not evaluate them 
here.104 Instead, I shall use the Frege-Geach problem to distinguish my proposal from 
non-cognitivism. Accepting that sentiments are necessary for mastery of evaluative 
concepts does not entail non-cognitivism without making additional assumptions. The 
fact that Mary does not have mastery of colour concepts (on its own) does not mean 
that our colour judgements are non-cognitive. One would only think that if this thesis 
were combined with a subjectivist account of colours/values. But there are other 
options available: error theory, realism, or a dispositional account like that of 
McDowell. 
I shall now review the argument. My strategy was to remove the obstacles for believing 
that sentiments are necessary for evaluations, and use for support the wide consensus 
that they are necessary. I have argued that the usual reasons to reject that sentiments are 
necessary for evaluations do not apply to my account. If that is the case, there is (so far, 
at least) no reason to reject the claim that sentiments are necessary for evaluations. This 
concludes my defence of the first premise.
104 For example, Blackburn (1984) has proposed that attitudes have logic: it is inconsistent to disapprove 
of lying and to approve of getting others to do it. This response has been attacked by Hale (2002) who 
argues that one could rationally withhold judgement when there is not enough evidence – something 
that Blackburn's account does not allow.
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6. Possible objections
6.1. Rejecting empiricists' principle105
As noted, there is wide agreement that Mary gets new knowledge after her release. But 
this agreement is not universal – Dennett (2007) is a notable dissenter. He argues that 
Mary, given her vast knowledge, will be able to work out that red looks like this, where 
'this' refers to a perception of red or to its recreation in imagination. The same goes for 
Spock – given his vast knowledge, he will work out that indignation, for example, feels 
like this, where 'this' refers to actually being indignant or to recreating the feeling of 
indignation imaginatively. Neither of them would be missing anything. According to 
Dennett (Ibid., p. 15), the Mary case is not an argument, but 'an intuition pump'. Most 
people have the intuition that Mary is missing something; Dennett does not. He thinks 
that we may fail to share his intuition simply because it's difficult to imagine someone 
who has all the information about experiences, apart from having them. If we can't 
imagine that, then we can't have a reliable intuition about what such beings would and 
would not be able to deduce. The crux of the matter is the acceptance of the empiricists' 
principle: 'you can't deduce what a colour looks like if you've never seen one' (Dennett 
2007, p. 17).106
To illustrate his point, Dennett (2007) asks us to imagine RoboMary and Locked 
RoboMary. RoboMary is a robot who, unlike other robots of her make, lacks colour 
vision because she has no colour cameras in her eyes. She orders colour cameras, and, 
whilst she is waiting for them to arrive,  learns all about the vision of her robotkind. 
She notes, for example, the values in the colour registers of other robots when they are 
looking at ripe tomatoes, and changes the values of her own colour registers to match 
these; she does the same thing for other colours. So, when the colour cameras finally 
arrive, RoboMary learns nothing new. This may seem like cheating, since, in order to 
learn what colours look like, RoboMary had to change her colour register values, 
105 I thank Prof. Papineau for his help with this section.
106 Dennett's opposition to the Knowledge Argument has a deeper source. Dennett is a behaviourist, who 
believes that 'necessarily, if two organisms are behaviorally exactly alike, they are psychologically 
exactly alike' (Dennett 1993). Even a thermostat, according to Dennett, has beliefs and desires: it 
believes that the temperature is such and such and, if this belief does not correspond to the 
temperature it wants to have, it acts to fulfil its desire (1995). So, if Mary can identify colours as well 
as anyone who has seen them, but by a different method (using scientific instruments), we should 
conclude, according to Dennett, that she is not psychologically different from us.
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which, for a robot, is equivalent to experiencing colour. In order to try to show that 
there is no cheating involved, Dennett introduces Locked RoboMary. Locked 
RoboMary is a robot who has no colour vision because her colour registers are set to 
grayscale; moreover, the registers are locked, so she cannot change their values. Locked 
RoboMary, using her spare memory, creates a simulation of herself that has unlocked 
registers. Then she gets her simulated self to look at a ripe tomato, and notices that 
simulation goes into state B. RoboMary notes the differences between her own state 
and state B and 'puts herself into state B' (Dennett 2007, p. 28), thereby learning what 
red looks like. This is not cheating, Dennett says, because state B is not a state of colour 
experience, but a state caused by a colour experience state (Ibid.) Presumably he relies 
here on distinctness of cause and effect: if B is caused by a state of experiencing red, 
then, since cause and effect must be distinct, B is not a state of experiencing red.
At least two different authors made the following objection to Dennett. Beaton (2005) 
and Alter (2008) argue that RoboMary and her locked counterpart do cheat by putting 
themselves into the states that Dennett imagines.107 As Alter puts it,
[i]f the states Mary, RoboMary, or another Mary counterpart puts herself in – states 
that enable her to deduce what it’s like to see red – involve color phenomenology, 
then she cheats: she does not a priori deduce the phenomenology from physical 
information. If, however, the states she puts herself in do not involve color 
phenomenology, then it is hard to see how they would enable her to deduce the 
phenomenology. (Alter 2008, p. 253.)
What is it to deduce something a priori? Alter uses Hume's missing shade of blue as a 
good example of a priori deduction. One can deduce, using phenomenal information 
one already has and combining it with non-phenomenal information, what the missing 
shade would look like. This deduction does not involve the use of new phenomenal 
information. But Mary, intuitively, cannot do this – however much information is 
available to her, she cannot deduce what red would look like. This relies on a general 
gap between understanding and ability. Suppose I know which biochemical changes 
make rhesus monkeys alert. Still,
107 There are also a couple of worries about Dennett's examples which I leave aside. The first one is that, 
since Locked RoboMary's colour register values are locked, she cannot put herself in state B. Dennett 
admits that it is no easy feat, but Locked RoboMary is an 'clever, indefatigable, and nearly omniscient 
being' (2007, p. 28), so she can do it after all. The second worry is that building a simulation of 
herself is superfluous: Locked RoboMary could have just used another robot of her kind who had 
normal colour vision. By making Locked RoboMary build a simulation of herself, Dennett may have 
been playing on our intuitions of how close Mary and her simulated self (which is literally a part of 
her) are, so Dennett's illustration is also an intuition pump.
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there is no logical or physical entailment from the ability to understand what such 
changes consist in to the ability to initiate such changes by any act of conscious 
will. (Beaton 2005, p. 22.)
So, Dennett's robots do not endanger the fact that both Mary and Spock learn 
something new. I have also tried to win over people who are suspicious of the empirical 
principle by weakening it (section 4.1.). Even someone who rejects the 'one perception 
– one (mastery of) phenomenal concept' thesis may accept the 'no perception from a 
particular sense – no (mastery of) concepts delivered by that sense' thesis. I can also 
make my theory acceptable to someone who has no intuition that Mary learns 
something by retreating to an empirical claim. Maybe Spock, being perfectly rational 
and having unlimited memory, will be able to work out what sentiments are like 
without the need to have them. But this is not possible for limited creatures like us. If 
so, we have to have sentiments in order to have normative reasons, as I argued in 
section 5. And if this is the case, then a Kantian theory is wrong about us, humans. 
Even if it is possible in principle to have normative reasons without sentiments, it is 
impossible for creatures like us. If 'ought' implies 'can', then a Kantian theory is an ideal 
that we cannot, being human, reach, and ought not to.
6.2. Mastery and possession
In section 4.2, I have made a concession to social externalists: I admitted that Spock has 
evaluative concepts, but lacks mastery. I made this concession for two reasons. First, 
because I wanted my account to be compatible with weak conditions for concept 
possession, such as, for example, being reliably disposed to identify red in the presence 
of red objects. Secondly, sometimes it is difficult to decide whether one lacks a concept 
or just lacks mastery of it. It is unclear whether psychopaths, for example, possess 
moral concepts whilst lacking mastery of them, or whether they fail to possess moral 
concepts altogether. Another vivid example of the same kind comes from the case of 
CIP sufferers. CIP – congenital insensitivity to pain – is a rare condition in which 
people affected cannot feel pain. Such people find it very difficult to learn to correctly 
apply the concept of danger. They often put fingers in their eyes, bite through their 
tongue, or sit in a position that strains their joints (Lambert 2007). They also find it 
difficult attributing pain to other people when they see others receive bodily damage, 
although not when they also see peoples' pained expressions (Danzinger et al. 2006). 
CIP sufferers seem to have the concept of pain, yet lack mastery of it.
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However, now that I have accepted that Spock can possess evaluative concepts, my 
opponent may object that he can deliberate without having mastery.108 His practical 
deliberation may be enhanced by mastery of evaluative concepts, but, since he already 
possesses them, he does not need mastery to start the deliberation off. 
First, I'd like to note that the objection is not a big threat to my thesis. I can accept that  
Spock's deliberation will be enhanced, rather than created, when he acquires mastery. 
This option will, of course, distance my theory from traditional Humeanism even 
further, since traditional Humeans believe that sentiments are necessary for practical 
deliberation, not merely enhance it. I am happy about this consequence, because even a 
more limited claim that without sentiments one cannot deliberate well is still in 
opposition to rationalism. This is because rationalists are best understood as not just 
claiming that reasoning alone is all we need for deliberating, but also as claiming that 
reasoning alone is all we need for deliberating well. Rationalists do not want to say that 
we can do some so-so deliberating through reasoning alone, but we'll do better if we 
involved sentiments; in fact, they want to say the opposite. So, I could concede the 
point about enhancing deliberation, and retain a distinctive non-rationalistic theory. 
There is, however, a way of disarming the objection. I can deny that Spock can 
deliberate practically even though he possesses evaluative concepts with correct 
extensions. In order for this response to work, I need to say what practical deliberation 
consists in. I think it will be agreed on all sides that just thinking about actions does not 
count: thinking about the actions of a fictional character is not practical deliberation.  
Deliberation is practical if it is directed at answering the question of what I should do, 
i.e. practical deliberation must be capable of leading to rationally formed intentions.  
This statement of a necessary condition for practical deliberation is intuitive, and, I  
think, fairly uncontroversial. I shall now show that Spock's deliberation before he gains 
mastery fails to satisfy this condition. I have compared Spock's situation to that of a 
psychopath. Psychopaths may have moral concepts, yet with normative force 
bracketed: a psychopath may have the concept of what a moral thing to do is, but she is 
not motivated by this. Spock, similarly, has evaluative concepts, yet without 
motivational pull. Spock knows that other people are motivated by values, yet he 
himself is not motivated, in the same way that Mary knows what red is (in that she 
possesses the concept with the correct extension), yet she has not seen it herself. So, 
108 I owe this objection to Prof. Pink.
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even though Spock can correctly apply the term 'good' to a given course of action, he is 
not motivated by it because the concept is so applied. If being capable of rational 
motivation is a necessary condition for practical deliberation, then Spock cannot 
deliberate practically: he cannot rationally form an intention to follow a particular  
course of action. Knowing perfectly well what other people call 'good' and being able to 
apply the term to the things that it applies to does not automatically bring motivation. 109 
This response relies on a claim that I have not argued for explicitly, i.e. the claim that 
one has to have sentiments in order to be motivated. I am not going to provide a 
thorough-going defence of this claim here, because, as noted above, the objection is not 
a serious one, it just shows that my claims are unusual for a sentimentalist, and, 
secondly, because I am not entirely unhappy to retreat to the empirical level. Maybe 
Spock can deliberate in the absence of mastery, but we, human beings, cannot. As the 
case of psychopaths shows, people who have no mastery of evaluative concepts are not 
motivated by them. Moreover, in the human case, sentiments are necessary even for 
gaining a concept with the correct extension. This is illustrated by the fact that 
psychopaths, who lack what one may call 'moral emotions' over-extend moral concepts 
to conventional ones. CIP sufferers, mentioned at the beginning of this section, also 
help to illustrate the same point: they find it very difficult to keep track of dangerous 
things, and they also have some difficulty in attributing pain to others. So, if the reader 
is not convinced about what Spock can and cannot do (he is, after all, a being who is 
never inconsistent, never forgets anything, etc.), she should still accept that creatures 
like us are unable to deliberate practically without mastery of the relevant evaluative  
concepts.110
6.3. Mud, dirt, hair – the scope of the theory111
One question about any theory is its scope: which things does it apply to? This is one of 
the questions taken up in Plato's Parmenides. In this dialogue, Parmenides criticizes 
Plato's theory of forms. The theory is, very roughly, that there are abstract objects – the 
forms – that explain the values that we encounter. The form of Beauty explains why 
109 There may be some people who would say that if Spock is not motivated, then he does not have the 
concept 'good' at all. For reasons discussed in section 5.2.2.2., I think this is too strong. I do, however, 
agree with a weaker version of this claim: if Spock is never motivated by the good, then he does not 
have mastery of the concept 'good'.
110 I say 'relevant' evaluative concepts because psychopaths can engage in practical deliberation in  
general, they just seem unable to deliberate practically about moral matters (as long as we accept that  
ability to form moral intentions is a necessary condition for moral practical deliberation).
111 I thank my examiners, Dr Lillehammer and Prof. Wolff, for the comments that lead to a fuller 
discussion of this point and of the overall structure of the thesis.
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beautiful boys, wise men, beautiful pieces of knowledge are all beautiful. Parmenides 
then asks Socrates:




'And what about these, Socrates? Things that may seem absurd, like hair and mud 
and dirt, or anything else totally undignified and worthless? Are you doubtful 
about whether or not you should say that a form is separate for each of these, too, 
which in turn is other than anything we touch with our hands?' (Parm. 130b-d.)
What Parmenides wants to know is the scope of Socrates' proposal. Socrates says that 
his theory does not apply to such things, because they don't require explanation the way 
values do.
My critic, in a similar spirit, could question the scope of my theory. It may be true, they 
could say, that in order to have conceptual mastery of, say, 'rude' or 'unjust', one has to 
have the relevant experience. One cannot, to adapt Foot's (1958) example, fully grasp 
what is rude without ever having been offended, nor can one fully understand what is 
unjust without ever having felt indignation. But the need for experience might 
disappear when we get to a high enough level of abstraction – to such thin concepts as 
'good' or 'moral'. The same goes for 'colour' in the Mary case. Oxford Dictionary Online 
defines colour as 'the property possessed by an object of producing different sensations 
on the eye as a result of the way it reflects or emits light'. It is not clear why Mary 
before her release cannot understand this definition as well as anyone who has seen 
colours. I have talked about phenomenal concepts as requiring to have had the relevant 
experience. It may be plausible for more specific concepts, such as 'indignant', but what 
is the relevant experience in the case of general concepts, such as 'good'? My response 
is that understanding of genera is enhanced by understanding of species. This claim can 
be cashed out by reference to the identification and application of generic concepts, but, 
as I show below, one cannot use the issue of application in order to answer the 




The first issue is that Mary and Spock will be unable to identify even general, rather 
than particular, colours and values without the help of test subjects. It is true that Mary 
before her release can understand the definition of colour given above. Yet it lacks 
depth, as the following demonstrates. Mary, let us suppose, has conceptual mastery of 
'colour', but not of individual colours. Spock, let us suppose, has conceptual mastery of 
'good', but not of 'injustice', 'deliciousness', etc. Faced with an unfamiliar object, Mary 
would not be able to identify whether it is coloured without her instruments.112 Her 
instruments must be calibrated with the help of test subjects who have mastery of 
colour concepts. Faced with an unfamiliar action, Spock would not be able to identify it 
as good without some test subjects, whose reactions he can observe – after all, the 
action's features fail to evoke a typical response in him. To enhance the parallel 
between that and the Mary case, we can give Spock an instrument that identifies which 
sentimental response a subject who possess sentiments would make. But this method is 
just a more indirect way of getting test subjects, since such subjects would be needed 
for the calibration of Spock's instruments.113 Given this issue with identification, it is 
not clear that Mary and Spock can have conceptual mastery even of generic concepts, 
species of which require undergoing certain experiences. (Mary here may be in a better 
position than Spock – she can, after all, make colour judgements that are at least 
extensionally correct. It is less clear that Spock's judgements will be extensionally 
correct. As the study of psychopaths discussed in the previous chapter suggests, even 
mastering such general concepts as 'moral' requires a wide range of sentiments, at least 
in humans. Spock, however, is not human, so he may possess value concepts with 
correct extensions.)
Application
The second issue is that of application. Suppose we admit that Spock (much the same 
would apply to Mary) can make extensionally correct value judgements. We can also 
concede to the opponent that Spock has mastered general concepts such as 'good' or 
'moral' – after all, these concepts are less clearly connected to sentiments. Would Spock 
112 To give plausibility to this situation, Mary must be colour blind, rather than confined to a black and 
white room. Otherwise she will gain mastery of the colour concept immediately on seeing the 
coloured object.
113 One has to be careful in picking the right test subjects for calibrating one's instruments. Colour blind 
people will be unsuitable for Mary, psychopaths – for Spock. It is not clear to me that Mary and 
Spock can complete even the task of picking suitable participants without the help of someone who 
already has mastery of colour or evaluative concepts, respectively.
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be able to apply the generic concepts when faced with particular cases? Can one grasp 
that a brave act is good without mastery of the concept 'brave'? A negative answer to 
this question requires a metaphysical commitment about values. Hurley (1989) is one 
making such a commitment to non-centralism, i.e. the idea that the general concepts 
(such as 'colour' and 'right') and specific ones (such as 'red' and 'just') are 
interdependent. Neither is prior to the other, but when they are grasped, they must be 
grasped together. Here is a short summary of Hurley's complex argument, which makes 
parallels between ethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. Meaning, 
evaluation and intentional action are not self-interpreting; these activities are only 
possible within some interpretation. But any interpretation must involve both formal 
and substantive constraints. Hurley argues – successfully, in my view – against a 
pervasive tendency to smuggle in substantive assumptions under the guise of formal 
requirements. So, when we are evaluating something (i.e. engaging in a particular type 
of interpretative activity), we have substantive ethical constraints which are 
interdependent with our specific evaluation. They are interdependent because without 
one or the other we would not be evaluating. This is essentially connected with 
Wittgensteinian idea of an 'austere conception of objectivity' (Hurley 1989, p. 226), i.e. 
the secondary-quality metaphysics of value, also popularized by McDowell (1998). 
This explanation is not available to me if I am to stay metaphysically neutral. Still, the 
previous point – that Spock cannot identify even generic values without the help of test 
subjects – holds, and requires no metaphysical commitments to what values are.
There is another way of pressing what is essentially the same objection. I have argued 
that evaluative concepts are phenomenal concepts: in order to master an evaluative 
concept, I must have had the relevant experience. But what is 'the relevant experience'? 
This is a fair question, yet I cannot answer it here to my satisfaction. This is because we 
lack a taxonomy both of sentiments and of evaluative concepts. Contemporary 
philosophical discussion of the latter tends to concentrate on generic evaluative 
concepts, such as 'right', 'ought', and 'moral'. Not many authors (Hurley is an exception) 
explicitly discuss the relationship between different evaluative concepts.114 Something 
similar can be said about the taxonomy of sentiments. A lot of work has been done on 
114 Discussions about the unity of virtue – i.e. Aristotle's thesis that someone who possesses one virtue 
will necessarily possess them all (NE 1144b-1145a2) – may be a helpful place to start when trying to 
provide a taxonomy of moral concepts. According to this idea, if not all evaluative concepts, then at 
least moral ones are interrelated in such a way that you cannot master them separately. Once you fully 
grasp one moral concept, you fully grasp its relationships with other moral concepts, too. However, as 
Badhwar (1996) points out, the idea of the unity of virtue is not uncontroversial: Williams, for 
example, takes its rejection, i.e. the claim that one can have one virtue without having all of them, a 
platitude (1985, p. 36).
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distinguishing 'the basic emotions'. Ekman (1989) lists happiness, sadness, fear, anger, 
surprise, and disgust, but this list is not universally accepted. Moreover, I have spoken 
not about emotions, but about a broader category of sentiments, so a classification of 
emotions is going to be only one part of the task. We need a taxonomy of evaluative 
concepts, a taxonomy of sentiments, and only then it is possible to work out the 
relationship between the two in satisfying detail. This, obviously, is a huge task, but, in 
my view, a necessary one for any sentimentalist account to be credible. Empirical 
studies will be of help here – e.g. autistic children lack empathy, yet are moral (e.g. 
Blair (1996) showed that autistic children do make the moral/conventional distinction). 
I have provided at least one case study in support of my view: as I argued in Chapter 3, 
psychopaths do fail to master moral concepts, which is best explained by a deficit in 
emotions such as guilt and remorse.
There is also new empirical evidence that, in humans, even such abstract concepts as 
permissibility require sentiments.115 Patients with damage to the ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (VMPFC), discussed in the previous chapter, also appear to have an 
unusual (by comparison to those whose emotions are normal) extension of a particular 
type of evaluative concepts: moral concepts.116 Koenigs et al. (2007) found that patients 
with VMPFC damage have abnormal moral judgements: unlike controls, they judge 
personal moral harms to be permissible. This is illustrated by the trolley/footbridge 
cases. In the trolley case, you can save five lives by flipping a switch, so that a runaway 
trolley changes direction; this would, however, result in the death of one person on 
another track. The footbridge scenario is the same, apart from the fact that you stop the 
trolley from reaching the five people by pushing a man off the footbridge. Once he is 
115 This complements the discussion in the previous chapter. There, I concentrated on two particular 
studies – Iowa Gambling Task and Blair's study of the moral/conventional distinction, because both 
have been widely discussed in the literature. However, I argued that the Iowa Gambling Task does not  
actually show what Damasio and other sentimentalists take it to show, i.e. that the best explanation of 
patients' behaviour is that they lack somatic markers. The aim of discussion there was to invite a 
certain caution first, about interpretation of studies, and, secondly, about presenting the Iowa 
Gambling Task as uncontroversially supporting sentimentalism; as we have seen, an equally good 
rationalist explanation of the study's results is available. Blair's study of the moral/conventional 
distinction, whilst unquestionably philosophically interesting, has recently become controversial. 
Dolan and Fullam (2010) have only partially replicated Blair's results. They found that the only 
dimension on which psychopaths in young offenders' institutions failed to distinguish between moral 
and conventional transgressions was authority-dependence. On other dimensions, such as seriousness, 
permissibility and justification, the performance of those with high psychopathic tendencies did not 
differ significantly from controls. Moreover, Aharoni et al. (2011) found that prisoners with high 
psychopathy scores were no worse than controls at distinguishing between moral and conventional 
norm violations. (Although Aharoni et al.'s study used a different method from Blair's.) Thus, this 
discussion brings in more recent evidence of psychopaths' moral abilities.
116 I am interested in evaluative concepts in general, rather than moral concepts in particular. However, I  
concentrate on moral concepts here because they are well-researched and because it is less obvious 
that sentiments are required for mastery for such abstract concepts (cf. 'tasty').
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pushed onto the tracks, his body stops the trolley. Normally, people say it is permissible 
to stop the trolley by using the switch, but impermissible to stop it by pushing the man 
onto the tracks. People with VMPFC damage tend to say that both are permissible. 
Researchers hypothesize that this is because VMPFC patients' emotions are impaired: 
contemplating pushing a person off the bridge 'would normally evoke a strong social 
emotion', leading to judgement of impermissibility' (Koenigs et al. 2007, p. 910). 
VMPFC patients have dulled emotions (participants in this particular study had 
impaired empathy, embarrassment and guilt), so they fail to think that the action is  
impermissible:
Normal pattern: personal harm – emotional response – it is not permissible to do this.
VMPFC patients' pattern: personal harm – no emotional response – it is permissible to 
do this.117
Other studies support the idea that these judgements are due to emotional deficits. 
Ciaramelli et al. (2007) replicated this result, as well as showing that it was due to 
emotional rather than cognitive deficits (such as impulsiveness or working memory 
problems). Martins et al. (2012) studied patients with traumatic brain injury, whose 
lesions were not constrained to VMPFC area. They found a positive correlation 
between difficulties in emotional processing and rating personal harms as more 
permissible.
Thus, patients with VMPFC damage over-extend the concept 'permissible actions', and 
they do so because their emotions are impaired. These agents can still make moral 
judgements – they provide normal responses to the trolley problem – but they have a 
selective deficit, as shown by deviant responses about personal harms. And this shows 
that emotional experiences play a role in determining extension of at least some abstract  
moral concepts. Further evidence for the same claim comes from studies of 
psychopaths' moral judgements.
Psychopaths' moral judgements diverge from those made by non-psychopaths. First, 
they judge accidental harms as more morally permissible. For example, if I put some 
white grainy substance that is labelled 'sugar' into a colleague's coffee cup, and my 
colleague dies as a result (because, as it turns out, the substance was highly toxic), 
117 I do not mean that VMPFCs patients' judgements are incorrect. All that is important for my purposes 
is that their moral judgement differs from normal because of deficiencies in emotional experience.  
This shows that our moral concepts depend on ability to experience emotions. This admission opens 
up an option that is commonly neglected: that patients with VMPFC damage are moral, but their 
morality is different from ours. The studies' results are them taken to show that a moral concepts of 
normal, non-brain-damaged humans, are dependent on normal sentiments.
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psychopaths tend to say that this is permissible, whilst non-psychopaths tend to say it is 
not (Young et al. 2012). Secondly, psychopaths are more likely than non-psychopaths 
to endorse impersonal harms.118 For example, most people say it is ok to divert the 
trolley by pushing the switch, yet psychopaths do so more readily than others. 
Psychopaths with low anxiety also make the same judgements as patients with VMPFC 
damage in personal harm cases, such as the footbridge case.
These studies show that even in the case of abstract moral concepts – the traditional 
domain of rationalists – sentiments are important, since human agents with abnormal 
sentiments have deviant extensions of the concept of permissibility.
So far I have presented a thesis that is fairly general: in order to master evaluative 
concepts, one has to have had certain sentiments. However, there are different ways of 
making this thesis more substantial. This may be necessary in order to clarify the 
relationship between the arguments presented in this chapter and the previous one. 
Suppose, for example, that values are natural properties of things. In this case, it is not 
clear why Spock cannot make masterful evaluations even though he lacks sentiments, 
contrary to the conclusion of the argument in section 5.2. There are several things I can 
do in order to answer this objection.
First, instead of staying neutral on the metaphysics of value, I could, like McDowell 
(1985) and Prinz (2007) liken values to secondary qualities.119 If a virtuous action 
cannot be understood except in relation to the sensibilities of those who classify it as 
such, Spock, who does not share this sensibility, will be unable to master the concept of 
virtue. Virtuous actions will be as much of a mystery to him as the distinctive 
phenomenology of colours is to the colour blind. If this option is taken, the arguments 
presented in sections 5.2 and 5.1 of this chapter are the main thrust of the thesis about 
mastery, whilst real cases described in Chapter 3 play supporting, illustrative role.
I am not attracted to this option because it entails what Lillehammer calls 'an air of  
relativism' (Lillehammer 2011, p.64). That is, the secondary-quality view of values 
allows for as many competing evaluative outlooks as there are differing sensibilities, 
118 These results directly contradict those of Cima et al. (2010), who found no differences between 
psychopaths' and non-psychopaths' patterns of judgement in these cases. Koenigs et al. (2012) 
explain this discrepancy by the difference in what they and Cima et al. defined as 'psychopathy': 
Koenigs et al. used a higher cutoff score for psychopathy. Indeed, when Koenigs et al. used the same 
score as Cima et al., they found no difference in judgement, either. This suggests that someone with 
psychopathic tendencies, but not classed as a psychopath, may exhibit the normal pattern of moral 
judgement, whereas someone classed as a psychopath does not.
119 In fact, this metaphysical commitment may be considered necessary for my thesis to go through. I 
rebut this suggestion in note 103 above.
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each of these outlooks being as justified as another.
Secondly, one could turn to language, and argue that sentiments are part of the meaning 
of evaluative concepts (e.g. Blackburn 1998, Prinz 2007). According to this view, one 
does not know what 'right' is unless one (always, or at least typically) has some 
negative feeling when one uses this concept in a sincere assertion in a certain type of 
proposition.120 If this option is taken, the arguments of this thesis play out in the same 
way as in the case of secondary-quality theory of value, with the arguments about 
empirical studies playing supplementary role.
There are several problems associated with this option, two of them already discussed. 
First, I can make dispassionate evaluations (section 5.2.2.2.), although this problem is 
avoided by the weaker version of the view, which requires that I have the sentiment 
only typically. Secondly, the feelings one has when using concepts are closely 
connected with motivation. Thus, the Too Many and Too Few Reasons problems, 
discussed in Chapter 2, re-appear. Thirdly, this option is usually coupled with an even 
more austere metaphysics than the secondary-quality theory of value: one's values are 
taken to be constituted by the sentiments one has. This allows for even more competing 
theories of value, criticisms of which are a matter of personal preference.
Instead of turning to metaphysics or to a thesis about meaning of evaluative terms, one 
could restrict the mastery thesis to a certain type of agents. The mastery thesis may fail 
to apply to perfectly rational aliens like Spock, but it applies to agents who are human 
and sufficiently similar.121 I am attracted to this last option, since it avoids the problems 
of the first two. It does not require a link between motivation and evaluation that I find 
objectionably strong. Nor does it exclude the possibility of values as primary qualities. 
This possibility is required for robust justification and criticism of competing 
evaluative outlooks.122 If this option is taken, then empirical arguments of the previous 
chapter provide the main support for the mastery thesis, whilst the arguments of section 
5.2, which requires a commitment to a specific metaphysics of value, does not go 
through.
120 ' A certain type' means that questions, conditionals, etc. are excluded, and what one may call 'basic'  
moral propositions, such as 'Murder is wrong.', are included.
121 We find out whether an agent is sufficiently similar to us by running the experiments to establish 
whether these agents' evaluative concepts change extension and whether they lead to motivation if the 
agents' sentiments are abnormal.
122 I do assume that we need to have objective values in order to justify our pre-philosophical talk about 
good reasons. But I had little chance to explore the irrealist cognitivist suggestion (Skorupski 1999) 
that one should, instead, settle on the question of what truth is first. Accepting a minimalist theory of 
truth might allow us to justify fully our talk of good reasons without there being any.
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Obviously, empirical arguments are only as good as the current empirical evidence, but 
that is an acceptable, if not a necessary, risk when one is primarily interested in human 




I have argued that someone who lacks sentiments will be unable to gain mastery of 
evaluative concepts by making a parallel with the Knowledge Argument in philosophy 
of mind. I have also shown why this lack of mastery is important: such a being will be 
unable to have (access to)  normative reasons for action.
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Conclusion
My question has been: what sort of beings respond to good reasons for action? In so far 
as we are such beings, the question is about us, humans. I have argued that, in order for 
us to respond to good reasons, we need sentiments. This is so because sentiments 
provide mastery of evaluative concepts, which then figure in our evaluations. 
Depending on which metaphysics one has, these evaluations either constitute one's 
normative reasons for action or represent them.
This answer belongs to a sentimentalist camp. I argued for sentimentalism by showing, 
in Chapter 1, that a purely formal rationalist theory fails to explain how we respond to 
good reasons. There I have argued that a rationalist theory must say that one must be 
equally motivated to follow equally consistent but opposing courses of action. 
Sentimentalism is also supported by empirical studies – the existence of psychopaths, 
who are rational yet amoral, is best explained by a sentimentalist theory (Chapter 3). I 
have also shown that my brand of sentimentalism overcomes traditional problems 
(Chapters 2 and 4). In doing so, I have provided a distinctive theory that links 
normative reasons for action with sentiments. This link, as I have shown, is best 
understood not in terms of having reasons to do what promotes my desires, but in terms 
of mastery of evaluative concepts.
With this I answer the question posed at the start: what sort of beings do we have to be 
in order to do things, and often for good reasons? Such beings must have a capacity for 
sentiment; a capacity for reasoning alone will not do the job.
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